Can Congress Block Presidential Tariffs? The Legislative Tools That Exist.

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The gap between what Congress can do and what Congress does tells you almost everything you need to know about how power works in Washington. Over the past century, Congress has deliberately transferred its power through trade laws, giving presidents the power to set tariffs instead of keeping that power for themselves. Now, faced with an administration that has pushed those delegations to their breaking point, Congress has multiple ways to take that power back. It hasn’t bothered.

Congress has multiple tools available to reclaim tariff authority, but political calculations make even a Republican-controlled Congress reluctant to constrain a Republican president—even when that president’s tariffs are costing their constituents real money.

The Supreme Court Delay and Congressional Opportunity

The Supreme Court heard arguments on November 5, 2025. By early February 2026, they still haven’t ruled. The extended timeline suggests the justices disagree about how much power the president has to impose tariffs.

For congressional staffers on the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee—the two committees with jurisdiction over trade—this delay provides time to draft legislative language, count votes, and figure out which legislative route offers the best chance of success if the Court rules against the administration.

If the Court strikes down the administration’s tariffs, new tariff proclamations could land within days of a decision. Congress that wants to block that pivot needs to be ready the moment the justices rule.

The Congressional Review Act: Fast but Legally Uncertain

The fastest weapon Congress has is the Congressional Review Act. When a federal agency issues a rule, that rule must be submitted to Congress. The vote happens quickly—senators can’t delay it with endless speeches, and House debate is limited. Both chambers pass it, the resolution goes to the president for signature or veto. The president vetoes, Congress needs two-thirds of members in both chambers voting yes to override.

The catch is whether Congress can legally use this process to block tariffs the president has announced. Some scholars argue that tariff proclamations are presidential actions, not agency rules, and therefore aren’t covered by the CRA. Others contend that the implementing regulations issued by Customs and Border Protection could be targeted, even if the presidential proclamation itself can’t be.

If Congress tries to use the CRA against IEEPA tariffs and the administration argues Congress doesn’t have the legal authority to do this, the administration could sue to block Congress, and courts would take months to decide. The tariffs would remain in place while courts sorted out whether Congress even had the authority to disapprove them this way.

Amending the Statutes: Slower but Permanent

Congress could amend the statutes that grant tariff authority. This is the slower approach, but it creates lasting change because it rewrites the law itself instead of blocking one tariff decision.

The standard legislative process applies: introduce a bill, assign it to committee, hold hearings, amend it in committee, debate it on the floor, pass it in one chamber, send it to the other chamber for the same process, work out the differences between the two versions, and send it to the president. From introduction to final passage, this typically takes four to six months for significant legislation.

Congress could clearly state in the law that the president can’t use IEEPA to impose tariffs—resolving the current case legislatively. It could amend statutes to require a narrower definition of “national security threat” or require Congress to vote again every few years to keep the law in effect. It could modify trade laws so Congress would have to vote to approve tariffs before they could be imposed above a certain threshold.

Each approach would require either the president’s signature or a two-thirds majority to override his veto.

Section 232 and Section 301: The Backup Authorities

If the Court strikes down IEEPA tariffs, the administration will likely pivot to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Section 232 authorizes tariffs on goods that the Commerce Department determines threaten national security. Once an investigation is complete, the president can do whatever he wants with those recommendations. There’s no limit on the size of tariffs that can be imposed, no requirement that they be “reasonable,” and no sunset date. Tariffs imposed under Section 232 can remain in place indefinitely.

Congress doesn’t have much power to stop Section 232 tariffs. The statute provides no mechanism for congressional disapproval. Congress could amend Section 232 itself—for example, by requiring congressional approval for any national security tariffs above a certain threshold.

Section 301 provides the U.S. Trade Representative authority to investigate foreign trade practices deemed “unjustifiable,” “unreasonable,” or “discriminatory,” and to impose retaliatory tariffs if those practices are confirmed. Unlike Section 232, Section 301 is explicitly intended for retaliatory trade actions rather than national security concerns. Congress could add language to spending bills that blocks funding for certain tariff investigations or enforcement actions, thereby blocking specific tariff actions indirectly.

