The Espionage Act Is 107 Years Old. Here’s How It’s Used Today.

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FBI agents arrived at Hannah Natanson’s home early on a Wednesday morning in January 2026. They had a search warrant. Within hours, they’d seized her personal laptop, work laptop, phone, and Garmin smartwatch. They took every device she uses to do her job as a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for The Washington Post.

Natanson wasn’t accused of a crime. She still isn’t. The search warrant was part of an investigation into Aurelio Perez-Lugones, a Maryland contractor with top-secret clearance. He allegedly removed secret documents from a secure government facility. The government wanted to know if Natanson had received any of those documents.

The federal government had never before executed a search warrant at a reporter’s home as part of a leak investigation involving national security. Not during Watergate. Not during the Pentagon Papers. Not even during the Obama administration’s crackdown on leakers, when federal attorneys secretly seized phone records from Associated Press reporters and named a Fox News reporter as a potential co-conspirator.

The Natanson search crossed a line. It happened because of a law that’s 107 years old this year—a law that was supposed to catch German spies during World War I but has become the primary tool for charging government employees who talk to the media.

The Espionage Act: From Catching Spies to Silencing Sources

Congress passed the Espionage Act in June 1917, three months after America entered World War I. The target was obvious: German agents, saboteurs, anyone helping the enemy. The law criminalized unauthorized possession of national defense information and its transmission to anyone who might use it to harm the United States.

For most of the twentieth century, federal attorneys used it against actual spies: foreign intelligence agents and the Americans who worked with them. The law did get weaponized against political dissidents sometimes. Socialist leader Eugene Debs went to prison under the Espionage Act for giving a speech criticizing World War I.

When Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the Nixon administration tried to stop The New York Times and Washington Post from publishing them. The Supreme Court said no—the First Amendment protects reporters who publish secret material. The government did charge Ellsberg with theft and conversion, but those charges collapsed due to prosecutorial misconduct. They didn’t use the Espionage Act.

The Obama Justice Department prosecuted eight people under the Espionage Act for leaking secret material to the media. That’s more than all previous administrations combined. Chelsea Manning, who gave diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks. Jeffrey Sterling, a CIA officer prosecuted in a case involving a New York Times reporter.

None of these people were spies in any traditional sense. They didn’t sell secrets to foreign governments. They gave material to the media because they believed the public had a right to know what their government was doing.

The Obama administration also went after reporters themselves. In 2013, federal attorneys secretly seized phone records from AP reporters and obtained a warrant for Fox News reporter James Rosen’s emails, even naming him as a potential “co-conspirator.” Attorney General Eric Holder tightened the rules, requiring high-level approval before federal attorneys could go after records from the media.

Those protections held through the end of the Obama administration and into the Biden years. Then Pam Bondi became Attorney General.

The Rules Changed in May 2025

In May 2025, Bondi rescinded the Biden-era protections and issued new guidelines. These made it substantially easier for federal attorneys to pursue leak investigations involving the media. The new standard said investigative techniques targeting reporters could be used “as a last resort when necessary to a successful investigation or prosecution”—language that sounds restrictive but is much looser than what came before.

The Biden guidelines had required federal attorneys to show a compelling government interest that couldn’t be served any other way. They mandated advance notice to reporters and their news organizations. Bondi’s version weakened both requirements.

President Trump has spent years calling the media “the enemy of the people” and suggesting they should face prison for publishing secret material. Bondi’s new guidelines gave federal attorneys more latitude.

Eight months later, they raided Natanson’s home.

The Contractor and the Classified Materials

Starting in October 2025, Aurelio Perez-Lugones allegedly accessed secret intelligence reports without authorization, took screenshots, printed them, removed markings, and smuggled them out of the secure facility where they were stored.

When FBI agents raided his home and car in January 2026, they allegedly found materials marked “SECRET” in a lunchbox in his vehicle. More secret materials allegedly turned up in his basement.

At his detention hearing, federal attorneys said Perez-Lugones was motivated by anger at Trump administration policies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Patricia McLane told the court he had “expressed exasperation for the current conditions in America” and warned that “even if the court restricted his use of electronics and cell phones, he could communicate the information stored in his head.”

