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U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began February 28, 2026. On March 2, the next U.S. trading day, Northrop Grumman shares closed up 6 percent, shares in RTX Corporation (RTX), which owns Raytheon, rose 4.7 percent, and Lockheed Martin gained 3.3 percent.
That first gain was in share value; later deals offered work, but neither was a measure of company profit. Lockheed later received a seven-year contract to make missile-defense interceptors. It could be worth up to $35 billion, but the government committed $842,871,672 when it made the award. Future orders and delivery costs will determine what the company earns.
What the first market gain measured
The Air & Space Forces Magazine account describes the March 2, 2026 rises as closing moves for that one session. They are not a measure of everything each stock did during the war, and they should not be presented as a lasting gain.
FINRA defines market capitalization as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the current share price. When a quote rises, that calculation makes the company’s market value larger even if no contract has changed hands. A shareholder who sells at the higher price may realize a gain; a shareholder who keeps the stock has a gain on paper that can reverse.
The same market report quoted defense analyst Byron Callan warning that the future of the war and the industry’s benefit were uncertain. The warning mattered on the day of the rally: investors were pricing an expectation about demand, not reading an invoice.
Even a correct expectation that Washington will replace weapons does not identify which company will get an order, how quickly it can deliver, or its eventual margin. The first answer to who gained is therefore the investors holding shares that appreciated in that dated trading session, not automatically the companies’ treasuries.
The report says Lockheed, RTX and Northrop also hit 52-week highs, while the Dow and S&P 500 finished nearly flat. The stock market was distinguishing defense expectations from the broader day’s trading, not grading the financial performance of these firms. It could still reverse its view if demand or delivery changed.
Which work can be tied to the operation
Lockheed Martin says its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has defended forces and infrastructure during Operation Epic Fury. That is a specific operational link, though it does not say how many of its interceptors were fired or what a replacement order would be worth. Northrop Grumman’s August 2026 frameworks cover rocket motors for the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) interceptor and components for THAAD interceptors.
Supplying parts to a missile program is a different role from making every finished interceptor, and a production framework does not prove that a Northrop part was used in a particular strike. Before the strikes, RTX said its Raytheon business had agreements to expand output of air-to-air missiles, missile-defense interceptors and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Those are relevant products and business prospects, but a product line alone is not proof that a specific Raytheon missile was expended in this operation.
The distinction protects against an easy overclaim: seeing a contractor’s name on a weapon does not show the government bought new units because of the Iran campaign. Nor can every subsequent order be assigned to one conflict when the same missile programs serve other U.S. and allied needs. RTX reported that Raytheon’s second-quarter 2026 bookings included Patriot interceptors for Ukraine as well as other missile orders.
The agreements that followed
RTX announced its Raytheon production-expansion agreements on February 4, 2026. That was before the Iran strikes. Calling those prewar plans a reward for the operation would reverse the timeline. On June 24, 2026, the government awarded Lockheed Martin a seven-year THAAD contract action with a potential value up to $35 billion. Lockheed said the contract put into effect a framework signed in January, before the strikes.
The published contract listing gave a more precise ceiling of $35,327,237,604 and said $842,871,672 in fiscal 2026 funds was obligated at award. The ceiling describes the possible size of multiyear work; the obligation is the amount committed then, not the company’s profit.
The June 24 contract list also reported a $398,691,358 Raytheon action for missile design-review work. It involved sales to foreign governments, not a documented order to replace weapons used in Iran.
Northrop’s two August 3, 2026 framework agreements totaled more than $3 billion for PAC-3 MSE motors and THAAD components. A framework can support future orders and investment without making the whole announced value an immediate sale. For all three firms, the sensible accounting starts with the exact instrument and date: a prewar plan, a framework, or an awarded contract.
Why orders and earnings diverge
Northrop reported about $20 billion in net awards and a roughly $105 billion backlog for the second quarter of 2026. RTX reported Raytheon backlog of $86 billion on June 30, 2026 and $20 billion in defense bookings during that quarter.
Lockheed reported $65 billion of new orders and a record $230 billion backlog in its second quarter. These are company-wide or business-segment figures, not a ledger of profit caused by one military operation. Backlog generally points to work to be performed; it is not the same line on a financial statement as quarterly sales or net income.
