About the Emergency Assistance for Non-Public Schools (EANS) Program

Last updated 2 days ago. Our resources are updated regularly but please keep in mind that links, programs, policies, and contact information do change.

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered unprecedented disruptions across the U.S. K-12 education landscape. School closures, abrupt shifts to remote learning, and heightened health concerns created immense challenges for both public and non-public schools, necessitating significant federal intervention.

While large-scale relief packages like the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) fund primarily targeted public school districts, Congress recognized the unique pressures facing non-public elementary and secondary schools and established the Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) program.

EANS was designed specifically to provide services and assistance to eligible non-public schools grappling with educational disruptions and operational challenges stemming from COVID-19. It was authorized initially under the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (CRRSA Act) as EANS I, then extended and modified by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP Act), creating EANS II (often referred to as ARP EANS).

Structurally, EANS operated under the umbrella of the Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (GEER) Fund but functioned as a distinct program with its own appropriation and rules. This separation had a significant consequence: unlike under the initial CARES Act, local educational agencies (LEAs) were not required to provide equitable services to non-public schools using the primary COVID relief funds (ESSER II, GEER II) authorized by the CRRSA and ARP Acts. Instead, EANS provided a direct, albeit state-administered, channel of support.

This structure suggests a Congressional intent to create a more streamlined pathway for delivering aid to non-public schools during the crisis, potentially avoiding administrative complexities or perceived delays sometimes associated with the standard equitable services process.

Funding the EANS Program: Scale and Distribution

Congress allocated substantial resources to the EANS program, reflecting the perceived need within the non-public school sector. Two separate appropriations of $2.75 billion each were made, first under the CRRSA Act for EANS I and then under the ARP Act for EANS II, resulting in a total federal commitment of $5.5 billion.

The distribution mechanism involved several steps. Funds flowed from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to the Governors of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. To receive these funds, each Governor had to submit an application or a signed Certification and Agreement to ED. Upon accepting the EANS award, the Governor automatically designated the State Educational Agency (SEA) – typically the state’s department of education – to administer the program. The SEA then served as the fiscal agent, responsible for managing the funds and overseeing service delivery to eligible schools.

ED allocated the EANS funds to each Governor based on a specific formula: the state’s relative share of children aged 5 through 17 who were from families with incomes at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty level and enrolled in non-public schools. This allocation method embedded an equity consideration into the program’s financial structure from the outset.

Reflecting the program’s emergency nature, initial timelines were aggressive. Governors had specific deadlines to apply, and once a state received its award, the SEA was expected to make applications available to non-public schools within 30 days and approve or deny those applications within another 30 days. Furthermore, SEAs were initially required to obligate all EANS funds within a tight six-month window after receiving the award.

However, the practical realities of setting up and running this novel program led to significant extensions of these deadlines. The obligation deadline for EANS I funds was ultimately extended to September 30, 2023. The final date for liquidating (spending) these funds varied, with some states closing out by September 30, 2023, while others had performance periods ending June 30, 2024. For EANS II, the obligation deadline was extended to September 30, 2024. The liquidation period for EANS II could be further extended through a waiver process, potentially allowing spending into mid-2025 or beyond for states receiving approval.

This substantial gap between the initial six-month SEA obligation requirement and the eventual multi-year extensions points to an underestimation of the time and effort required for SEAs to effectively implement EANS. Any EANS funds that an SEA failed to obligate within the required timeframe were to revert to the Governor for use under the broader GEER II program.

Who Was Eligible? Navigating EANS Criteria

Eligibility for receiving services or assistance under the EANS program involved multiple layers of criteria, with significant differences between the first round (EANS I) and the second round (EANS II).

Basic Eligibility Criteria (Both EANS I and EANS II)

For a non-public school to be considered for EANS services in either round, it had to meet several fundamental requirements:

• Non-Profit Status: The school must operate on a non-profit basis
• Compliance with State Law: It must be accredited, licensed, or otherwise operate in accordance with state law
• Pre-Pandemic Existence: The school must have been in existence prior to March 13, 2020, the date the national emergency was declared

EANS I (CRRSA) Specific Eligibility Factors

Beyond the basic criteria, EANS I included two key distinguishing factors:

Prioritization, Not Exclusion: SEAs were mandated to prioritize the provision of services or assistance to non-public schools that enrolled students from low-income families and were most impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. This meant that while needier schools were served first, other eligible schools were not automatically excluded if funds remained.

The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Restriction: A critical eligibility barrier existed for EANS I related to the SBA’s PPP loans. A non-public school was ineligible to receive EANS I services or assistance if it applied for and received a PPP loan on or after December 27, 2020. This restriction applied for the duration of the school’s participation in EANS I. However, schools that had received PPP loans before December 27, 2020, remained eligible for EANS I.