A contractor with top-secret clearance allegedly stole secret material and removed it from a secure facility. But why raid the reporter’s home?

The Pretext Problem

Legal scholar Steve Vladeck argues the government may have used “the (superficially legitimate) investigation of Perez-Lugones” as a fake reason to get “the identities of Natanson’s sources inside the executive branch…unrelated to Perez-Lugones’s alleged offenses.”

Natanson had spent the past year covering the Trump administration’s dismantling of the federal workforce, drawing on hundreds of confidential sources inside government agencies. In December 2025, she published a piece describing how she’d built an extensive network of sources within agencies being targeted by Trump’s drive to gut the civil service. She’d exposed the workings of Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, detailed the impact of staff reductions on Social Security, revealed widespread concerns among federal employees.

She’d also been one of six Washington Post reporters who published an exclusive story about Venezuela based on leaked material.

The raid came weeks after some of her most significant work holding the government accountable. The warrant itself remains partially sealed, so the public doesn’t know what legal theory federal attorneys used to justify raiding her home. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has asked a federal judge to unseal the warrant applications, arguing that “the public is therefore left with no means to understand the government’s basis for seeking (and a federal court’s basis for approving) a search with dramatic implications for a free press.”

Even if federal attorneys genuinely believed Natanson might have material that Perez-Lugones gave her, seizing her devices gives them access to far more than that. They get her communications with dozens or hundreds of other sources. They get her notes on stories that have nothing to do with Perez-Lugones. They get a roadmap to every confidential source she’s cultivated over years of reporting.

The Chilling Effect

The Washington Post reported that sources immediately began reaching out to Natanson to express their anxiety about the raid. Alex Papachristou, director of the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice, warned the assault on freedoms of the media would have a chilling effect on sources’ willingness to speak to reporters.

If you’re a federal employee who’s been talking to a reporter about waste or misconduct or harmful policies, and you see the FBI raid that reporter’s home and seize all her devices, you stop talking. You delete your Signal messages. You assume anything you’ve said can now be traced back to you.

Jameel Jaffer, executive director of the Knight First Amendment Institute, said he suspects “the search is meant to deter not just that reporter but other reporters from pursuing stories that are reliant on government whistleblowers” and to “deter whistleblowers” themselves from coming forward.

James Risen, the former New York Times investigative reporter who was himself targeted by the Obama Justice Department for his coverage of warrantless wiretapping, said the Trump administration’s actions “go way beyond anything that is expected or required under any normal and traditional guidelines covering the way the government deals with the press.” Risen fought a seven-year legal battle to avoid revealing his source, a fight that went all the way to the Supreme Court. Even then, the Obama administration never raided his home.

What the Law Says (and Doesn’t)

The Espionage Act’s language is broad enough to criminalize almost any unauthorized disclosure. It covers anyone who “willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted” material “relating to the national defense” to someone “not entitled to receive it.”

Notice what’s missing: any requirement that the person intended to harm the United States or help a foreign power. Any distinction between selling secrets to Russian intelligence and giving material to The Washington Post. Any recognition that some material reveals government wrongdoing that the public has a right to know about.

The statute was written in 1917, when “national defense information” meant troop movements and battle plans. Now it covers everything from diplomatic cables to reports on election interference to internal assessments of government programs. The government classifies millions of items every year, many of them containing material that poses no genuine threat but would embarrass officials or reveal waste or misconduct.

Because the Espionage Act doesn’t distinguish between espionage and whistleblowing, federal attorneys can use it against anyone who leaks anything secret, regardless of motive.

Chelsea Manning leaked diplomatic cables that revealed civilian casualties and detention practices in Iraq and Afghanistan. She was sentenced to 35 years under the Espionage Act. Reality Winner leaked a single report about Russian interference in U.S. elections. She got five years.

The Protections That Aren’t

Reporters do have some legal protection against government raids, but it’s weaker than most people think. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 generally prohibits raiding homes or offices of the media for work product without a subpoena. But the law contains exceptions for situations involving imminent danger or probable cause that the reporter has committed a crime.

