Is the US on a War Footing with Venezuela?

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US forces struck Venezuela on January 3, 2026, and captured President Nicolás Maduro, who was taken to the United States for prosecution. Congress has not declared war on Venezuela, and Venezuela answered on January 3, 2026 with an emergency decree ordering military mobilization, not a declaration of war. A country on a war footing is ready or preparing to fight a war.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said the United States is at war with drug-trafficking organizations, not with Venezuela; Venezuela’s ambassador to the United Nations called the raid an illegitimate armed attack. Maduro’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, took power as acting president, leaving another member of his government in charge. If Washington prepares to use more force to replace that remaining government, it would face the larger task a Brookings analyst describes: changing a regime is harder and riskier than seizing its leader.

The raid was real, but it was not the whole relationship

On January 3, 2026, American military strikes supported the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and their transport to the United States for criminal prosecution. In Caracas during the January 3, 2026 assault, explosions and low-flying aircraft sent people rushing into the streets, according to Associated Press reporting published by PBS. Associated Press-verified video showed tracers and smoke, and a photograph documented smoke rising at La Carlota airport that day.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ January 9, 2026 imagery analysis reported two identified civilian deaths and damage to residential buildings in Caracas during the January 3 operation. Those are identified civilian cases within an analysis of selected strike sites. Reuters reported on January 16, 2026 that Venezuela’s defense minister said forty-seven Venezuelan soldiers were killed in the raid; it also reported the interior minister’s earlier figure of one hundred deaths, without a military breakdown.

Congress has not formally declared war against Venezuela: the Senate’s current account of declarations says the last formal US declaration was during World War II. Venezuela’s January 3, 2026 official decree declared an external emergency in response to the US attack and ordered national military mobilization and stronger border patrols. The decree declared an emergency, not war on the United States, and does not by itself show whether a declaration came later. In its analysis of the raid, the Brennan Center for Justice stated that Venezuela had not declared a state of war with the United States or attacked US territory or military facilities. The absence of a US declaration does not mean that hostilities have not occurred or that congressional war powers disappear.

In a January 4, 2026 White House account, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States was fighting drug-trafficking organizations, not waging war against Venezuela. Mark Cancian’s January 5, 2026 analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies described a raid in which US forces withdrew while Maduro’s officials remained in charge. Removing a leader and determining who governs afterward are different tasks. A withdrawal after a raid is also not a promise about where American troops would serve later.

Two earthquakes struck Venezuela on June 24, 2026; the Pan American Health Organization’s September 18 situation report listed a preliminary death toll of 6,301. A July 2026 Air Force account says the 621st Contingency Response Wing had completed a disaster-relief deployment at Simón Bolívar International Airport. The unit worked with local aviation authorities to manage airfield operations and move relief supplies. A military presence can therefore serve a cooperative mission as well as a coercive one; the presence alone does not identify the objective.

A September 2, 2026 Pentagon account described Operation Southern Spear as a continuing military campaign against drug-trafficking organizations across the Western Hemisphere. Its report for April 1 through June 30 listed eight Navy and Marine Corps vessels, a patrol and reconnaissance aircraft squadron and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with three vessels shifted to Venezuelan earthquake relief in late June. That count covers one quarter of a regional operation; it is not a measure of forces in or near Venezuela now.

UPI reported that Southern Command announced a Caribbean strike on October 4, 2026, saying it killed four people it described as narco-terrorists. A regional counterdrug strike has a different stated target from the raid that captured Venezuela’s president.

Washington’s case combines security and political aims

Rubio’s January 4, 2026 statement set out goals of ending drug trafficking, removing what he described as an Iranian and Hezbollah presence, and preventing Venezuela’s oil industry from enriching US adversaries. Those are broader objectives than taking a defendant into custody.

In April 16, 2026 remarks to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Representative Maria Salazar praised the operation as American strength spreading freedom and democracy in the Western Hemisphere.

The Congressional Research Service described Rubio’s plan as stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, followed by political transition. It recorded his June 3, 2026 testimony that a genuine transition requires multiparty, free and fair elections. Cooperation with an acting government can advance the earlier phases without completing the final one.

The January 2026 superseding indictment, unsealed in the Southern District of New York after Maduro’s seizure, charges him and other defendants with narco-terrorism, narcotics and weapons offenses. It alleges that defendants provided drug traffickers with diplomatic passports, private planes under diplomatic cover and armed military escorts. The indictment also alleges the use and carrying of machineguns and destructive devices in drug crimes, and a conspiracy to possess those weapons for the narcotics offenses. These are the prosecution’s accusations, rather than a court’s findings that the defendants committed the alleged acts.

CNN’s July 22, 2026 court report said Maduro and Flores had pleaded not guilty to gun and cocaine-importation conspiracy charges and were awaiting a trial scheduled for June 2027.

