Can the Courts Stop President Trump’s Tariffs?

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Courts can stop a tariff that exceeds the President’s legal powers, and the Supreme Court has done so. On February 20, 2026, it ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, does not authorize presidential tariffs.

For a business paying import taxes, though, winning that argument is only part of the fight. Duties imposed under other laws remain in place, the administration has turned to different statutes for new ones, and recovering money already paid raises a separate dispute.

What the courts have actually decided

The ruling covered two consolidated cases: Trump v. V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. Six justices joined the holding that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, while Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh dissented. The challenged IEEPA actions included duties justified by drug trafficking, imposed at 25 percent on most Canadian and Mexican imports and 10 percent on most Chinese imports. They also included the trade-deficit duties described as reciprocal tariffs, set at 10 percent or more on imports from all trading partners.

The Learning Resources plaintiffs, Illinois companies that employ more than 500 people in the United States, said in their Supreme Court brief that they develop their educational products domestically but manufacture most of them abroad, primarily in China. The brief said the IEEPA duties had become high enough to threaten importation and their businesses. They sued in a federal district court on April 22, 2025.

The federal government argued that the statutory power to regulate imports included tariffs, a traditional tool of trade regulation. Its brief invoked United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., a 1975 decision in which the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court upheld President Richard Nixon’s tariffs under similar language in the Trading with the Enemy Act, IEEPA’s predecessor. The government also argued that tariffs could address the declared threats by providing negotiating leverage. On that reading, it did not matter that IEEPA never uses the word tariff, because the broader power to regulate imports covered tariffs.

The Learning Resources plaintiffs answered that IEEPA never mentions tariffs, duties or another revenue-raising mechanism, unlike laws that expressly authorize tariff action. They also argued that Congress must clearly authorize decisions of vast economic significance and cannot hand over its legislative power without adequate limits. Congress, they said, does not use vague language to grant virtually unconstrained taxing power. Their objection was about the source and limits of the power, rather than whether a particular tariff rate was economically sensible.

The Supreme Court concluded that IEEPA’s list of emergency powers omitted tariffs and duties, and that the power to regulate importation did not fill that gap. Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, also applied major-questions reasoning, which asks whether Congress clearly authorized an extraordinary power the executive claims; the other three justices in the majority did not join that part. Kavanaugh’s dissent viewed the import-regulation language as part of a deliberately broad set of presidential tools for responding to foreign threats in national emergencies.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in the companion Trump v. V.O.S. Selections case, but vacated the Learning Resources judgment and directed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit had concluded in the companion case that IEEPA did not authorize the challenged tariffs, and the justices left that judgment in place. The government had asked to move the Learning Resources case from district court to the U.S. Court of International Trade, the federal court for tariff disputes. The Court explained that these tariff challenges belonged exclusively in the Court of International Trade, so the district court lacked jurisdiction over Learning Resources. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs were five small businesses and twelve states.

Why winning one tariff case does not end every tariff

A Supreme Court ruling against tariffs under one law does not prohibit tariffs authorized by a different law. Nor does invoking a different law guarantee that the next tariff will survive a challenge under that law’s own conditions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, said the end of IEEPA duties did not affect duties imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 or Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 232 concerns national security and Section 301 concerns other countries’ trade practices; both are explained below.

President Trump issued the proclamation on February 20, 2026, invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 and imposing a temporary 10 percent import surcharge effective February 24, subject to exceptions. Section 122 permits a surcharge of up to 15 percent for no more than 150 days unless Congress extends the period by law. That authority addresses specified international-payments problems, including large and serious balance-of-payments deficits, an imminent significant depreciation of the dollar, or cooperation to correct an international payments imbalance. Changing the statutory label changed the legal question: the replacement had to satisfy the conditions Congress wrote into Section 122.

In Burlap and Barrel, Inc. and Basic Fun, Inc. v. Trump, two businesses challenged the surcharge in a lawsuit filed March 9, 2026, in the U.S. Court of International Trade. On May 7, 2026, the trade court ruled that the proclamation did not meet Section 122’s conditions; its relief covered the State of Washington and the two business plaintiffs, rather than all importers. In a June 11 order granting a stay during the appeal, the Federal Circuit described the government’s argument that Congress allowed a balance-of-payments deficit to be measured using an economically reasonable methodology, rather than only the measures the trade court accepted. The appeals court said the government had shown a likelihood of success, while expressly declining to reach a final conclusion on whether the trade court’s judgment was correct. The Section 122 tariffs expired on July 24, 2026; in its account of that expiration, the businesses’ lawyers at the Liberty Justice Center said they would continue seeking complete relief, including refunds. Expiration ends the surcharge going forward; it does not by itself settle the dispute over money collected while it was in force.