Lockheed says it generally recognizes revenue on long-term contracts as it performs the work, often measuring progress by costs incurred. A contract can therefore enter the backlog now and produce reported sales over years, with profit depending on the costs of delivering it. In its July 2026 results, Northrop reported second-quarter sales of $10.9 billion and operating income of $1.1 billion.
Those numbers show the size of the whole company, but they do not isolate an Iran-war windfall. RTX’s second-quarter 2026 release separately reported actual sales and earnings, backlog, and a raised outlook for the rest of the year. The three categories are deliberately different: what has been sold, what has been ordered, and what management expects.
The public side of the bill
In an account of munitions planning, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) described military services comparing their requirements with inventories and appropriated funds to decide what to buy. Army acquisition rules describe the subsequent work: planning, soliciting and evaluating offers, negotiating, selecting a supplier and preparing a contract. Combat use can raise a need, but it does not itself pick a contractor or pay an invoice.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that the White House requested supplemental funding in June 2026, including $21 billion for munitions and $17.3 billion for operational costs. CRS said the House passed a budget resolution in July 2026 that included those amounts. That House step was not itself a final appropriation or proof that all of the money went to these three contractors. CRS also noted that Congress could provide, condition or prohibit funds for operations and future purchases.
That is where a forecast about replenishment must meet public decisions about priorities and money. The Government Accountability Office says the Federal Procurement Data System is the principal repository for federal procurement information, with some data displayed on USAspending.gov. A reader checking a claimed windfall should look for an award and its obligations there, then separate those amounts from market-value headlines.
GAO’s 2026 annual weapons assessment found delays in key decisions on some expensive programs and questioned the realism of their schedules. Its assessment said estimated costs for programs included in the prior year’s major-acquisition portfolio had risen by $51.8 billion.
That is not a finding about these Iran-related agreements, but it is a reason not to treat any large announced ceiling as certain value delivered. A stock rally alone also cannot establish that a contractor influenced the decision to strike; it records investors’ response, not the administration’s decision process.
The case for replenishment, and the cost objection
Michael Duffey, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief, said an additional supplier of interceptor components would help triple PAC-3 and quadruple THAAD production. Reporting on the Northrop agreements identified rocket motors as a bottleneck in the interceptor supply chain. From that perspective, predictable demand can justify a second source and capacity investments that a one-off order might not support.
Lockheed Martin executive Tim Cahill argued that multiyear procurement would let the company expand production and deliver missiles faster. Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said the company planned to invest roughly $900 million to $1.1 billion at its Troy, Alabama facility over the next few years.
The National Priorities Project, a budget advocacy group, argued in March 2026 that war spending leaves less money available for domestic needs. Its early estimate put operating costs for selected deployed systems at $59.39 million per day and compared that sum with daily Medicaid and food-assistance spending.
The group’s estimate deliberately omitted munitions and other costs, so it is an argument about opportunity cost, not a complete official price tag for the war. The disagreement is not over whether used defenses can need replacement; it is over the scale, terms and scrutiny of the purchases that follow. Reliable delivery and public accountability are both tests for these deals, not competing definitions of a stock-market gain.
What remains unsettled
No single update will settle this accounting. A new appropriation can authorize purchases, a later contract notice can show who won a specific order, and the next earnings statement can reveal sales and margins across a wider business. Those records answer different questions. Reading one in place of another is how a plausible story about a contractor’s gain turns into an unsupported total.
As of September 2026, CRS described U.S.-Iran relations as somewhere between all-out hostilities and diplomacy. A change in fighting or negotiations could change future demand, while contracts already signed would still have their own terms. CRS said Congress retained choices about additional funding for the conflict and future operations. Those decisions, subsequent orders, delivery schedules and later company filings will determine how much of today’s expectation becomes business. CRS said work on fiscal 2027 appropriations gives Congress further opportunities to shape U.S. action toward Iran.
The March rally answered what investors thought might happen; the public contract and financial records answer what has actually happened. Lockheed’s 2026 filing says government appropriations and procurement priorities can affect its financial performance.
