Why the U.S., Russia, and China Are Ramping Up Nuclear Testing Activities

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The specter of nuclear testing—a practice most Americans associate with Cold War-era footage of mushroom clouds—has returned to the headlines with alarming force.

Vague statements from major world leaders and satellite imagery of new construction at remote test sites have fueled fears of a new nuclear arms race.

That said, the word “testing” itself has become a point of confusion, conflating routine science, political threats, and actual preparations for an explosion.

The November 2025 Flashpoint

The current anxiety was not triggered by a seismic shock, but by a social media post. In a matter of days, a rapid-fire exchange between Washington and Moscow resurrected nuclear fears and exposed the fragility of the global ban on explosive testing.

October 30: President Trump’s Directive

While traveling to a high-stakes summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that he had “instructed the US Department of War to ‘start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis… immediately.'”

The Stated Justification: The post was explicitly justified “because of other countries testing programs.”

In a subsequent 60 Minutes interview, President Trump elaborated, claiming “Russia’s testing, and China’s testing… And certainly North Korea’s been testing. Pakistan’s been testing.”

The Unstated Context: The timing, just before meeting President Xi, strongly suggests the post was intended as geopolitical signaling, a high-level negotiating tactic.

It also followed recent Russian announcements of its new “super-weapons,” including the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile.

November 2-3: The Official “Walk-Back”

As allies and arms control experts expressed alarm, the U.S. government moved to clarify the President’s statement.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright—whose agency, the Department of Energy (DOE), and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), not the Pentagon, controls warhead testing—stated that the planned activities are “system tests,” not “nuclear explosions.”

He described them as “noncritical explosions” used to test components.

November 5: Russia’s Escalatory Response

Moscow seized on President Trump’s initial vague directive, not the clarification. President Vladimir Putin ordered his government to “analyze Washington’s intentions and work out proposals for resuming nuclear weapons tests.”

At the same security meeting, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov went further, advising Putin to “begin immediate preparations” for “full-scale nuclear tests” at the Novaya Zemlya test site.

The Escalation Loop

This November 2025 crisis perfectly illustrates a new, dangerous dynamic in 21st-century great power politics: an “escalation loop” fueled by strategic ambiguity.

The sequence began with Russia’s highly publicized tests of its novel delivery systems (the Burevestnik missile and Poseidon torpedo), which, while nuclear-powered or -armed, are not explosive warhead tests.

The U.S. President then misinterpreted or, more likely, intentionally conflated these delivery system tests with banned explosive nuclear tests.

This conflation led to the vague but highly escalatory public order to “test on an equal basis.”

While the U.S. government’s technical experts (at the DOE) immediately tried to “walk back” the statement, clarifying it meant non-explosive tests, Russia’s government ignored the clarification.

It seized upon the President’s initial, ambiguous statement as a political pretext to justify its own preparations for explosive testing.

This reveals that ambiguous, top-level political signaling is now a tool of strategic statecraft. Even if “corrected” by officials, the initial statement provides a “permission structure” for an adversary to escalate, while allowing both sides to claim the other is the aggressor.

What ‘Nuclear Testing’ Really Means

To understand the current crisis, it is essential to understand that “nuclear testing” is not one single activity. The public debate is dangerously confusing four very different things.

1. Full Explosive Tests (Supercritical Tests)

What it is: This is what most people imagine: an underground (or historically, atmospheric) detonation of a nuclear weapon. These tests are “supercritical,” meaning they are designed to produce a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction and a massive explosive yield.

Status: This is the practice that has been under a global taboo since the 1990s. It is banned by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

No country other than North Korea has conducted one this century.

2. Subcritical Experiments

What it is: These are the primary “tests” the U.S. conducts. An experiment, usually underground, that uses chemical high explosives to shock real weapons-grade plutonium.

The Key Difference: The experiment is designed to be “subcritical”—meaning the plutonium is intentionally prevented from reaching a critical mass. No self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction occurs.

Status: These tests are permitted under the CTBT and are a routine part of the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship program.

The U.S., Russia, and China all conduct them.

3. Hydrodynamic Tests

What it is: These are “mock” implosions. They test the non-nuclear components of a weapon. They use chemical explosives just like a subcritical test, but use a “surrogate” heavy metal (like lead or depleted uranium) instead of plutonium.

The Purpose: The term “hydrodynamic” is used because the intense pressure causes the solid metal to flow like a fluid.

Powerful, high-speed X-ray machines (like the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility, or DARHT) take images of this implosion to ensure the non-nuclear trigger works perfectly.

4. Delivery System Tests

What it is: This is the test of a delivery vehicle, such as an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) or a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).

A rocket is launched to test its propulsion, guidance, and reentry vehicles.

Status: These tests are routine and not nuclear tests. The missiles carry “dummy” warheads. The U.S. routinely tests its Minuteman III missiles, and Russia tests its systems like the Yars.

The “Zero-Yield” Ambiguity

The central, exploitable problem in the global testing ban is the technical ambiguity of the term “zero-yield.” This ambiguity creates a “trust gap” that all three major powers are now exploiting.

