Why Americans Keep Re-electing Congresspeople They Dislike

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Voters are unhappy with their government. This anti-incumbency sentiment, defined as a desire to vote out officeholders, is a constant in U.S. elections. Polling frequently captures deep dissatisfaction with the way things are going.

This frustration became especially intense in 2024. A “universal malaise” that began with the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by high prices and a surge in migration, drove a powerful global anti-incumbent wave. Voters worldwide expressed frustration with political elites, viewing them as out of touch.

Here’s the paradox: despite this anger, U.S. congressional incumbents almost never lose. In the November 2024 general election, a year defined by anti-incumbent fervor, 95% of incumbents nationwide who ran for re-election won their races. For members of the U.S. Congress specifically, the rate was even higher, hovering between 95% and 98%.

If voters want to “throw the bums out,” why do they keep re-electing the overwhelming majority of them? The answer reveals that structural advantages, voter psychology, and a dramatic shift in the political landscape have created a system that is highly resilient to anti-incumbent sentiment—even as that sentiment grows stronger.

In This Article

• The article highlights the contradiction often called Fenno’s Paradox: while Americans generally dislike the U.S. Congress as an institution, they frequently re‑elect their own representatives.
• It presents data showing very low approval ratings for Congress overall alongside very high re‑election rates for incumbents.
• The piece discusses factors contributing to incumbents’ advantage, including:
  • name recognition and established networks;
  • constituent service (casework, local presence) which builds goodwill;
  • party loyalty and voter behavior (voters may dislike Congress but prefer their local representative or the party they identify with);
  • structural features such as safe seats, districting/gerrymandering, and limited competition.
• It notes that voters may judge “Congress” differently than their own member: they see the institution as gridlocked or partisan, but view their own member more favorably because of local ties and personal contact.
• The article argues that this dynamic makes sweeping change in Congress difficult, even when public dissatisfaction is high.

So What

• Implication for accountability: When voters dislike the institution but keep re‑electing the same people, it suggests that electoral accountability is limited. Voters may express frustration, but their re‑election patterns don’t necessarily force change.
• Impact on reform efforts: Because incumbents are so secure, structural reforms (e.g., redistricting changes, campaign‑finance reform, increasing competition) may be necessary to increase responsiveness rather than relying solely on voters to replace unpopular legislators.
• Understanding voter behaviour: The article sheds light on how voters distinguish between “the institution” and “my representative” — this helps explain why public anger at Congress doesn’t always translate into large electoral turnover.
• Political strategy: For challengers or reform‑minded campaigns, the piece indicates that defeating incumbents isn’t just a matter of raising issues — they must overcome structural advantages like resources, visibility, and local embeddedness.
• Democratic health: The phenomenon raises questions about how healthy the electoral system is when dissatisfaction is high yet change is limited. It may signal inertia, reduced competition, and potential barriers to political renewal.

Hating Congress, Loving Your Congressperson

Political scientist Richard Fenno identified this paradox decades ago. Even when the public holds Congress in extremely low regard, the same public “loves” their own congressman.

In his 1978 book, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Fenno found that incumbents don’t run as members of Congress—they run for their district against Congress. They build a personal brand, a “home style,” that insulates them from national anger.

This is an active survival strategy. A smart incumbent’s primary job is to convince constituents that they are not one of the “bums” who need to be thrown out. They achieve this through relentless local appearances, constituent service, and “credit claiming” for federal projects in the district.

Fenno’s research featured Congressman Barber Conable, a New York Republican. Conable cultivated a bond with his district by going home at least 40 times a year, often traveling without staff to add credibility, and sending a weekly printed newsletter—a rare practice at the time. This built a personal, trustworthy brand separate from the “mess” in Washington.

This strategy severs the link between a voter’s national frustration and their local vote, allowing the incumbent to survive even when their party or Congress as a whole is deeply unpopular.

But the paradox is not as stable as it once was. The strategy relies on a voter’s ability to see their representative as distinct from their national party. Recent research indicates that intense ideological polarization is “considerably lowering” approval for individual legislators.

As voters increasingly judge their representative based on the “R” or “D” next to their name rather than their “home style,” the personal connection Fenno described begins to erode.

Why Your Representative Almost Always Wins

When anti-incumbent sentiment does try to break through, it runs into a fortress of structural advantages that make a challenger’s task incredibly difficult.

Name Recognition and Media

Incumbents begin every race with the one thing challengers must spend millions to acquire: name recognition. By virtue of holding office, they are “always in the public eye” and can generate a steady stream of free media exposure simply by announcing grants, holding press conferences, or appearing at local events.

The Power of the Office

Officeholders command a staff dedicated to constituent service, or casework. This involves helping individuals navigate the federal bureaucracy—cutting through red tape to get a delayed Social Security check, resolving an issue with veterans’ benefits, or assisting with a passport application.

