A History of US Policy Toward Venezuela: From Monroe to Maduro

Last updated 2 months ago. Our resources are updated regularly but please keep in mind that links, programs, policies, and contact information do change.

The relationship between the United States and Venezuela spans nearly two centuries of dramatic shifts, from early republican partnership to today’s bitter standoff.

Formally established in 1835, this diplomatic history reveals how strategic oil interests, ideological conflicts between democracy and authoritarianism, and America’s evolving hemispheric role have shaped policy toward one of Latin America’s most important nations.

Understanding this history is essential for grasping Venezuela’s current crisis and the complex role the United States has played in its development.

Foundations of Partnership (1835-1908)

The United States recognized Venezuela as an independent nation on February 28, 1835, following its separation from Gran Colombia. This act continued American support for South American independence movements, with Venezuelan leaders like Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Miranda having visited the United States, studied its founding documents, and corresponded with American political figures.

Early relations centered on commerce and Pan-American ideals. The first U.S. consulate opened in Maracaibo in 1824, with a formal commercial treaty signed in 1836. But President James Monroe’s 1823 doctrine declaring the Western Hemisphere off-limits to European colonization would most profoundly shape U.S.-Venezuelan relations for the next century.

The 1895 Boundary Crisis

For much of the 19th century, Venezuela was locked in a territorial dispute with Great Britain over the western boundary of British Guiana (modern-day Guyana). Venezuela appealed to the United States for help, citing the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1895, President Grover Cleveland’s administration intervened decisively. Secretary of State Richard Olney sent a strongly worded note to London, reframing the border dispute as a Monroe Doctrine violation and demanding British submission to arbitration. Olney boldly declared that “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”

When Britain initially refused, Cleveland asked Congress for authorization to appoint a boundary commission and enforce its findings “by every means,” prompting serious war talk between the powers. Facing this firm stance and managing its global empire, Britain ultimately agreed to arbitration. Though the 1899 tribunal largely favored British claims, the episode marked the first time the United States successfully wielded the Monroe Doctrine against a major European power.

The 1902-1903 Crisis and Roosevelt Corollary

Less than a decade later, Venezuela experienced a dramatically different Monroe Doctrine application. In 1902, Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro refused to pay foreign debts and compensate European citizens for civil war damages. Britain, Germany, and Italy responded with a naval blockade of Venezuelan ports.

Castro assumed the Monroe Doctrine would compel U.S. intervention, as in 1895. He was wrong. President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration saw the doctrine as prohibiting European territorial seizure, not debt collection intervention. With European assurances of no territorial ambitions, the U.S. remained neutral, allowing the blockade to proceed. Roosevelt had previously stated that “if any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it.”

The crisis was resolved through international arbitration, but the episode unsettled Washington. U.S. policymakers feared such interventions could become pretexts for prolonged European military presence in the hemisphere. This concern, sparked by Venezuelan events, led directly to fundamental Monroe Doctrine reinterpretation.

In 1904, Roosevelt issued his famous Roosevelt Corollary. The Corollary unilaterally asserted U.S. rights to exercise “international police power” in the Western Hemisphere. In cases of “chronic wrongdoing” by Latin American nations that might invite “foreign aggression,” the United States would intervene to stabilize economic affairs and forestall European involvement.

These two crises, seven years apart, demonstrated early U.S. policy’s flexible, self-serving nature. The Monroe Doctrine wasn’t a fixed protection principle but a malleable tool for a rising power defining its sphere of influence. The policy shifted from warning against European colonization to justifying U.S. intervention—a pivot catalyzed by Venezuelan events that laid ideological groundwork for a century of Latin American interventionism.

The Age of Oil and Dictators (1908-1958)

Vast petroleum reserve discovery and commercial exploitation after World War I permanently altered U.S.-Venezuela relations. Oil transformed Venezuela from a relatively poor, agrarian nation into a global energy powerhouse, making it a top-tier U.S. strategic priority. By the late 1930s, Venezuela had become the world’s leading oil exporter.

From this point forward, U.S. policy objectives focused overwhelmingly on ensuring stable and “adequate supply of petroleum, especially in time of war”. For the next half-century, this “petro-diplomacy” would consistently take precedence over stated American ideals of promoting democracy.

Supporting Venezuelan Dictatorships

Oil security pursuit led Washington to cultivate close relationships with authoritarian rulers who could guarantee stability and favorable business climates for American corporations.

Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935): The U.S. Navy played a role in helping Gómez seize power in a 1908 coup. His long, brutal dictatorship was marked by extreme repression, but he “endeared himself to Washington and Wall Street” by granting highly profitable concessions to foreign oil companies, including American giants like Standard Oil (now ExxonMobil). Gómez’s economic policies laid foundations for the country’s oil-dependent economy, with petroleum revenues eventually supplying 95% of foreign exchange.

Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948-1958): In the early Cold War, U.S. priorities shifted to include anti-communism alongside oil security. After Pérez Jiménez overthrew Venezuela’s democratically elected government in a 1948 coup, the United States embraced his fiercely anti-communist regime. His government was notoriously repressive but actively supported Venezuelan natural resource exploitation by American oil companies like Mobil and Exxon. The Eisenhower administration awarded Pérez Jiménez the U.S. military’s Legion of Merit for his “exceptionally meritorious conduct.”

The Good Neighbor Interlude

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy (1933-1945) represented a notable though temporary deviation. This hemispheric initiative renounced armed intervention and emphasized cooperation and trade over military force. The policy’s central tenet was non-interference in Latin American nations’ internal affairs.

While representing a softer diplomatic approach, it didn’t fundamentally alter U.S. strategic interests. The policy was enacted during Gómez regime’s latter years, when U.S. oil interests were already secure. Venezuelan oil’s strategic importance only intensified during World War II, when the country became crucial and reliable Allied war effort supplier. The Good Neighbor Policy era effectively ended with Cold War onset, as oil and anti-communism strategic imperatives reasserted their foreign policy dominance.

This half-century of U.S. policy was defined by stark pragmatism where oil flow served as the ultimate arbiter of American interests. Stated democracy commitments were consistently subordinated to securing energy resources and maintaining regional stability goals, even at the cost of supporting repressive regimes. This approach fostered deep, lasting Venezuelan perceptions that the United States was an ally of corrupt domestic elites and foreign corporate interests—powerful grievances that would fuel nationalist political movements for generations.

Democratic Alliance (1958-1998): The Puntofijo Era

Dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez’s 1958 overthrow ushered in a new era for Venezuela and significant U.S. policy shift. Venezuela established a durable, two-party democratic system through the “Puntofijo Pact,” which would govern the country for the next 40 years. Departing from previous strongmen support, the United States moved to strongly back Venezuela’s new democracy.

During Cold War height, Venezuela became a democratic development showcase and crucial U.S. strategic partner in a region increasingly falling under military dictatorship sway.

President Rómulo Betancourt’s administration (1959-1964), an anti-communist social democrat, was seen by Washington as a vital bulwark against Fidel Castro’s Cuban influence. The United States endorsed Betancourt’s government, providing significant economic and military assistance to help it succeed and fend off threats from leftist, Cuban-backed insurgencies. President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program heavily supported Venezuela, holding it up as a regional model.

The Betancourt Doctrine vs. U.S. Cold War Policy

This partnership flourished despite significant foreign policy ideological divergence. President Betancourt instituted the Betancourt Doctrine, which stipulated Venezuela would refuse diplomatic relations with any government—right or left—that came to power through military coup. This principled pro-democracy stance often put Venezuela at odds with U.S. Cold War strategy, which frequently involved supporting right-wing military regimes to prevent communism spread.

The shared strategic goal of containing Soviet and Cuban influence, however, proved strong enough to override these differences. The U.S. supported Venezuelan democracy because it was stable, reliable, oil-producing, and staunchly anti-communist. This was rare American ideals and interests convergence in the region at the time.

Throughout this period, relations were characterized by strong cooperation in trade, investment, energy, and counter-narcotics efforts. Venezuela remained a major and dependable U.S. oil supplier. However, Puntofijo system stability masked deep-seated problems. The political system was widely seen as an exclusive elite party pact, and government corruption was endemic. This sowed popular disillusionment seeds that would eventually lead to system collapse and the rise of a leader who would fundamentally challenge the long-standing U.S. partnership.

The decades of stable alliance created Washington expectations of a compliant partner, making subsequent anti-American populist Hugo Chávez’s rise not just a policy challenge but a profound strategic shock.

The Bolivarian Rupture (1999-2013): The Hugo Chávez Era

Hugo Chávez’s election as president in 1998—a former army colonel who had led a failed 1992 coup—marked an abrupt, decisive break in U.S.-Venezuela relations. Chávez rode popular anger against Puntofijo system corruption, inequality, and perceived elitism, winning with 56% of the vote on a radical change populist platform.

His “Bolivarian Revolution,” named after 19th-century liberator Simón Bolívar, aimed to fundamentally transform Venezuela’s political and economic order and challenge what he termed U.S. “imperialism” in the hemisphere.