The Appropriations Rider Strategy: Defunding Enforcement

Congress must pass spending bills every year to keep the government running, and those bills provide leverage points for attaching policy restrictions. A carefully drafted provision could specify that no funds appropriated to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Commerce Department, or the Trade Representative’s office may be spent to collect, enforce, or defend tariffs imposed under specified authorities. This wouldn’t officially cancel the president’s power to impose tariffs, but it would make enforcement impossible by cutting the budget for the agencies that would enforce the tariffs.

The House has rules limiting the types of policy riders that can be attached to spending bills. Using this power requires compliance with precise parliamentary procedures and faces resistance—some members think it’s unfair to sneak policy changes into spending bills.

If Congress attached a tariff-defunding provision to a must-pass spending bill, the president could threaten a veto, forcing Congress to choose between funding the government and blocking tariffs. In a scenario where the president strongly supports tariffs and his party controls at least one chamber, that veto threat would likely prevail.

The Veto Override Math: Why It Probably Won’t Happen

Most legislative mechanisms for blocking tariffs would require a presidential veto override—two-thirds of members in both chambers voting yes. Veto overrides are rare because they require such large majorities.

Are there circumstances where that many Republicans might break ranks? Political observers have identified certain groups of Republicans who might vote against the president: senators and representatives from states with significant import-dependent manufacturing, agricultural exporters facing retaliatory tariffs, or retail industries where tariffs raise consumer costs.

Some Republicans have already shown willingness to vote against Trump on tariff matters. In 2025, Lisa Murkowski, Susan Collins, Mitch McConnell, and Rand Paul broke party ranks on National Emergencies Act votes related to tariffs. But criticizing a policy already in place is different from taking power away from the president. The former involves objecting to something already implemented; the latter involves owning whatever happens if tariffs are blocked.

Tariffs on steel and aluminum impose costs on manufacturers in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic that depend on these materials. Tariffs on agricultural goods invite retaliation against American farm exports, harming agricultural states throughout the Farm Belt. Tariffs on consumer electronics and vehicles raise costs for retailers and automotive manufacturers. These impacts hurt specific groups of voters and businesses. Members representing those constituencies face pressure from affected businesses and workers. During the 2019-2020 steel and aluminum tariff episode, some Republican members expressed private concerns about tariff impacts on their constituents’ jobs and businesses.

Those private concerns haven’t translated into public veto override attempts.

Why Congress Hasn’t Used These Tools

Congress has all these mechanisms for blocking presidential tariffs, yet has rarely deployed them. The answer involves both structural factors built into how Congress works and contingent political circumstances specific to this moment.

First: the legislative process is deliberately slow and requires lots of agreement before major changes happen. Once the president has imposed tariffs, those tariffs generate immediate revenue and create immediate economic effects. Reversing them requires legislative action that must overcome procedural hurdles, committee negotiations, floor debates, and potential filibuster or veto. Those trying to block tariffs have to do more work than those defending them.

Second: party alignment. When a president and the majority party in Congress share policy goals, the majority party faces powerful reasons not to constrain the president’s authority, even if formal constitutional power nominally rests with Congress. Congress gave the president tariff power precisely because Congress wanted him to use it to achieve what Congress wanted. This dynamic was evident during Trump’s first administration, when Republican-controlled Congresses refrained from passing legislation to restrict tariffs despite vocal concerns from affected industries.

Third: individual members benefit from staying quiet. Members from districts hurt by tariffs want to complain and get special deals for their local businesses. They may propose amendments, attend hearings, and issue critical statements. But they face competing reasons not to take the step of voting to override a presidential veto or support statutory amendments that would transfer authority away from the president. Such votes appear—to constituents unfamiliar with procedural details—as opposing the president. In a party-aligned legislature, voting against the president on his main policy could mean losing party support and facing a challenge from a primary opponent.