The CTBT bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion”, which the U.S. has long insisted means a “zero-yield” standard. The U.S. defines this as a no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.

However, as scientists point out, “zero yield” is a “ridiculous term” from a physics perspective, as even a non-detonating piece of plutonium experiences some spontaneous fission.

This ambiguity creates a slippery slope. The U.S. definition allows “subcritical” tests. Other countries may have a different definition, for example, permitting “hydronuclear” experiments. These are “supercritical” (they produce a small chain reaction), but the energy released is tiny and dwarfed by the chemical explosion.

These would violate the U.S. standard but perhaps not another nation’s. This leads to a “verification gap,” as the international monitoring system is designed to detect seismic signals from explosions, not tiny, contained, low-yield tests.

The result is a “trust gap”: the U.S. accuses Russia and China of conducting secret, low-yield tests that violate the “zero-yield” standard.

They deny this, claim they are only doing what the U.S. does, and accuse the U.S. of hypocrisy.

Because there is no verifiable proof either way, this gap allows all sides to justify their own test site preparations as a necessary response.

The U.S. Approach: Stockpile Stewardship Without Explosions

When U.S. officials talk about “testing,” they are almost exclusively referring to the sophisticated, science-based program used to maintain the existing arsenal without explosions.

The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program

Since the U.S. voluntarily stopped explosive testing in 1992, the core mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been “Stockpile Stewardship.”

The goal is to certify that the nation’s nuclear weapons, many of which are decades old and being kept in service far beyond their original design life, remain safe, secure, and effective without ever detonating one.

The NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan outlines this strategy, which depends on science, not explosions.

America’s ‘Virtual Test Site’

The SSMP replaces full-scale tests with a suite of high-tech tools:

Advanced Supercomputing: The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program uses some of the world’s fastest supercomputers to create “virtual” 3D models of a nuclear detonation, based on data from past tests.

Hydrodynamic Tests: As described above, facilities like the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos use powerful X-rays to see if the non-nuclear “trigger” of a weapon implodes correctly.

Laser-Driven Fusion: The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory uses 192 giant lasers to create temperatures “multiple times hotter than the sun.”

This allows scientists to study the physics of thermonuclear reactions in a controlled lab setting, ensuring the data for their computer models is accurate.

The Real Increase: More Subcritical Experiments

The U.S. is increasing its testing activities, but only of subcritical experiments at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

The U.S. has conducted 34 subcritical experiments since the 1992 moratorium.

In 2023 and 2024, NNSA officials announced a plan to increase the frequency of these tests. The goal is to move from roughly one every couple of years to “approximately three subcritical experiments per year.”

The stated motive is to “gather important data on nuclear weapons materials” as they age, particularly plutonium.

No Technical Need for Full Tests

Despite the November 2025 political statements, the U.S. government’s technical and scientific leadership is unified on one point: there is “no technical need” for the U.S. to resume full-scale explosive testing.

NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams testified in his April 2025 confirmation hearing that he “would not advise nuclear testing” and would “rely on scientific information.”

The Stockpile Stewardship Program is considered a massive success. As one expert noted, “Through the science program, we now better understand nuclear weapons than we ever understood them before.”

Russia: Parity, Pressure, and ‘Super-Weapons’

Russia’s actions are designed to signal parity with the U.S., apply pressure on arms control, and validate a new class of exotic weapons.

Legal Posturing

In November 2023, Russia officially withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

Moscow’s stated reason was to “mirror” the United States, which signed the treaty in 1996 but never ratified it.

Geopolitical Motives

Coercion over New START: Russia’s “testing” rhetoric is a bargaining chip. The last remaining U.S.-Russia arms control treaty, New START, expires on February 5, 2026.

By preparing to test, Russia applies “coercive signaling” to pressure Washington into a follow-on agreement that is more favorable to Moscow.

Coercion over Ukraine: This rhetoric is also part of Russia’s broader strategy to deter NATO and Western support for Ukraine.

Technical Motive

Unlike the U.S., which is mostly modernizing old designs, Russia is building entirely new categories of weapons, including the Burevestnik (“Skyfall”) nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater torpedo.

Analysts believe Russia may have a genuine technical need to conduct low-yield tests to validate the novel, specialized warheads for these systems.

The Physical Evidence (Novaya Zemlya)

Satellite imagery confirms extensive activity at Russia’s Arctic test site, Novaya Zemlya.

Construction: Imagery from 2023-2025 shows new construction and expansion of facilities.

Burevestnik Activity: Activity at the Pankovo launch site on the archipelago is consistent with preparations for, and the conduct of, Burevestnik missile tests.

New Defenses: Imagery from August 2025 also shows the installation of new defenses, such as “cope cages” over fuel tanks, designed to protect the site from long-range Ukrainian drone attacks.

China: A New Superpower’s Nuclear Expansion

China’s activity is perhaps even more significant. It signals a fundamental shift in its nuclear strategy, moving from a small, defensive force to a true nuclear peer.

The Strategic Shift

China is in the midst of the “largest nuclear buildup ever” in its history.

