The Sanctions Toolkit: What Authority the U.S. Has to Pressure Warring Parties

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The fighting in South Sudan’s Jonglei state is “rapidly expanding,” according to UN officials who briefed the international community on January 29, 2026. Over 200,000 people have been displaced this month alone. The UN Mission in South Sudan warned that “all the conditions for a human catastrophe are present.”

U.S. Sanctions Tools and Powers

When violence erupts in places like South Sudan, the U.S. government can freeze assets, ban travel, and cut individuals off from the American financial system. The process requires establishing specific evidence, coordinating across federal agencies, and balancing the need to pressure combatants against the reality that civilians caught in the crossfire still need food and medicine.

The conflict persists. As government forces and opposition militia clash in Jonglei, U.S. officials must decide whether existing sanctions are working, whether to expand them, or whether to try something else entirely.

Executive Order 13664: The Legal Foundation

On April 3, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13664. The order identified specific conduct that would trigger sanctions: actions threatening South Sudan’s peace or stability, targeting women and children through violence, using child soldiers, obstructing humanitarian operations, and attacking UN peacekeeping missions.

This executive order has formed the foundation for all subsequent U.S. sanctions on South Sudan. Executive orders are implemented through regulations issued by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC. OFAC maintains the Specially Designated Nationals List, which publicly identifies individuals and entities whose property is blocked. Anyone on this list cannot conduct business with U.S. persons or entities, and all their U.S. assets are frozen.

The public list warns the financial sector whom to avoid, signals consequences to designated persons, and creates a transparent record of who the U.S. government considers to be threatening international peace or committing atrocities.

The Global Magnitsky Act: Targeting Human Rights Abusers

The U.S. government also employs sanctions under a 2016 law that lets the U.S. punish human rights abusers—the Global Magnitsky Act. This law authorizes targeted sanctions against foreign persons responsible for serious human rights abuses or corruption.

Unlike Executive Order 13664, which requires a presidential declaration of national emergency, the Global Magnitsky Act lets the U.S. sanction human rights violators more directly. Rather than punishing entire nations or sectors of their economy, the U.S. has increasingly shifted toward sanctions focused on specific people. A South Sudanese general credibly accused of committing war crimes can be designated under Global Magnitsky authority without necessarily triggering broader restrictions on South Sudan’s financial sector that might harm ordinary citizens dependent on banking services.

How Designations Work

While OFAC ultimately maintains the sanctions list, the organization doesn’t operate in isolation. The Treasury Department coordinates with the State Department, the National Security Council, the Justice Department, and intelligence agencies to identify, vet, and designate individuals and entities.

The U.S. needs less evidence to freeze someone’s assets than to convict them of a crime, but more than mere suspicion. The U.S. government typically requires evidence from intelligence, witnesses, documents, or aid organizations.

A serious problem in active conflicts is timing. By the time a particular military commander has been investigated and designated for using child soldiers or targeting civilians, the military situation on the ground may have shifted dramatically. Sanctions operate on a timeline measured in months and years, while armed conflicts can escalate or shift in weeks.

Once credible information suggests a person meets the designation criteria, the relevant agencies check whether the designation will work. Does the individual have assets that can be frozen? Does he or she maintain relationships with U.S. financial institutions? Can the designation be enforced?

Current South Sudan Sanctions Framework

The U.S. maintains sanctions imposed in 2014 under Executive Order 13664, but South Sudan is also subject to UN sanctions imposed through Security Council resolutions. The European Union, United Kingdom, and other countries have imposed sanctions on the same people and organizations. When multiple countries sanction someone, it’s harder for them to find workarounds.

Currently, South Sudan is under an arms embargo. The country’s government officials and opposition leaders have been placed on UN and U.S. targeted sanctions lists for various violations.

China and Russia, both permanent Security Council members, have opposed the continuation of South Sudan sanctions, arguing that restrictions on the government have prevented the government from building a police force and military. African members of the Security Council have also expressed concerns about maintaining the sanctions regime, viewing it as counterproductive to peace efforts. This debate reflects a fundamental tension in sanctions policy: sanctions meant to stop abuse can also prevent a government from doing basic things like building a police force.