A separate tariff took effect July 24, 2026: under Section 301, the U.S. Trade Representative imposed duties of 10 percent to 12.5 percent on imports from sixty economies, with exemptions, in what CBP’s guidance calls a forced-labor action. USTR said the economies had failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on imports made with forced labor, practices it found unreasonable and burdensome to U.S. commerce. A business can therefore be relieved of one tariff charge and still face a different one on its goods.

How a tariff challenge reaches a court

Who can challenge a tariff starts with who pays it. CBP calls that party the importer of record and says it is ultimately responsible for the entry documents and for all duties, taxes and fees, even when it uses a customs broker. The importer that pays Customs and a customer who later buys the product are in different positions, in court and in the refund process.

To sue in federal court, a challenger needs standing, which generally requires a personal injury that can fairly be traced to the challenged government action and is likely to be remedied by a favorable court decision. A generalized injury shared by citizens is insufficient, although a concrete personal injury can qualify even when many others suffer the same harm. Disagreeing with tariff policy is not enough: a plaintiff must show how it was injured and how the court order it seeks would help.

The Court of International Trade is the only court that can hear specified cases against the United States arising from import revenue, tariffs, import restrictions and their administration or enforcement, subject to the statute’s exceptions. Final decisions of the trade court can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and ultimately to the Supreme Court.

For a preliminary injunction, a temporary order before final judgment, Supreme Court precedent requires a challenger to show that the legal claim is likely to succeed, harm is likely without relief and cannot be repaired afterward, the competing hardships favor relief, and the order would serve the public interest. A plausible claim that a tariff is unlawful is therefore not enough, by itself, to win an immediate order stopping it.

In 2025, after ruling that IEEPA did not authorize the tariffs challenged in V.O.S. Selections, the Federal Circuit withheld its mandate while the parties sought Supreme Court review. A mandate is the order that sends an appeals court’s decision back to the trial court to be carried out; holding it back means a win on appeal does not take effect right away. So whether a lawsuit has actually stopped a tariff depends on more than who won: it also depends on whether the ruling is on hold during an appeal and how far the court’s order reaches.

Why national-security and China tariffs face different tests

Section 232 applies when the Commerce Department finds that imports threaten to impair national security; the President then decides whether to concur and how to adjust those imports. The statute connects economic welfare to national security and directs consideration of foreign competition’s effects on domestic industries, employment, revenues, skills and investment. Its inquiry reaches beyond whether a shipment itself has a military use.

In American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit in 2020 rejected a claim that Section 232 unconstitutionally hands legislative power to the President. The court said the question was controlled by Algonquin, an earlier Supreme Court decision on Section 232 license fees for petroleum products. That result reflects a lower court’s duty to follow Supreme Court precedent; it does not establish unrestricted presidential power over every import.

Commerce’s investigation report is due within 270 days after an investigation begins. The President has 90 days after receiving the relevant report to decide whether to concur and what action to take. An initial decision to adjust imports must be implemented within 15 days.

In Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, the trade court had ruled against a later increase in tariffs on Turkish steel, in part because it came outside the statute’s time periods. The Federal Circuit reversed in 2021, finding that the President had adhered to Commerce’s original finding of a national-security threat. Under that reading, the deadlines do not bar every later change to a tariff already in place.

Section 301 allows action against a foreign country’s unreasonable or discriminatory practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce when the U.S. Trade Representative determines action is appropriate. The statute expressly authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative to impose duties or other import restrictions on that country’s goods. Section 307 separately permits modification or termination of actions under stated conditions, including a changed burden on U.S. commerce or an action that is no longer appropriate. That express grant is the difference from IEEPA, where the government tried to derive a tariff power from more general wording.

The case concerned List 3 and List 4A tariffs on Chinese imports, challenged by businesses importing goods subject to those lists. In HMTX Industries LLC v. United States, challengers argued that the U.S. Trade Representative had not adequately responded to significant public comments about the tariffs. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the agency’s further explanation, given after the trial court sent the matter back, remedied any such violation. The Supreme Court denied the HMTX petition for review in 2026. The case shows another kind of court check: judges can require an agency to follow a lawful process and explain itself without necessarily eliminating the duties.