This work is almost entirely non-political and builds a deep, personal reservoir of goodwill. A voter who has been directly helped by their congressperson’s office is highly likely to vote for them, regardless of national political winds.

The Franking Privilege

Since the first Congress, members have enjoyed the “franking privilege,” the right to send mail to their constituents for free, paid for by taxpayers. While this privilege has rules—it cannot be used for overt campaign literature or be sent within 90 days of an election—members use the other 21 months of their term to send a barrage of “official” newsletters, legislative updates, and surveys.

These mailings are politically beneficial, touting the incumbent’s accomplishments and keeping their name in front of voters, all part of a “taxpayer-subsidized election effort.”

The Money Advantage

The single greatest advantage is money. Incumbents raise far more campaign cash than their challengers. In 2022, the average Senate incumbent raised $29.7 million, while the average challenger raised just $2.1 million. In the House, the incumbent spending advantage over challengers has grown from a 3-to-2 ratio in 1972 to a 6.5-to-1 ratio in recent years.

This financial gap is not an accident. A 2014 study used “regression discontinuity design”—which isolates the effect of incumbency by comparing candidates who barely won an election to those who barely lost—to prove that winning office itself causes a 20-25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent’s party.

This cash flows primarily from “access-oriented interest groups.” These groups, often from industries under heavy regulation, are not necessarily donating based on ideology. They are donating because incumbents “make policy” and are “proven winners,” and they want access to those in power.

These advantages create a powerful, self-reinforcing feedback loop. An incumbent has power and name recognition. This power attracts overwhelming sums of money from access-oriented groups. This massive war chest, in turn, scares off high-quality, well-funded challengers.

Facing a weak or unknown opponent, the incumbent wins easily, reinforcing their status as a “proven winner” and attracting even more money for the next cycle. General anti-incumbent sentiment from voters is rarely strong enough to break this cycle on its own.

Gerrymandering

In many states, incumbents are protected by the very maps they run on. Gerrymandering is the practice of manipulating the boundaries of legislative districts to favor one political party. In states where the legislature is responsible for drawing the maps, the party in power can “rig” the districts to create “safe seats” for their incumbents, all but guaranteeing the outcome of the general election and reducing electoral competition.

Because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that partisan (but not racial) gerrymandering is a “non-justiciable” question, federal courts have offered no remedy.

The reality is more nuanced than the common view that gerrymandering universally protects incumbents. Some academic research, using advanced statistical models, has found that changes in redistricting rules over time—particularly legal constraints like the Voting Rights Act—have reduced the probability of incumbent re-election in some cases.

The primary effect of modern gerrymandering is not necessarily protecting every single incumbent. It creates districts that are overwhelmingly partisan: safe for Republicans or safe for Democrats. This sorting of the electorate eliminates the political center and ensures that the only meaningful election is often the party primary.

Incumbent Re-election Rates: The Data

The “incumbent’s fortress” is not theoretical. The data on congressional re-election rates, often referred to as “congressional stagnation,” is stark. Even in “wave” elections defined by massive anti-incumbent anger, the vast majority of officeholders who run for re-election win.

Analysis of data from Ballotpedia and the “Vital Statistics on Congress” project illustrates this phenomenon:

The Enduring Power of Incumbency: U.S. House Re-election Rates (1988-2024)

This data reveals the illusion of competition. What the public experiences as a historic “wave” or “pummeling” is, statistically, a marginal event.

The 2010 “Tea Party” wave, one of the most significant anti-incumbent elections in modern history, still saw 85.4% of incumbents who ran win their race. Anti-incumbent sentiment does not operate like a broadsword, sweeping out all officeholders. It functions as a scalpel, picking off the 30 to 50 most vulnerable members, which is just enough to flip control of a narrowly divided Congress.

For the other 90%, the fortress holds.

When Anti-Incumbency Breaks Through

Despite the fortress, incumbents do lose. This happens when two conditions align: the incumbent makes themselves individually vulnerable, and a powerful national “wave” is strong enough to override local loyalties.

Individual Vulnerabilities

An incumbent’s greatest foe is often themselves. Challengers look for signs that an officeholder has become arrogant, broken a key promise, or grown unresponsive to their district. If polling shows an incumbent’s “unfavorable” rating has climbed over 40% in a competitive district, they are considered vulnerable to defeat.