Buoyed by soaring 2000s oil prices, Chávez expanded the state’s economic role, nationalized key industries, and used oil revenues to fund vast social programs known as misiones, which helped reduce poverty and improve healthcare and education access. In foreign policy, he ended decades of close Washington cooperation, forging tight alliances with U.S. adversaries like Cuba and Iran, and used Venezuela’s “oil diplomacy” to build leftist government coalitions across Latin America.

The 2002 Coup: A Point of No Return

The relationship reached a breaking point in April 2002. Amid massive opposition protests, Chávez was briefly overthrown by dissident military officers and business leaders coalition and replaced by interim government headed by businessman Pedro Carmona. The United States’ role in the coup remains intensely debated.

The George W. Bush administration quickly acknowledged the Carmona government, contrasting sharply with other Latin American nations’ condemnation. Subsequent investigative reports and declassified documents revealed senior U.S. officials had foreknowledge of the plot and had met with coup plotters in preceding months.

Within 47 hours, loyalist military factions and massive popular uprising restored Chávez to power. The Bush administration then reversed its position, denied involvement, and publicly called on Chávez to “correct his course” and address opposition grievances. For Chávez and his supporters, however, the U.S. government’s actions were irrefutable proof of hostile intentions. The accusation that Washington backed the coup became central, recurring theme in his anti-American rhetoric, cementing the adversarial relationship nature for his rule’s remainder.

The U.S. handling of the 2002 coup served as powerful catalyst, transforming Chávez’s ideological predispositions into hardened state policy. It appeared to validate his anti-imperialist narrative, which in turn justified his subsequent power consolidation, including state oil company and judiciary politicization, as necessary measures to defend Venezuelan sovereignty against foreign intervention. The U.S. response helped solidify the very adversary it feared, locking both nations into escalating hostility cycles.

Nationalization and U.S. Response

Challenging the U.S.-led economic consensus known as the “Washington Consensus,” Chávez’s government embarked on sweeping nationalization programs. It reasserted state control over strategic economy sectors, including oil projects, telecommunications, electricity, steel, and banking. These moves directly impacted major U.S. corporations that had operated in Venezuela for decades, such as oil giants ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, and service providers like Verizon and AES Corp.

The U.S. response during this period was multifaceted. Diplomatically, it consisted of sharp criticism of Chávez’s democratic backsliding and authoritarian tendencies. Financially, the U.S. provided funding to opposition civil society groups through organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy. Simultaneously, the U.S. began laying legal groundwork for more punitive measures.

Starting in 2005, the U.S. government began annually decertifying Venezuela for “failed demonstrably” to cooperate on counter-narcotics efforts, and from 2006, for “not cooperating fully” with counter-terrorism efforts. These designations, made under U.S. law, authorized the first targeted sanctions and arms sales prohibitions against the Venezuelan state.

Maximum Pressure and Deepening Crisis (2013-Present): The Maduro Era

Following Hugo Chávez’s death from cancer in March 2013, his handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro, assumed the presidency after a narrow, disputed election victory. Maduro inherited an economy already showing severe strain signs from years of mismanagement, corruption, and oil over-dependence. The subsequent 2014 global oil prices collapse plunged Venezuela into catastrophic political, economic, and humanitarian crisis—one of the worst in modern hemispheric history outside of war.

As the economy imploded, Maduro’s government grew increasingly authoritarian. It violently suppressed protests, jailed political opponents, and systematically dismantled the country’s democratic institutions, culminating in effective opposition-controlled National Assembly neutering after 2015 legislative elections. This deepening crisis prompted dramatic U.S. policy escalation, moving from targeted pressure to comprehensive campaign aimed at forcing regime change.

Evolution of U.S. Sanctions Policy

U.S. sanctions against Venezuela have evolved significantly across three presidential administrations, reflecting different strategies for confronting the Maduro regime.

Obama Administration (2013-2017): The initial response built upon the targeted sanctions framework. The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 authorized the president to freeze assets and ban visas for Venezuelan officials implicated in human rights abuses and anti-democratic actions. In a pivotal March 2015 move, President Obama issued Executive Order 13692, which declared the Venezuelan situation an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” This declaration provided broad legal authority for all subsequent sanctions.

Trump Administration (2017-2021): The Trump administration shifted from targeted pressure to “maximum pressure” campaign explicitly designed to oust Maduro. This involved rapid sanctions expansion beyond individuals to encompass the entire Venezuelan economy. Key measures included financial sanctions cutting off the Venezuelan government and its state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from U.S. financial markets; ban on the government’s digital currency; and, most critically, sectoral sanctions blocking all U.S. dealings with PDVSA, the central bank, and gold mining sector. In August 2019, E.O. 13884 effectively blocked all Venezuelan Government property in the United States.

