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Student Free Speech Rights: What They Can and Cannot Say in Public Schools

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Students do not give up their First Amendment right to free speech when they enter a public school. A school cannot ban an unpopular political message just to avoid controversy, the Supreme Court ruled in 1969 in a case about students who wore black armbands to protest U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Those rights have limits. A school can discipline speech that materially disrupts classwork, a lewd speech at an assembly or a message it can reasonably read as promoting illegal drug use, and it can control what a class newspaper prints for legitimate teaching reasons. Courts are more skeptical when a school regulates off-campus speech, such as a weekend social media post, though threats and serious targeted bullying may still be open to discipline.

Political disagreement is protected, even at school

In December 1965, students in Des Moines, Iowa, planned to wear black armbands to oppose the Vietnam hostilities and support a truce. School principals adopted a rule requiring students to remove the armbands or face suspension, and students who wore them were sent home.

On February 24, 1969, the Supreme Court ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that the quiet, passive protest was protected by the First Amendment. The Court said students and teachers do not shed their constitutional speech rights at the schoolhouse gate.

To justify banning an expression of opinion, the Court said, a school must show something more than a desire to avoid the discomfort that comes with an unpopular viewpoint. Nothing in the case gave school officials reason to forecast substantial disruption, and the armbands caused discussion outside classrooms but no interference with schoolwork and no disorder.

Tinker also said schools cannot confine students to officially approved sentiments or treat them as recipients of only the ideas the state chooses to communicate.

In a 2021 case about a student’s weekend social media post, Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Supreme Court called public schools the “nurseries of democracy” and said representative democracy works only if the free exchange of ideas is protected, including unpopular ideas.

Disruption, lewd speech and drug messages have different rules

Under Tinker, student conduct is not shielded from school discipline when it materially disrupts classwork, creates substantial disorder or invades the rights of others. That limit turns on what the expression does in school, not on whether an administrator objects to the idea.

Tinker considered whether facts could reasonably lead officials to forecast substantial disruption, as well as whether disruption had actually occurred. So a school does not have to wait until a disturbance has happened. A school needs a factual reason for its forecast, rather than an assumption that a controversial message will cause trouble.

Under Tinker, the time, place or type of behavior can be what makes a student’s conduct disruptive, in class or out of it. Expressing opposition to a policy and interrupting a lesson to deliver that message are different situations. The American Civil Liberties Union is a civil liberties advocacy organization that defends freedoms including speech and religion. When students walk out of class to protest, the American Civil Liberties Union’s guidance says, schools can typically discipline them for missing class but cannot impose a harsher punishment because of the protest’s political message.

In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, decided July 7, 1986, the Supreme Court allowed a school to punish a student for an offensively lewd, sexually explicit speech to a teenage audience at a high school assembly. The Court distinguished that speech from the political armbands in Tinker and said the penalties were unrelated to any political viewpoint. The Court also quoted historians describing public education’s role in preparing pupils for citizenship and teaching habits of civility needed for self-government.

Morse v. Frederick, decided June 25, 2007, concerned a “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner that students unfurled at a school-sanctioned, school-supervised event. The principal confiscated the banner and later suspended a student who refused to take it down. The Supreme Court’s Morse majority allowed schools to safeguard students from speech reasonably regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote separately that he joined the opinion on the understanding that it gave no support for restricting speech that can plausibly be read as commenting on a political or social issue, including drug legalization. Alito also rejected a broad rationale allowing censorship whenever student speech conflicts with a school’s educational mission. Debating whether a drug should be legal is different from encouraging students to use it illegally.

A class assignment or school newspaper is a different setting

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, decided January 13, 1988, students challenged the removal of newspaper pages containing articles about pregnancy and divorce. The newspaper was written and edited by a journalism class as part of the school’s curriculum.

Hazelwood drew a line between requiring a school to tolerate a student’s personal expression and requiring it to promote expression that students, parents or the public might reasonably see as carrying the school’s approval. The opinion places supervised publications and other expressive activities designed to teach knowledge or skills in this school-sponsored category, even outside a traditional classroom. A student’s right to write something does not automatically include a right to have the school publish it.