The most potent individual vulnerability is scandal. A 2019 study of U.S. Senate elections from 1972 to 2016 found that an incumbent seeking re-election while confronting a scandal suffers an average 4% decrease in the popular vote. The type of scandal matters significantly:

• Political misdeeds (like campaign finance violations) are the most damaging, causing an average 6.5% vote decline
• Controversial statements (gaffes) are nearly as bad, causing a 6.0% decline
• Financial improprieties (like accepting improper gifts) cost the incumbent 4.6% of the vote

These re-election numbers actually overstate incumbent safety. Political science research notes a “selection effect”: “strategic incumbents” who know they are vulnerable or expect to lose will simply choose to retire rather than face defeat. This removes the weakest members from the data pool, artificially inflating the re-election rate for those who remain.

The “Retired” column in election statistics is also a measure of quiet anti-incumbent pressure.

The National Wave

The second condition is a strong national tide. This is almost always a referendum on the president. One of the “few iron laws of American politics” is that the president’s party loses House seats in midterm elections.

This means that “anti-incumbent sentiment” is rarely a non-partisan “throw all the bums out” event. It is a partisan weapon used by the “out” party to punish the “in” party, with the president as the primary target.

The most powerful driver of this national mood is the economy. Voters are not simple “cash registers.” Research shows voters have a “longer-range view of the economy” and judge incumbents based on relative performance.

A voter’s judgment is highly personal. A 2020 study found that voters react based on “personal exposure to specific dimensions of economic deterioration.” For example:

• Pensioners are most responsive to inflation and stock market returns
• Low-skilled workers are most responsive to unemployment and cuts to public spending

Pollsters measure the strength of this national wave using the “generic ballot.” This poll, which asks voters if they plan to vote for the “Republican Party’s candidate” or the “Democratic Party’s candidate” for Congress, “has proven to be an accurate predictor” of the partisan distribution of the national vote. When one party has a significant lead on the generic ballot, it signals a wave is building.

Four Major Wave Elections

When a powerful national wave combines with vulnerable incumbents, the fortress can be breached. The four major modern wave elections all followed this pattern.

1994: The Republican Revolution

What Happened: A “historic” and “extraordinary” victory for the GOP, which gained 54 House seats and 8 Senate seats, seizing control of the House for the first time in 40 years.

The Cause: A “foul mood” among voters driven by three converging trends: “anti-incumbent, anti-Washington, and anti-Clinton” sentiment. It was a direct backlash to President Bill Clinton’s first two years’ agenda, particularly his failed push for universal healthcare.

The Mechanism: Republicans, led by Newt Gingrich, successfully nationalized the election by running on the “Contract with America,” a unified national program. This tactic turned 435 local races into a single referendum on President Clinton.

2006: The Democratic Wave

What Happened: A “Category 4 or 5 hurricane” that swept Democrats back into power with a gain of 31 House seats and 6 Senate seats.

The Cause: This election was almost a pure national referendum. It was “driven primarily by a very unpopular war in Iraq” and “secondarily by public perceptions of incompetence in the Bush administration and corruption in the Republican Congress.”

2010: The Tea Party Revolt

What Happened: A historic “pummeling” for Democrats. Republicans gained 63 House seats—their largest gain since 1938—and 6 Senate seats.

The Cause: A powerful conservative backlash against President Barack Obama’s agenda, particularly the bank bailouts and the Affordable Care Act. This anger was harnessed by the populist Tea Party movement, which framed the election as a continuation of the “vote for change” message from 2006 and 2008.

2018: The Suburban Blue Wave

What Happened: Democrats gained 41 House seats to retake the chamber.

The Cause: The election was a clear “thermometer on how the country feels about the president’s performance.” It was a direct referendum on President Donald Trump, driven by a revolt of suburban swing voters (“Obama-Trump” and “Romney-Clinton” voters) who had shifted away from the GOP.

How the Rules Are Changing

These case studies illustrate how anti-incumbency works. To understand how it is changing, one must look at a deeper structural shift. The incumbency advantage is not disappearing. It is transforming. The “personal” advantage described by Fenno is eroding, being replaced by a more powerful and rigid partisan advantage.

The Death of the Split-Ticket Voter

The most significant change in the American electorate is the decline of the “split-ticket voter,” a person who votes for one party for president and another for Congress. After the 2016 election, for the first time in the history of direct Senate elections, every single Senate race was won by the candidate from the same party that won that state’s presidential vote.

This trend has accelerated. Voters are no longer making separate choices based on an incumbent’s “home style” or personal qualities. Partisanship is overwhelming all other factors.

This shift has profound implications. The old-school incumbency advantage (building a personal brand) is collapsing for members who are in “wrong-colored” states. For example, Democrats like (former) Sen. Jon Tester in deep-red Montana, or (former) Sen. Sherrod Brown in increasingly Republican Ohio, lost battles for re-election because they can no longer rely on personal popularity to survive in an era where voters pull a straight party lever.