Biden Administration (2021-Present): The Biden administration has maintained the sanctions architecture inherited from Trump years but shifted its tactical approach. Instead of solely applying pressure, it has used limited and reversible sanctions relief offers as bargaining chips to incentivize Maduro government engagement in negotiations with Venezuelan opposition. The goal is securing conditions for free and fair presidential elections.

In October 2023, the U.S. temporarily lifted key sanctions on Venezuela’s oil, gas, and gold sectors after the government and opposition signed the “Barbados Agreement.” However, much of this relief was revoked in April 2024 after the administration determined Maduro had failed to honor key commitments, such as allowing the opposition’s chosen candidate to run for office.

Key U.S. Sanctions Timeline

The Guaidó Gambit

In January 2019, U.S. policy took its most dramatic turn. Following Nicolás Maduro’s widely condemned 2018 re-election, the Trump administration officially recognized Juan Guaidó, the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly president, as Venezuela’s legitimate interim president.

The legal justification was based on Venezuelan constitution interpretation, which the opposition argued made the legislature head interim president in presidential vacancy events. The U.S. contended Maduro’s fraudulent election rendered him illegitimate, thus creating such vacancy.

The United States led nearly 60-country coalition in recognizing Guaidó, gave his government control over some Venezuelan assets held abroad, and intensified sanctions to force Maduro out. However, the strategy ultimately failed to achieve its primary objective. Maduro retained unwavering Venezuelan military and security forces loyalty, as well as crucial backing from international allies like Russia, China, and Cuba.

By early 2023, after the Venezuelan opposition itself voted to dissolve the interim government, the United States officially ceased recognizing Guaidó’s presidential claim.

The Sanctions Debate

U.S. sanctions policy efficacy and morality remain fiercely debated subjects.

Proponents argue sanctions are vital, non-military tools to punish corrupt, dictatorial regimes, deny them financial resources for people repression, and create leverage for democratic transitions. They point out Venezuela’s economic collapse and humanitarian crisis began years before the most severe U.S. sectoral sanctions were imposed in 2017 and 2019, attributing decline primarily to two decades of socialist economic mismanagement and rampant government corruption.

Critics contend broad economic measures, particularly oil industry targeting, have had devastating and indiscriminate humanitarian impact. They argue sanctions have crippled the country’s main revenue source, severely exacerbating food, medicine, and basic goods shortages, and disproportionately harming the most vulnerable Venezuelans. Furthermore, they assert “maximum pressure” policy failed in its political goal of ousting Maduro, instead pushing him deeper into U.S. adversaries’ arms and giving him powerful nationalist narrative to blame the U.S. for the country’s suffering.

In response to the humanitarian crisis, the United States has provided nearly $3.7 billion in aid since 2017 to support Venezuelans both inside the country and those who have fled to the region. The U.S. Treasury has also issued numerous general licenses intended to ensure sanctions don’t impede humanitarian goods flow like food and medicine. However, humanitarian organizations reports and a 2021 U.S. Government Accountability Office study found that sanctions fear and “overcompliance” by financial institutions can still hinder aid delivery.

The Limits of Maximum Pressure

The “maximum pressure” campaign created a profound paradox. While the policy succeeded in inflicting severe Venezuelan economy damage, it failed to achieve its primary political objective. The regime didn’t collapse; instead, Maduro consolidated power, retained military loyalty, and deepened reliance on U.S. adversaries for economic and political lifelines.

The resulting economic devastation fueled unprecedented refugee crisis, with over 7 million Venezuelans fleeing their country, creating major challenges for the U.S. and entire region. This outcome demonstrated stark limits of using unilateral economic sanctions as regime change tools and has forced U.S. policy into more complex, nuanced strategy of leveraging sanctions as bargaining chips in protracted diplomatic stalemate.

The Venezuelan case illustrates broader tensions in American foreign policy between idealistic democracy promotion and pragmatic strategic interests. From early 20th-century support for oil-friendly dictators to 21st-century sanctions aimed at democratic restoration, U.S. policy has consistently reflected immediate strategic priorities over long-term democratic values. Today’s crisis represents the culmination of nearly two centuries of complex, often contradictory engagement—a relationship shaped by oil, ideology, and the persistent challenge of balancing American interests with Latin American sovereignty.

As Venezuela’s crisis continues and regional migration pressures mount, the United States faces difficult choices about how to balance pressure with pragmatism, sanctions with humanitarian concerns, and unilateral action with multilateral cooperation. The history of U.S.-Venezuela relations suggests these tensions are likely to persist, requiring nuanced approaches that learn from past policy failures while adapting to new regional and global realities.

Our articles make government information more accessible. Please consult a qualified professional for financial, legal, or health advice specific to your circumstances.