What importers can recover after a ruling

Refunds turn on a customs process called liquidation. In customs law, liquidation means the final computation or ascertainment of duties on an entry. The word describes the status of the customs accounting, not whether a business has closed. That status matters because a refund may require correcting an entry that is still open or reopening one already finalized.

In its April 17, 2026 V.O.S. Selections order, the trade court directed Customs to liquidate or reliquidate IEEPA entries without those duties, including entries whose liquidation was already final. The order itself suspended the requirement of immediate compliance and excluded the separate dispute about duty-free de minimis treatment of low-value imports.

In its October 8, 2026 opinion, the trade court reported that the government had appealed on June 3 the portion of its order requiring liquidation or reliquidation of all affected entries; both sides had filed briefs in appeal No. 26-1895, and a Federal Circuit decision was still to come. Separately, the government asked the Federal Circuit to block an order compelling the Customs commissioner to testify in person. The court’s June 4 stay in that proceeding was not a decision on the merits of the refund order.

CBP’s Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries system, or CAPE, processes eligible IEEPA refund requests through the Automated Commercial Environment portal. Reconciliation lets an importer flag estimated entry information and supply the corrected information later through a separate customs filing. CBP describes Phase 1 as covering certain unliquidated entries and certain entries within 80 days of liquidation, and Phase 2 as covering qualifying entries flagged for reconciliation before the later reconciliation filing has been made. To request a refund, an importer or authorized broker needs a portal account, refund bank information and a submitted CAPE declaration.

CBP says an importer does not need to file a trade-court case to receive a Phase 1 refund due to it, but offers no legal guidance on whether a suit is needed for other entries. The general customs protest statute allows 180 days after liquidation or reliquidation to protest covered decisions, with a different starting point where those events do not apply. Meeting that general deadline does not guarantee that a protest alone resolves an IEEPA refund claim.

In its October 8, 2026 opinion, the trade court confirmed that Customs had deployed CAPE Phase 3 on October 6, allowing plaintiffs in more than 4,000 cases where the court’s order had been entered to file CAPE declarations. In his September 15 declaration, CBP executive director Brandon Lord said plaintiffs who had supplied a valid importer-of-record number by July 30 could file Phase 3 declarations starting October 6. Lord said plaintiffs supplying their number after July 30, 2026 would receive additional instructions from CBP.

A new processing phase is not the same as a legal right to have a finalized entry reopened.

On October 8, the trade court certified a class in Freestyle World v. United States seeking liquidation or reliquidation without IEEPA duties. It covers importers of record who paid the challenged duties between February 1, 2025, and February 19, 2026, excluding entities that separately sued to recover IEEPA payments. The court said it had not yet decided the merits of that case; certification organizes the claims rather than itself ordering payment. For an importer pursuing an individual action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the general limit is two years after the claim first accrues; the accrual date depends on the government action challenged, international trade attorney Kelly M. Reid explains. Reid also warns that an IEEPA-only protective protest should not be assumed to stop that separate lawsuit deadline.

An importer’s refund does not by itself produce a government refund for a customer who bought the imported product. What matters is whose entries a court order or Customs procedure covers.

What Congress can change

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to impose duties and regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress can therefore take back or limit the tariff powers it has handed to the President, by narrowing them, adding conditions or repealing them.

A bill must pass both houses and be presented to the President, whose veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house. A majority that opposes a tariff may therefore be enough to pass legislation but still fall short of overcoming a presidential veto.

The National Emergencies Act allows a declared emergency to be ended by a joint resolution enacted into law or by a presidential proclamation, though ending it does not affect specified actions and proceedings already under way. Like a bill, a joint resolution that passes both chambers must be presented to the President, and a veto takes two-thirds of each chamber to override; a vote in one chamber is not enough. Ending an emergency also does not repeal tariff laws that do not depend on an emergency declaration.

The Trade Review Act of 2025, S. 1272, was introduced in the Senate on April 3, 2025, and referred to the Finance Committee. The official congressional status record lists that referral as its latest action. The introduced proposal would generally limit duties to 60 days unless Congress enacted a resolution of approval, while excluding antidumping and countervailing duties. Antidumping duties address imports sold at unfairly low prices; countervailing duties offset unfair foreign-government subsidies. It is a proposal, not a rule that governs the tariffs discussed here.