For school-sponsored expressive activities, Hazelwood permits editorial control over style and content when reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, meaning concerns about teaching and learning. For an assignment, the relevant question is how the disputed expression relates to the learning task and its requirements.

The Supreme Court ruled for the school district in Hazelwood, holding that the students’ First Amendment rights had not been violated and reversing the Eighth Circuit. In the case itself, the Court said it was not unreasonable for the principal to conclude that one article’s frank talk about students’ sexual histories and birth control was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen.

The Hazelwood opinion explains that a public forum, a space intentionally opened for public expression, is not created merely by allowing limited discussion. The Court examined the school board’s policy placing sponsored publications within the curriculum and regular classroom activities. The label “student newspaper” alone does not answer whether the school is sponsoring the speech or providing a forum for students to speak for themselves.

The American Civil Liberties Union’s student speech guidance says public school students may hand out flyers and petitions, provided they do not disrupt the school’s functioning or violate content-neutral policies. A content-neutral rule does not distinguish between speech based on its message or rest on disagreement with that message. An independently produced leaflet does not automatically become the school’s own publication merely because a student distributes it at school.

The federal constitutional rule is not necessarily the full extent of a student journalist’s protection. State law or a publication’s own policy can change the answer in a censorship dispute, so check both. The Student Press Law Center lists eighteen states with legislation protecting public high school student press freedom, including California. In California, for example, Education Code section 48907 protects public and charter school pupils’ speech and press, including expression in official publications whether or not the school supports them financially or with its facilities. Section 48907 also requires a local written publications code with reasonable provisions about the time, place and manner of these activities, meaning when, where and how they happen.

California’s law does not protect expression that is obscene, libelous or slanderous. It also prohibits material that incites pupils so as to create a clear and present danger of unlawful acts on school premises, violations of lawful school rules or substantial disruption of the school. Libel generally involves written or recorded defamatory statements, while slander generally involves spoken statements. Obscenity is a legal category, not a synonym for mere vulgarity. The incitement exception covers expression that urges those acts, not discussion of a controversial subject.

A weekend post can reach school without becoming school speech

The Mahanoy case, decided June 23, 2021, began when high school student B.L. failed to make the varsity cheerleading squad and posted vulgar criticism of the school and the squad on Snapchat while visiting a convenience store over the weekend. After learning of the posts, school officials suspended her from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the upcoming year. The Supreme Court affirmed that the school violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court found no evidence of substantial disruption or threatened harm to others’ rights, although students discussed the posts briefly in algebra and some cheerleaders were upset. The Court also explained that B.L.’s crude criticism was not constitutionally obscene. The fact that school officials could sanction the lewd assembly speech in Fraser did not decide the legality of this weekend punishment.

Mahanoy explains that off-campus speech normally falls within parental responsibility, and extending school rules beyond campus risks regulating everything a student says throughout the day. The opinion says courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech, and that a school has a heavy burden to justify stepping in when political or religious speech takes place outside school or a school program or activity. A post’s eventual arrival in a classroom does not by itself establish that the school may punish it.

Mahanoy nevertheless identifies serious or severe targeted bullying or harassment, threats to students or teachers, rules for online school activities and breaches of school security as potential grounds for off-campus regulation. The Supreme Court left future cases to decide where, when and how an off-campus location makes the critical difference.

The Ninth Circuit covers Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington, as well as Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.

Federal appeals court decisions bind lower courts within the same circuit. In Chen v. Albany Unified School District, decided December 27, 2022, one federal appeals court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, rejected First Amendment claims by students who had been disciplined for off-campus social media posts. The case involved a supposedly private Instagram account with racist and violent posts targeting particular Black classmates. The court found that the posts in that case had a sufficient connection to the school for discipline: because electronic messages are easy to copy or show to others, it was foreseeable that the posts would reach their targets, with significant effects on students and the school. Calling an account private did not erase that connection.

A school’s authority to discipline, its exposure to a damages lawsuit and a prosecutor’s authority to obtain a criminal conviction are separate questions. Applying the test for one to the others can make a school’s power look larger or smaller than it is.