Humanitarian Consequences

Even with humanitarian carve-outs, implementation challenges persist. Banks are afraid of breaking the rules about transactions involving sanctioned countries or entities. A bank might technically comply with sanctions and humanitarian exemptions, but if it fears regulatory penalties, banks refuse to do business in the region out of fear, even when it’s technically legal.

Humanitarian organizations have reported that obtaining explicit permission to operate in sanctioned environments isn’t enough if their banks are unwilling to facilitate the necessary financial transfers. Consider a concrete scenario: a humanitarian organization needs to pay a truck driver in South Sudan to transport food to displaced persons in a conflict zone. If the truck driver or his business is affiliated with a sanctioned entity or individual, the organization would normally violate sanctions law by paying him.

The implementation of this exception requires banks, humanitarian organizations, and compliance officers to make detailed, documented judgments about each transaction. This process slows down aid delivery. Humanitarian operations move more slowly and cautiously than they would in the absence of sanctions, with potential consequences for civilian populations dependent on food, medicine, and shelter.

The January 2026 Crisis

The escalation in Jonglei state in January 2026 presents U.S. policymakers with a concrete decision: whether to expand sanctions, maintain the status quo, or pursue different pressure tactics altogether.

The UN has documented that the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, the government’s official military, has conducted airstrikes and launched attacks with allegedly incendiary weapons, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. Opposition forces have engaged in renewed fighting. The displacement numbers are staggering—180,000 people displaced in Jonglei alone by late January, with a broader displacement total exceeding 200,000 for the month.

According to UN officials, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating rapidly. Over 500 cholera cases were reported across the country in January, with treatment centers overwhelmed and critically short of supplies. The UN estimates that hunger deaths range from a minimum of 425 to a maximum of 1,201 daily deaths in some areas. Two-thirds of South Sudan’s population—approximately 7.5 million people—require humanitarian assistance.

Do Sanctions Work?

Research on sanctions effectiveness in preventing mass atrocities provides a mixed picture. A study examining over 200 sanctions cases found that sanctions helped achieve their goals only about 34% of the time. Sanctions work better when they ask for small changes, not when they try to overthrow a government. Targeted sanctions focused on individuals responsible for abuses have shown some promise, particularly when applied in conjunction with other diplomatic tools.

In South Sudan’s case, the track record is discouraging. The 2014 sanctions imposed by Executive Order 13664 did not prevent the civil war from continuing and indeed deepening through 2015-2018. Some analysts argue that targeted financial measures did contribute to the 2018 peace agreement negotiations—evidence suggests that regime elites responded to Treasury Department warnings about financial scrutiny, particularly when the UK National Crime Agency simultaneously enhanced oversight of South Sudanese political figures’ banking activities.

However, the fact that this peace agreement has failed to be implemented, with elections repeatedly postponed and violence recurring, suggests that even the most carefully calibrated financial pressure has limits as a tool for forcing behavioral change in conflict zones.

One prominent argument made by foreign policy experts is that existing sanctions should be reoriented around network-based targeting. Rather than placing asset freezes on low-level county commissioners, this approach would target President Salva Kiir himself and the network of allies, businesses, and family members that keep him in power. This strategy would make it much more difficult for the regime to function by attacking the corruption and patronage networks at its core. The law already allows such network-based designations—both IEEPA and the Global Magnitsky Act permit them—but the political will to target a sitting president, even one credibly accused of massive abuses and obstruction of democratic processes, remains contested.

When Sanctions Backfire

A study examining the relationship between economic sanctions and conflict intensity found that in the time period 1989-1999, economic sanctions either had no effect or increased conflict intensity, and in 2000-2019, sanctions only produced increasing effects on conflict intensity.

When a regime is sanctioned, its leaders can blame external enemies for economic hardship, rallying nationalist sentiment and justifying internal repression. A population under sanctions may support their government’s military efforts more strongly, not less. Sanctions can push targeted regimes to strengthen relationships with non-sanctioning countries, potentially drawing them into relationships with less scrupulous actors—arms dealers, criminal networks, state adversaries of the U.S.