The Justice Department guidelines interpreting that law have significant gaps. Under Bondi’s revised guidelines, those gaps got wider.

The First Amendment provides reporters with some protection against being forced to reveal confidential sources. But that protection isn’t absolute. Courts have consistently held that the government can overcome it by demonstrating a compelling interest in the material.

Attorney Mark Zaid notes that “in modern times, everything about the Espionage Act regarding treatment of the press has been based on norms and policy, not law.” There’s no Supreme Court precedent clearly forbidding the government from charging sources under the Espionage Act or from raiding homes of reporters in leak investigations. The protections the media thought they had were based on prosecutorial restraint and Justice Department guidelines—both of which can be changed by a new Attorney General.

What Congress Could Do (But Probably Won’t)

Thirty-one freedom and civil liberties organizations released a joint statement condemning the raid and calling on Congress to act. Their primary recommendation: pass the PRESS Act—the Prevent Unjustified Seizure of Newsgathering Equipment and Reporting Materials Act.

The PRESS Act would establish explicit statutory protections for materials from the media and prevent the government from using the Espionage Act to target reporters. It would require advance notice before any raid or seizure, establish a tougher test federal attorneys would have to pass, and limit raids to narrow circumstances where the government demonstrates a compelling interest and the material is needed to investigate a serious crime.

The coalition also called for broader reform of the Espionage Act itself to protect reporters and whistleblowers. A reformed law could distinguish between traditional espionage and public interest disclosure, preventing future charges against sources who leak to the media to expose government wrongdoing.

President Trump has repeatedly called the media the “enemy of the people” and suggested they should face prison for publishing secret material. Congressional Republicans have shown little interest in restricting the Justice Department’s ability to pursue leak investigations.

Why This Matters Beyond One Reporter

The raid isn’t about one reporter or one leak investigation. It’s about whether the media in the United States will retain the ability to investigate government wrongdoing.

Edward Snowden’s disclosures exposed mass surveillance programs the government was conducting in secret, prompting debate and leading to legislative restrictions on surveillance authorities. Chelsea Manning’s leaks revealed civilian casualties and detention practices that the public had a right to know about. Reality Winner’s leak showed foreign interference in U.S. elections.

All of these individuals were charged or could have been charged under the Espionage Act. All of them gave material to the media with the expectation that it would be published and the public would be informed.

If the government can raid homes of reporters and seize their devices whenever a source leaks secret material, that entire category of reporting becomes impossible. Sources won’t come forward if they know the reporter can’t protect them. Reporters can’t report on government wrongdoing if they can’t communicate securely with sources.

First Amendment lawyer Theodore Boutrous told NPR the raid is “troubling” and potentially violates laws and guidelines protecting the media. But “potentially violates” isn’t the same as “clearly violates.” The legal protections for the media are weaker than most people realize, and they’re getting weaker.

The 107-Year-Old Law in 2025

A law written to catch German spies in 1917 is now used primarily to charge government employees who talk to the media. An administration openly hostile to the media has weakened the guidelines that previously limited how aggressively federal attorneys could go after reporters. For the first time in American history, the FBI has raided a reporter’s home as part of a leak investigation.

The Espionage Act has traveled a long way from its origins. It started as a tool against foreign espionage. It became a weapon against political dissidents. Then it evolved into a mechanism for charging whistleblowers. Now it’s being used to justify raiding homes of reporters and seizing the devices they use to communicate with sources.

At each stage of this evolution, the government has claimed it’s protecting security. At each stage, the definition of what threatens security has expanded to include more and more material that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing.

The question now is whether courts will push back, whether Congress will act, or whether this becomes the new normal—a world where reporters who report on leaked material know that the FBI might show up at their door with a warrant, and sources who talk to the media know that their communications might be seized from the reporter’s devices.

Freedom advocates say the raid was “the product of decades of backsliding” on protections for the media. But it’s also something new—a line that previous administrations, even aggressive ones, chose not to cross.