Title IX is the federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, subject to its statutory exceptions. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided May 24, 1999, the Supreme Court said a school can owe damages under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment only when the behavior is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it denies its victims equal access to education. The opinion says simple teasing or name-calling, even targeting gender differences, does not meet that damages threshold. This does not make every lesser incident constitutionally protected or require schools to wait for that level of harm before responding.

Under Davis, a school can be liable for deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment, but the opinion says administrators do not have to take any particular disciplinary action to avoid liability. A school’s response, or lack of one, counts as deliberately indifferent only when it is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. Whether a school’s response violates a student’s speech rights is a separate question that depends on the expression, its connection to school and the speech rule that applies.

Counterman concerned a man prosecuted for sending repeated Facebook messages to a singer, including messages envisioning violent harm, after she repeatedly tried to block him. In Counterman v. Colorado, decided June 27, 2023, the Supreme Court said true threats are not protected by the First Amendment and described them as serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence.

For a criminal true-threat prosecution, Counterman requires proof that the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the communication would be viewed as threatening violence. That mental state is called recklessness, and the Court held that it is enough; the state does not have to prove any more demanding form of intent to threaten. That requirement governs criminal prosecutions; Counterman was not a case about school discipline. At the same time, describing an unwelcome opinion as threatening does not itself answer the legal question.

Colleges, private schools and teachers need separate answers

In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, decided March 19, 1973, a graduate student had been expelled for distributing on campus a newspaper said to contain indecent speech. The Supreme Court held that the expulsion violated her First Amendment rights and sent the case back with instructions to restore her earned credits and reinstate her unless valid academic reasons barred it. Papish reaffirms that a state university cannot suppress ideas merely because they offend good taste or conventions of decency. Criticism in a college publication is therefore not punishable simply because administrators consider its content offensive. A university can still enforce reasonable rules on the time, place and manner of speech and distribution.

Hazelwood expressly left undecided whether the same degree of deference, or leeway for administrators, applies to school-sponsored expression at colleges and universities. So Hazelwood does not settle whether the high school newspaper rule applies to a college publication.

The First Amendment ordinarily limits government action, not private persons, although a private entity can qualify as a state actor, meaning it is treated as the government, in limited circumstances. That is why the rules for public schools do not automatically apply at a private school.

State law can add protection for private school students. In California, Education Code section 48950 bars a private secondary school from disciplining a high school pupil solely for speech that would be protected from government restriction off campus. The section includes an exception for religiously controlled private secondary schools to the extent applying it would conflict with the organization’s religious tenets. Section 48950 also permits discipline for harassment, threats or intimidation unless constitutionally protected and recognizes reasonable rules about the time, place and manner of speech.

Teachers and other public school employees do not give up their speech rights by taking the job, but not every work-related statement is protected. Garcetti involved a supervising deputy district attorney who recommended dismissing a prosecution after concluding that a search-warrant affidavit contained serious misrepresentations. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, decided May 30, 2006, the Supreme Court said public employees who make statements as part of their official job duties are not speaking as citizens, and the First Amendment does not shield those statements from employer discipline. Employees who speak as citizens on a matter of public concern may have a First Amendment claim, subject to the employer’s justification for treating them differently.

Garcetti expressly left open whether the same analysis applies to speech related to scholarship or teaching. How the First Amendment applies to what a teacher says in the classroom is therefore not settled by that case.

A challenge starts with the expression and the school’s reason

A useful first step is to identify the expression being restricted and the reason the school gives. Ask what rule was applied, what evidence supports the school’s reason and how the expression connects to its educational responsibilities. A disagreement about a political message calls for different evidence from a dispute over curriculum, attendance or targeted online harm.

The Student Press Law Center’s guide recommends keeping a paper trail, summarizing meetings, preserving documents and storing copies of censored material safely. For a censorship dispute, the guide recommends a formal written objection asking the administrator to reconsider.

The Student Press Law Center offers a free hotline for student-journalism legal questions and asks that urgent matters, such as imminent censorship, be flagged in the request.

A federal law, Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, allows a lawsuit against someone who, acting under the authority of state law, deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. It does not turn every disagreement with a school into a winning constitutional lawsuit.

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