In United States v. Maduro, Maduro filed two dismissal motions on September 2, 2026: one claiming immunity as a head of state acting officially, and another challenging the narco-terrorism count’s allegations and its application outside the United States. The US position, stated by Ambassador Michael Waltz at the United Nations on January 5, 2026, is that Maduro is not a legitimate head of state following disputed 2024 elections. The Congressional Research Service’s September 21, 2026 update reported that the government had not responded and the court had not ruled on either motion as of that writing.

The prosecution leaves a separate question unanswered: whether the military operation supporting it was authorized.

The president’s command role does not settle the authority question

Article II of the Constitution makes the president commander in chief of the Army and Navy. Article I gives Congress the powers to declare war, raise and support armies, maintain a navy, and make rules for the armed forces. Commanding military forces and deciding the legal basis for a larger campaign are related powers, not interchangeable ones.

The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel argued in a December 23, 2025 memorandum that the president had inherent Article II authority to conduct the operation to seize Maduro without congressional authorization. The office separately argued that international law did not restrict the president as a matter of US domestic law. Those are executive-branch legal arguments, not judicial rulings authorizing the raid, and they leave Congress’s competing account of its war powers in dispute.

Rubio argued on January 4, 2026 that congressional approval was unnecessary because the operation was not an invasion or an extended military operation.

The War Powers Resolution, the federal law that sets the reporting duties and deadlines described below, says the president’s power to send forces into hostilities, or into situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, is exercised only under a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. A description of an operation as law enforcement does not resolve which of those legal grounds applies.

Without a declaration of war, the law requires a written report within 48 hours for specified introductions of forces, including hostilities or clearly imminent hostilities. The report must give the circumstances, the constitutional and legislative authority, and the estimated scope and duration. A report is also required when forces equipped for combat enter foreign territory, airspace or waters, unless the deployment is solely for supply, replacement, repair or training. The same duty applies when combat-equipped forces already in a foreign country are substantially enlarged.

When a report involves hostilities, the president must end the use of forces within 60 calendar days after the report is submitted or was required, whichever is earlier. That deadline does not apply if Congress declares war or specifically authorizes the use, extends the period by law, or cannot physically meet because of an armed attack on the United States. The president can extend the period by no more than 30 days by certifying to Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity involving the forces’ safety requires their continued use while they are promptly withdrawn. The withdrawal extension is conditional; the statute does not offer an automatic three-month permission to conduct a new war.

The Senate recorded receipt on January 5, 2026 of a presidential War Powers report covering the January 3 strikes in Venezuela. Rubio had said on January 4 that US forces were on the ground for about two hours and had left Venezuela. A Just Security analysis following the raid argued that hostilities remained ongoing and noted that the White House report did not say the operations had concluded.

In Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 98, sponsored by Sen. Tim Kaine, would direct the removal of US armed forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela that Congress has not authorized. The Senate voted 52-47 to advance the legislation. The following week, on January 14, 2026, the Senate agreed on a 50-50 recorded vote that the measure was not entitled to expedited procedures under the war-powers law, the fast-track process that law sets for such resolutions. The vice president voted yes to break the tie.

In a statement that day, Senators Kaine, Charles Schumer and Adam Schiff criticized the procedural motion as sidestepping their resolution. Schumer objected to Congress failing to assert its constitutional authority over military force and warned about prolonged conflict without a plan or articulated goals. Schiff said the vote narrowly blocked consideration of the resolution. The resolution did not become law through that vote; to take effect it would have to pass both chambers and be signed by the president or survive a veto.

Bombing, extracting a leader and governing a country are different jobs

Whether further bombing would serve the stated objectives depends on which objective is being tested. Capturing an individual is a different test from reducing trafficking or creating a political system capable of holding credible elections.

Brookings analyst Caitlin Talmadge argued that changing a regime requires changing institutions, including the military, and is harder, riskier and more resource-intensive than extracting a leader. She used the Iraq comparison to distinguish rapid removal of a government from the insurgency and civil war that followed despite a long-term US ground presence. That comparison identifies responsibilities a larger intervention could create, rather than proving that Venezuela would follow the same course.

A strike can destroy a target without supplying the institutions that would replace it.

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft warned that US administration of Venezuela could repeat the kinds of insurgency, civilian suffering and regional instability associated with Iraq. It argued for diplomacy with clearly stated aims, military restraint and respect for international law as safeguards for American security. Diplomacy supplies a different means of pursuing stated aims; choosing restraint does not itself complete the political transition Rubio described. The disagreement is therefore about which means can produce the desired result at an acceptable cost, not simply a choice between action and doing nothing.

Sovereignty objections are not the same as a declaration of retaliation

At the January 5, 2026 United Nations Security Council meeting, Venezuelan Ambassador Samuel Moncada described the raid as an illegitimate armed attack and accused Washington of seeking Venezuela’s natural resources. He requested Maduro and Flores’s release and safe return, condemnation of force, and measures to de-escalate tensions and protect civilians. An objection to the raid and a request for international intervention do not establish that a retaliatory attack on the United States is imminent.