This PPP restriction created a difficult choice for schools needing financial support later in the pandemic. Those facing payroll crises after December 27, 2020, might have opted for PPP, thereby forfeiting access to the potentially broader range of support offered by EANS I.

EANS II (ARP) Specific Eligibility Factors

The ARP Act significantly tightened the eligibility criteria for EANS II, shifting from prioritization to mandatory requirements:

Mandatory Low-Income Threshold: Under ARP EANS, an SEA could only provide services or assistance to eligible non-public schools that enrolled a “significant percentage” of students from low-income families.

• Definition of Low-Income Family: Students aged 5-17 whose family income didn’t exceed 185% of the 2020 Federal poverty level
• Definition of “Significant Percentage”: The Department of Education established a default threshold of 40% or more students from low-income families
• State Alternative Percentage Option: ED allowed Governors to request approval for a lower percentage based on specific state circumstances. States like Ohio (25%) and Texas (22%) successfully applied for and used alternate percentages

Mandatory “Most Impacted” Criteria: In addition to the low-income threshold, an eligible school under EANS II also had to be determined by the SEA to be among those “most impacted” by the COVID-19 emergency.

The shift from EANS I’s prioritization approach to EANS II’s strict dual-eligibility requirements represented a fundamental change. The introduction of the mandatory “significant percentage” rule, especially the high 40% default threshold, proved highly controversial. Critics argued this would exclude many non-public schools that were still facing pandemic-related challenges.

Allowable Uses: Supporting Schools Through Crisis

The EANS program authorized SEAs to provide a range of specific services and assistance to eligible non-public schools. It’s crucial to understand that EANS funds were generally not provided as direct grants to schools; rather, the SEA (or its contractors) procured and delivered the approved support.

Allowable uses fell into several broad categories:

Health and Safety Measures

• Supplies for sanitizing, disinfecting, and cleaning school facilities
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) like masks and gloves
• Measures to improve ventilation systems
• Physical barriers to facilitate social distancing
• Other materials or equipment recommended by the CDC for safe reopening

COVID-19 Testing and Monitoring

• Expanding capacity to administer coronavirus tests
• Support for surveillance and contact tracing activities

Educational Technology

• Hardware (laptops, tablets)
• Software
• Internet connectivity
• Assistive technology and adaptive equipment

Addressing Learning Loss and Instructional Adjustments

• Redeveloping instructional plans and curriculum for remote/hybrid learning
• Initiating or maintaining education and support services, including tutoring

Staff Support

• Training and professional development focused on sanitation, proper use of PPE, and strategies for minimizing disease spread

Facilities and Transportation

• Leasing temporary sites or spaces to ensure safe social distancing
• Reasonable transportation costs associated with pandemic response

Unallowable Uses

• Major capital improvements or construction
• Permanent renovations (though some ventilation improvements were allowed)
• Purchasing school buses
• Directly paying personnel salaries

The Secular, Neutral, Non-Ideological Mandate

A critical constraint applied across the board: all services, assistance, materials, equipment, and other items provided using EANS funds had to be “secular, neutral, and non-ideological.” This requirement was fundamental to the program’s design, aiming to ensure that public funds supported only the non-religious aspects of school operations related to the pandemic response.

Contrasting Reimbursement Rules

A major operational difference existed between the two phases of EANS regarding reimbursement:

EANS I (CRRSA): This phase allowed SEAs to reimburse non-public schools for many allowable expenses, provided the costs were incurred on or after March 13, 2020, were reasonable and necessary, and had not already been paid for with other federal funds. This offered schools flexibility but required that title to any reimbursed materials or equipment be transferred to the SEA or another public agency.

EANS II (ARP): The ARP Act explicitly prohibited SEAs from using EANS II funds to provide reimbursements to any non-public school. All support under EANS II had to be delivered as direct services or assistance procured and managed by the SEA or its designated contractors.

The elimination of the reimbursement option in EANS II had significant practical consequences. While it likely simplified concerns about whether participating schools would be deemed “recipients of Federal financial assistance,” it simultaneously shifted a substantial administrative and logistical burden onto the SEAs.

How EANS Worked: Administration and Implementation

The EANS program operated through a distinct administrative structure involving federal, state, and school-level actors. The Governor of each participating state or territory played the initial role by applying to the U.S. Department of Education for the state’s allocated EANS funds and, upon acceptance, formally designating the State Educational Agency (SEA) to manage the program. The SEA then became the central administrative hub, acting as the fiscal agent responsible for drawing down federal funds and overseeing all aspects of program implementation.

Non-public schools did not receive EANS funds directly as grants. Instead, eligible schools had to apply to their state’s SEA to request specific services or assistance allowable under the program. The SEA was responsible for developing this application process, ensuring the application form was easily accessible, and distributing information about the program promptly to all potentially eligible non-public schools within the state.