Enforcement and Secondary Sanctions

Once individuals or entities are designated, the practical challenge of enforcement begins. OFAC can only directly enforce sanctions on Americans and American companies—the law can’t directly compel a Chinese bank or a Kenyan business to respect a U.S. sanctions designation.

The U.S. government addresses this gap through what are known as secondary sanctions—penalties the U.S. can impose on foreign companies that do business with sanctioned people. By threatening to cut foreign banks off from the U.S. financial system, the U.S. can effectively extend the reach of its sanctions to parties with no direct connection to America.

Secondary sanctions are powerful tools, but also controversial. Critics say the U.S. is illegally imposing its laws on foreign countries. The European Union has resisted by passing laws that protect EU companies from U.S. penalties.

Nevertheless, the ability to enforce sanctions on companies outside the U.S. through the dollar-based financial system remains formidable. Any foreign entity that needs access to U.S. dollars, U.S. banking services, or U.S. markets faces strong incentives to comply with OFAC sanctions lists. In South Sudan’s case, foreign financial institutions and companies that might do business with designated individuals face a complex compliance challenge. A Kenyan bank handling transactions for a sanctioned South Sudanese general would risk being cut off from the U.S. financial system entirely. A shipping company moving goods across South Sudan’s borders faces similar pressures. Companies leave the market to avoid accidentally breaking sanctions rules.

Policy Options Going Forward

As of January 2026, the U.S. government faces a decision point regarding South Sudan sanctions. The existing framework, in place since 2014, has not prevented the current violence. UN Security Council discussions in May 2025 showed continued division about whether the sanctions regime should be maintained, expanded, lifted, or modified. The U.S., UK, and France pushed for renewal, while China and Russia argued for lifting or adjusting restrictions to support the government’s security building.

One option is to sanction the whole network of corrupt officials and businessmen around Kiir, to break up the system where Kiir rewards allies with money and power. This approach would require designating not military figures credibly accused of atrocities, but also the businessmen, family members, and enablers who benefit from the current system and support Kiir’s hold on power. This would be politically more fraught, as it would be perceived as directly targeting the leadership rather than holding specific individuals accountable for specific crimes.

Another option is to offer rewards instead of punishment. Rather than emphasizing punishment through asset freezes, the U.S. could emphasize development assistance, technical support, and removing someone from the sanctions list or lifting penalties as rewards for hitting specific goals. This approach requires clearly defining what counts as success—what specific steps would lead to such relief. It would also require patience, recognizing that conflict resolution timelines are measured in years, not months.

A third pathway involves maintaining the current sanctions regime while simultaneously expanding humanitarian access and ensuring that aid organizations can operate without jeopardy. This approach accepts that sanctions alone are insufficient but maintains them as a signal and baseline pressure while focusing more heavily on humanitarian action and diplomatic engagement.

Conclusion: Limits of Economic Pressure

Freezing someone’s assets doesn’t automatically make them change their behavior. Sanctions can cause serious harm by shutting down basic economic activity in war zones. In the specific case of South Sudan, the real question is whether sanctions can help end the conflict.

The existing sanctions framework, in place since 2014, has not prevented civil war, humanitarian catastrophe, or obstruction of democratic processes. What seems clear is that economic pressure alone is insufficient. Experts say sanctions alone won’t work; they need to be part of a bigger strategy that includes diplomatic engagement, assistance, support for peace processes, and in some cases military intervention. The U.S. government has nominally pursued this approach in South Sudan—maintaining USAID programs, supporting UN peacekeeping through UNMISS, and engaging in diplomacy—while simultaneously imposing sanctions.

The UN Secretary-General has called for a “political not military solution” to the current crisis, emphasizing the need for “inclusive dialogue” rather than military escalation. The real challenge is using sanctions carefully, protecting aid delivery, and combining them with diplomacy toward the shared goal of preventing catastrophe.

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