Members from import-heavy districts often receive campaign contributions from companies and unions that oppose tariffs. But those same members also represent districts with other economic interests that may benefit from tariffs or that prioritize loyalty to party and president. The result is that members are torn, so they don’t take strong action.

Fourth: uncertainty about effects. If Congress blocks IEEPA tariffs, the administration could pivot to alternative authorities and continue imposing tariffs. If Congress conditions spending on tariff restrictions, the president could veto and force a government shutdown. If Congress attempts to override a veto and fails, it would be a public humiliation that strengthens the president’s hand. Members might instead try to get special deals for their industries or help individual constituents rather than pick a big fight.

How Other Democracies Handle Tariff Authority

While the U.S. Constitution explicitly vests tariff power in Congress, many other democracies maintain legislative control through different mechanisms.

The European Union represents perhaps the most instructive comparison. Member states have delegated tariff authority to the European Commission, but the European Parliament maintains significant oversight through legislative procedures, including the power to approve or disapprove trade agreements and change the rules that carry them out. The Commission must explain its tariff decisions and Parliament can review and question them.

The United Kingdom and Canada provide additional examples. In both countries, Parliament retains power to approve or disapprove major trade agreements, with legislative procedures requiring Parliament to approve first, rather than trying to block after. The normal rule is that the executive needs parliament’s approval for trade actions, not merely subject to potential disapproval if Parliament can muster the votes.

This changes who has to do the work: the executive has to get approval first, which changes how they behave. The executive must negotiate legislative support before implementing trade policy, rather than implementing policy and then defending it against legislative challenge.

Congress deliberately transferred its power to the president over time. Congress could change the law to require its approval before the president can impose certain types of tariffs, giving Congress more power to control tariff policy.

The Timeline After the Court Rules

When the Court issues its decision—expected by late February or early March 2026, though possibly delayed further—Congress will face a compressed timeline. The Court’s ruling will determine what happens next. The justices might order the government to stop collecting tariffs and pay back the money already collected. Or they might allow the administration time to propose alternative bases. They might only block the specific tariffs in this case, leaving open the possibility that the president could use IEEPA for other tariffs.

Assuming the Court strikes down the IEEPA tariffs and the administration has been preparing alternative authorities, new tariff proclamations could arrive within days. From that point, Congress’s timeline depends on which approach it chooses.

If Congress attempted statutory amendment, the process would take months as the bill went through committees and floor votes. How fast Congress votes would depend on political circumstances. If there were urgency and consensus, a bill might reach a floor vote within weeks. If the legislation faced opposition from the president’s party or the administration, the party in charge would decide when to hold a vote, and the bill might never get a vote.

The Refund Question as Leverage

An issue complicating congressional response is the question of refunds for tariffs already collected. If the Court rules that IEEPA tariffs were unlawful, importers and businesses could demand refunds of the tariffs they paid. The justices might order immediate refunds, or they might leave the question to lower courts.

Congress will have to decide about refunds, which gives it bargaining power. Congress could say it will approve refunds only if the president agrees to limits on future tariffs. Or Congress could require that it vote to approve refunds, forcing the president to accept limits on his power in exchange for Congress approving refunds.

The amount of money involved is substantial. If tariffs were collected under authority later found unlawful and those tariffs were refunded, the federal government would lose substantial revenue. Depending on when this happens, the government might need to borrow money or cut other programs.

Power Without Will

Congress has substantial power to block or overturn presidential tariffs. The Congressional Review Act, statutory amendment, spending bill provisions, and the authority to override a presidential veto all provide mechanisms through which Congress could reassert control over tariff policy.

Using any of these tools requires Congress to choose to use them. That choice involves risks and uncertainty that have historically discouraged Congress from acting.

The Court’s imminent decision creates a moment when these questions are no longer academic. If the justices rule against the administration, Congress will have to decide whether to let the president switch to other laws to impose tariffs or to use the decision as a reason to pass laws that limit the president’s tariff power.

The legislative tools exist, they’re well-understood, and Congress can use them if it decides the time is right to reassert the constitutional power over tariffs that Congress transferred to the president but never fully surrendered.

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