The application itself required schools to provide necessary information for the SEA to determine eligibility and prioritize requests, including:

• Enrollment data (particularly the number and percentage of low-income students)
• Details about the specific services or assistance being requested
• Connection to pandemic disruptions
• Assurances of compliance with program rules

The program statutes set ambitious timelines for SEAs:

• Make the application available to non-public schools within 30 days after receiving EANS funds
• Process each application within 30 days after receiving it

A cornerstone of the EANS administrative model was the requirement that the SEA (or another designated public agency) maintain control over the program funds and hold legal title to all materials, equipment, and property purchased with those funds, even when these items were used by the non-public school. Services were provided either directly by the public agency or through third-party contractors hired by the SEA.

This structure ensured public control over the use of federal funds and assets, a key element in navigating church-state complexities, but it also positioned the SEA as an intermediary gatekeeper and direct service provider (or contract manager) for non-public schools. This represented a significant departure from the typical SEA role focused on public school systems and added layers of administrative complexity.

Accountability: Reporting, Compliance, and Oversight

The significant federal investment in the EANS program came with substantial accountability requirements for both the SEAs administering the funds and the non-public schools receiving services.

Federal Reporting Requirements

SEAs, as the prime recipients of EANS grants, faced several federal reporting mandates:

FFATA Reporting: Under the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, SEAs were required to report monthly on any subawards valued at $30,000 or more through the federal FSRS system.

Annual State Performance Reports: SEAs were obligated to submit annual reports to ED detailing how they used their EANS funds during the performance period through the ED’s Annual Report Data Collection Tool.

Real Property Reporting: For any EANS-funded projects involving renovations, major remodeling, or construction, SEAs had ongoing annual reporting requirements using Standard Form 429 (Real Property Status Report) and its attachments.

Compliance Monitoring and Oversight

Oversight occurred at multiple levels:

SEA Responsibility: SEAs bore the primary responsibility for ensuring that non-public schools receiving services met all eligibility criteria, that requested services were allowable and appropriate, and that the program was implemented according to federal and state rules.

Federal Oversight: The U.S. Department of Education conducted its own monitoring of state EANS programs, and the ED Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed audits to evaluate the administration and oversight of EANS funds.

OIG Audit Example (Tennessee): An OIG audit of Tennessee’s EANS program identified several weaknesses, including:

• Drawing down EANS I funds to cover EANS II expenditures without proper documentation
• Failing initially to establish an adequate inventory system to track assets
• Neglecting to obtain required prior written approval for equipment purchases exceeding $5,000 per unit

These findings highlight how the combination of a novel program structure, rapid deployment, and administrative complexities could lead to significant compliance gaps.

Record-Keeping and Asset Management

School Responsibilities: Non-public schools participating in EANS were typically required to maintain relevant programmatic and financial records related to the services received.

Asset Management and Disposition: Because the SEA retained title to all items purchased with EANS funds, managing these assets throughout their lifecycle and ensuring proper disposition at the program’s end was a critical SEA responsibility. This involved:

• Maintaining an accurate inventory of all equipment and supplies
• Consulting with non-public schools near the end of the EANS performance period
• Following specific federal regulations for disposition, depending on the item type and its current fair market value

Assessing the Impact: Did EANS Meet Its Goals?

The Emergency Assistance for Non-Public Schools program was established to help eligible non-public schools address educational disruptions caused by COVID-19, support safe operations, facilitate remote or hybrid learning, and mitigate learning loss. Determining the extent to which the $5.5 billion program achieved these aims, however, proves challenging.

EANS provided a significant infusion of resources specifically targeted at the non-public school sector. The allowable uses directly addressed key operational and instructional challenges:

• PPE, sanitation supplies, and ventilation improvements likely contributed to safer in-person learning environments
• Support for educational technology was crucial for enabling remote and hybrid instruction
• Resources dedicated to addressing learning loss aimed to counteract academic setbacks

The importance of the EANS program to the non-public school community is evident from the active engagement of national and state private school organizations like the Council for American Private Education (CAPE) and the National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA). These groups played vital roles in disseminating information, hosting webinars, connecting schools with service providers, and advocating regarding program rules.

Despite the clear allocation of resources and alignment with pandemic needs, definitively measuring the program’s overall impact remains difficult. The available documentation focuses heavily on the mechanics of the program rather than assessing effectiveness in terms of student outcomes or operational improvements.

Consequently, while EANS undeniably directed $5.5 billion towards non-public schools for critical pandemic-related needs, the existing evidence base is insufficient to draw firm conclusions about its ultimate effectiveness.

Challenges and Controversies Surrounding EANS

The EANS program faced numerous challenges and controversies throughout its implementation, spanning constitutional concerns, equity debates, administrative hurdles, and legal disputes.