All Politics Is National

This trend is driven by the “nationalization of politics.” Voters increasingly view their local House race as a “census of Democrats and Republicans rather than contests between individual candidates.”

The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI), which measures a district’s baseline partisan lean, has become the single best predictor of its election outcome. This is exacerbated by a fragmented media environment, the rise of polarizing social media, and the decline of local news, which makes it harder for incumbents to build a personal brand and easier for national issues to dominate.

The Primary Threat

This leads to the most important transformation of anti-incumbent sentiment. In an era of gerrymandered, “sorted” districts where one party has a massive advantage, the general election is often a coronation, not a contest.

The only place for anti-incumbent sentiment to express itself is in the primary election.

The “new” anti-incumbency is not a wave from the opposing party. It is an ideological purity test from within an incumbent’s own party. Members of Congress, even those in “safe” seats, now “consistently articulate fears” that they will lose their quest for re-nomination. This “perceived threat” of a primary is what “alters their behavior in Congress.”

Research confirms that incumbents involved in scandals are more likely to face a serious primary challenge, especially in “safe districts” where the primary is the only plausible path to removing them.

This reveals the great transformation of incumbency:

The Old Model (1970s-1990s): The personal advantage was strong. Incumbents used “home style” to win over split-ticket voters. The main threat was a general election wave driven by the “out” party.

The New Model (2000s-Present): The personal advantage is weak; the partisan advantage (the safe, sorted seat) is strong. Voters do not split tickets. The main threat is an ideological primary from a challenger who claims the incumbent is not a true believer.

This new dynamic creates its own feedback loop. Incumbents, fearing a primary, vote in lockstep with their party’s base. This increases polarization, which in turn fuels the national “anti-Washington” sentiment that voters claim to hate, all while making the incumbent’s general election seat even safer.

A Volatile, Polarized Electorate (2022-2025)

The election cycles from 2022 to 2025 provide proof of this “new normal.” Anti-incumbent sentiment is stronger than ever, but it is nationalized, volatile, and hits different targets in different ways.

2022: The Wave That Wasn’t

The 2022 midterms had all the classic ingredients for a massive anti-incumbent “red wave.” President Biden’s approval rating was low (around 41%), and inflation was the dominant concern—a perfect storm for the party in power. Yet, the wave failed. Democrats held the Senate and lost the House by only a narrow margin.

This happened because two anti-sentiments collided. The public’s anti-incumbent (anti-Biden/Democrat) feeling was overridden by their anti-extremist feeling. Voters in key swing states rejected Republican challengers they viewed as too extreme, particularly “election deniers.”

This proved that anti-incumbency is not a blind force. Voters will stick with an incumbent party they dislike if they view the alternative as unqualified or dangerous.

2024: The President Falls, Congress Holds

The 2024 election provided the starkest evidence of the new rules. Globally, it was the “super year” of elections, defined by a “breathtaking” anti-incumbent wave that “drubbed” sitting governments from the United Kingdom to India to South Africa.

The U.S. presidential election followed this global trend. The incumbent Democratic party lost the White House as Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris. This marked the third straight U.S. presidential election in which the incumbent party was defeated.

But in the very same election, congressional anti-incumbency was non-existent. House re-election rates were 95.5%. A Princeton University analysis noted that despite the anti-incumbent narrative, only 15 of 381 incumbents running for re-election lost.

This is the ultimate proof of the nationalization thesis. The presidency is the one office voters use to express national, collective anti-incumbent rage. But in their sorted, safe House districts, that anger had no outlet, so they defaulted to their party.

The anti-incumbent wave hit the White House but bounced harmlessly off the partisan fortress protecting Congress.

2025: The Whip-Saw Electorate

The final proof came just one year later. The November 2025 off-year elections, the first test of the new Trump administration, saw a dramatic “whip-saw” back to the Democrats. They scored decisive victories in gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey and flipped longtime GOP strongholds at the state and local level.

In a stunning result, Democrats won two statewide Public Service Commissioner races in Georgia, defeating Republican incumbents—their first non-federal statewide wins in that state since 2006.

The cause for this sudden reversal? The exact same issue as 2024: the economy. One year after Trump’s victory, AP Voter Polls found the public was still “angry” and “dissatisfied,” troubled by an economy “trapped by higher prices and fewer job opportunities.”

Having voted out the Democrats for failing to fix the problem, they used the 2025 election to punish the new party in power, the GOP, for also failing to fix it.

This confirms the modern face of anti-incumbent sentiment. It is no longer a cyclical “wave” that builds for two years and breaks during a midterm. It is a chronic condition of a volatile, polarized, and permanently dissatisfied electorate. Voters are no longer patient. They will use any election available to express their national-level frustration, leading to the rapid “whip-saw” swings seen between 2022, 2024, and 2025.

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