CSIS’s January 9, 2026 analysis found that US forces hit selected Venezuelan air-defense batteries and radars to open a helicopter corridor, while leaving many other air-defense sites and regular military headquarters untouched. The CSIS analysts said Venezuelan command and control, degraded by electronic warfare and possibly cyber operations, failed to react in time during the January 3 raid. That performance shows vulnerability during the raid; it does not show how ready Venezuela’s forces are now or that a retaliatory attack on the United States is imminent.

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter requires peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibits threats or use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. Article 51 preserves individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member, until the Security Council takes necessary measures, and requires immediate reporting of the defensive measures. A domestic criminal indictment and the international-law basis for force answer different legal questions.

Reactions in the region included both condemnation and support. Brazil’s National Human Rights Council, in a note dated January 3, 2026, condemned the action as a violation of sovereignty and the United Nations Charter. The council warned of danger to civilians and instability in Venezuela and Latin America. It sought an immediate end to the military action, release of Maduro and Flores, and condemnation by the United Nations General Assembly. That is an argument for a multilateral response, not an announcement that neighboring states will enter a war.

United Nations reporting on the January 5, 2026 Security Council meeting also recorded Argentina’s support for the operation as a possible route toward restored democracy and the rule of law.

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said that it had activated preventive border coordination in Cúcuta to prepare for possible mass migration, while the Simón Bolívar crossing was operating normally. United Nations reporting on January 6, 2026 described a decade-long exodus of millions of Venezuelans fleeing repression, instability and economic hardship, and said it was too early then to know whether the latest events would intensify displacement. Those early reports describe preparation for a possible movement of people, not a new wave caused by the operation.

Oil and sanctions show pressure operating alongside cooperation

An August 31, 2026 White House fact sheet announced an agreement with Venezuelan interim authorities granting North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions over 17 oil fields. The fact sheet said the company granted the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity stake in its corporate parent. The announced arrangement is not the same thing as demonstrated additional oil production or a completed democratic transition. Department of War is a secondary title for the Department of Defense under the September 5, 2025 executive order; the statutory name remains controlling until changed by law.

Venezuelan government property that is in the United States or held or controlled by a US person is blocked unless exempt or licensed, according to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). That includes property of the central bank and the state oil company. US persons are generally prohibited from transactions with the government or entities it owns at least 50 percent of, unless authorized; a covered entity can be blocked even without appearing on the sanctions list. OFAC says transactions with Venezuela’s people or country are not generally prohibited when blocked persons and otherwise prohibited conduct are not involved.

The office explains that general licenses authorize defined Venezuela-related activities that would otherwise be prohibited, without requiring US persons to apply for a specific license. The office’s license list includes General License 46E for certain Venezuelan oil or petrochemical activities, dated September 28, 2026, and General License 52C for certain transactions involving the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, dated September 14. These permissions show how economic engagement can expand through specified exceptions rather than through a blanket end to sanctions. A business should rely on the terms of the license that covers its activity, not on announcements of improved relations.

A Government Accountability Office report dated February 4, 2021 found that sanctions on the state oil company in 2019 likely contributed to a steeper economic decline by limiting oil revenue, while mismanagement and lower oil prices also affected performance. The report also described humanitarian organizations’ continuing problems serving Venezuelans despite federal efforts to ease negative consequences.

Travel advice and embassy help

The State Department’s June 27, 2026 Venezuela entry in its official advisory feed rates travel Level 3, Reconsider Travel, citing crime, kidnapping, terrorism and poor health infrastructure and natural disaster, and says not to travel within 20 miles of the Colombian border or to Amazonas, Apure and Táchira states. The advisory’s do-not-travel list also includes Aragua outside Maracay, rural Bolívar and Guárico because of crime and kidnapping risks. The national advisory level does not remove the stricter warnings for those areas.

The Caracas embassy’s July 5, 2026 alert, issued after two earthquakes hit Venezuela’s northern coast on June 24, says it provides emergency passports and other emergency services to Americans, with limited emergency help outside Caracas; visa services remain suspended in Venezuela and are provided in Bogotá. The embassy directs Americans needing consular help to ACSCaracas@state.gov and the State Department’s numbers, +1-202-501-4444 from abroad or 888-407-4747 from the United States and Canada, and recommends enrollment in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program for alerts. Check the embassy’s latest alerts before making travel plans, because an emergency-service notice is not a promise of unrestricted consular support.

The next objective matters more than the label

Each new military step raises two questions: what authority permits it, and what objective is it meant to achieve? Congressional approval for military action, the activities permitted by sanctions licenses and the steps toward political transition would each change a different part of the relationship.