Church-State Separation Concerns

Providing public funds to religiously affiliated non-public schools inevitably raises questions under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The EANS program included specific design features intended to mitigate these concerns:

• Public control of all EANS funds
• Public title to all materials and equipment purchased
• Strict secular use mandate for all services and materials

Despite these precautions, concerns remained. Under EANS I, which allowed reimbursement of past expenditures, questions arose about whether participation might render a non-public school a “recipient of Federal financial assistance,” potentially subjecting schools to broader federal regulations like Title IX.

Equity and Fairness Issues

Several aspects of the EANS program design sparked debates about fairness:

EANS II Low-Income Threshold: The ARP Act’s requirement that EANS II funds only go to schools enrolling a “significant percentage” of low-income students, coupled with ED’s 40% default threshold, was highly contentious. Many argued this excluded schools still significantly impacted by the pandemic but serving slightly less impoverished populations.

EANS I PPP Interaction: The rule disqualifying schools from EANS I if they received a PPP loan on or after December 27, 2020, created potential inequities based on the timing of a school’s financial need.

Targeting vs. Universal Access: These eligibility debates reflect a larger tension in designing aid programs: should resources be narrowly targeted to those deemed most in need or provided more broadly to all institutions affected by a crisis?

Administrative Burden and Complexity

The EANS program imposed significant administrative burdens:

Impact on SEAs: SEAs faced a heavy workload, particularly given the program’s novelty and rapid rollout. They had to quickly develop expertise in new federal regulations, create application systems, manage complex procurement processes, ensure compliance, track assets, and handle extensive reporting requirements.

Impact on Schools: Non-public schools also faced burdens related to understanding program rules, completing applications, providing documentation, and coordinating with SEAs and vendors to receive services.

Link to Compliance Issues: The administrative complexity likely contributed to compliance problems identified in audits, such as the issues with drawdowns, asset tracking, and prior approvals found in Tennessee.

Legal and Political Disputes

The broader context of pandemic relief funding was politically charged, leading to legal challenges. Lawsuits were filed by coalitions of states against the Department of Education challenging decisions related to the termination or clawback of access to unspent COVID-19 education relief funds, including ESSER, ARP-HCY, and EANS funds.

Lessons from the EANS Experiment

The Emergency Assistance for Non-Public Schools program directed $5.5 billion in dedicated resources towards supporting the nation’s non-public elementary and secondary schools through an unprecedented crisis. Its core objectives were to help these schools address educational disruptions, maintain safe operations, facilitate remote and hybrid learning, and mitigate student learning loss.

In terms of successes, EANS undeniably provided a vital lifeline to many non-public schools, offering resources for essential health and safety supplies, technology upgrades, and academic supports during a period of immense strain. It represented a direct federal commitment to a sector that typically receives federal aid indirectly.

However, the program was also marked by significant challenges. Eligibility criteria proved complex and controversial, particularly the EANS I restriction related to PPP loans and the stringent mandatory low-income threshold imposed under EANS II. The administrative structure placed considerable burdens on State Educational Agencies, leading to implementation delays and documented compliance issues. Despite safeguards, underlying tensions regarding the use of public resources for religious institutions persisted. Finally, a lack of comprehensive evaluation data makes it difficult to definitively assess the program’s long-term impact.

The EANS experiment offers several potential lessons for future emergency education aid initiatives:

1. Clarity and Consistency: Eligibility rules should be clear, consistent, and predictable to minimize confusion and ensure equitable access. Mid-program shifts in fundamental eligibility criteria can create significant disruption.
2. Balancing Speed and Feasibility: While emergencies demand rapid action, program timelines must realistically account for the administrative capacity of implementing agencies. Overly ambitious deadlines can compromise effective oversight.
3. Delivery Mechanism Matters: The choice between different aid delivery models has profound implications for administrative burden, compliance risks, and implementation speed. The EANS shift from reimbursement to direct service highlights this dynamic.
4. Navigating Church-State Boundaries: Designing programs that support religiously affiliated institutions requires careful attention to constitutional principles. Mechanisms like public control of funds are crucial but may not eliminate all controversy.
5. Building in Evaluation: Future programs should incorporate robust data collection and evaluation plans to enable meaningful assessment of their impact and effectiveness.

The Emergency Assistance for Non-Public Schools program was a notable, large-scale federal intervention born from crisis. It provided substantial, targeted aid but also encountered significant hurdles related to eligibility, administration, and constitutional sensitivities. Its complex legacy serves as an important case study for policymakers considering how best to support the diverse landscape of American education during future national emergencies.

Our articles make government information more accessible. Please consult a qualified professional for financial, legal, or health advice specific to your circumstances.