Its stockpile is growing faster than any other country’s, doubling from an estimated 300 warheads in 2020 to 600 in 2025.

The U.S. Department of Defense projects China will have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

This buildup includes new silo fields for ICBMs and the development of a full “nuclear triad” (land, sea, and air-based weapons).

The Technical Motive

This expansion involves new, modern warhead designs. Unlike the U.S., China has a much smaller database from historical explosive tests (only 46 total).

Therefore, analysts believe it is “more likely” that China feels a technical need to conduct low-yield tests to validate these new designs.

The Physical Evidence (Lop Nur)

Analysis of commercial satellite imagery of China’s Lop Nur test site reveals a dramatic expansion between 2020 and 2024.

This includes extensive new tunnel excavation at its underground test area.

It also shows what may be a new vertical-shaft drill site, intended to support “repeated subcritical nuclear tests” to support its research on new weapon designs.

The U.S. State Department has raised concerns that this activity at Lop Nur may be “inconsistent with its moratorium commitment” as interpreted in accordance with the U.S. “zero-yield” standard.

The Tri-Polar Security Dilemma

These individual actions are symptoms of a profound, structural shift in the global order. The arms control framework was built for a bipolar (U.S.-Russia) world. That world is gone, and the framework is now breaking under the strain of a new tri-polar (U.S.-Russia-China) reality.

The entire arms control regime, exemplified by the New START treaty, is based on U.S.-Russia parity, limiting both to 1,550 deployed warheads.

China, which is not party to any of these treaties, is in a “sprint” to build a nuclear arsenal that will “match or exceed” those of the U.S. and Russia.

This creates an “unprecedented challenge” for U.S. strategy: deterring two nuclear-peer adversaries simultaneously.

This pressure has led to calls within the U.S. (e.g., in Project 2025) for the administration to signal a “willingness to conduct nuclear tests… if necessary” and to prepare to rapidly expand its own arsenal.

This U.S. posturing, intended to deter both rivals, is then used by Russia and China as proof of American aggression, justifying their own escalatory preparations.

The “increase” in testing activities and rhetoric is a direct consequence of this tri-polar security dilemma.

The Global Rules Under Threat

The current crisis is putting immense stress on the two treaties that form the bedrock of the global nuclear order.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

What It Is: The NPT is the “grand bargain” of arms control, in force since 1970. It is the “centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.”

The Three Pillars:

Non-Proliferation: Non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire them.

Disarmament: The five “official” nuclear-weapon states (U.S., Russia, UK, France, and China) commit under Article VI to “pursue negotiations” toward “general and complete disarmament.”

Peaceful Use: All parties are given the right to access peaceful nuclear energy, such as for power generation.

Why It’s Under Threat: A return to explosive testing by the major powers would be seen by the rest of the world as a flagrant violation of the spirit of their Article VI disarmament commitment, potentially causing the entire treaty to unravel.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

What It Is: A multilateral treaty opened for signature in 1996 that bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” anywhere in the world.

The “Catch-22”: It’s Not Legally in Force. The CTBT has been signed by 187 nations, but it cannot formally enter into force until 44 specific “nuclear-capable” states ratify it. Nine of those have not.

Signed but Not Ratified: U.S., China, Israel, Iran, Egypt

Not Even Signed: North Korea, India, Pakistan

Ratified, then “De-Ratified”: Russia (ratified in 2000, withdrew ratification in 2023)

The “Global Norm”: Despite not being in force, the CTBT has been wildly successful at creating a powerful global norm (a “taboo”) against testing.

Since 1996, the only country to conduct an explosive test has been North Korea.

Are Nuclear Tests “Illegal”? Not technically, under a universally binding treaty. But a test would violate this powerful norm, draw universal condemnation, and violate UN Security Council resolutions.

A New Arms Race is Already Here

The convergence of escalatory rhetoric, ambiguous non-explosive tests, and major test site preparations signifies a turning point. We are witnessing the end of the post-Cold War era of disarmament and the clear beginning of a new, more complex, and more dangerous nuclear age.

Influential reports from 2025, such as the SIPRI Yearbook and analyses from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), confirm this grim picture.

The Key Shift: For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the number of usable nuclear warheads in global military stockpiles is increasing.

While the U.S. and Russia are still slowly dismantling retired warheads, they (and especially China) are building and deploying new, modern weapons faster.

As SIPRI’s Director stated, “We are now in one of the most dangerous periods in human history”.

Source Data: Federation of American Scientists (FAS) & Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The Risk of a ‘Testing Cascade’

The greatest danger of the November 2025 rhetoric is that it could shatter the global norm. Experts warn that if any one of the “Big Three” (U.S., Russia, China) conducts a full-scale explosive test, it would send a “destabilizing political signal” and create a “domino effect.”

This act would provide political cover for other nations in a “testing cascade.”

North Korea would almost certainly use the opportunity to conduct its seventh nuclear test.

India and Pakistan, which are not signatories to the CTBT and are in a regional arms race, could quickly follow.

This would destroy the non-proliferation regime.

Why Explosive Tests Would Backfire on America

A broad consensus of U.S. nuclear experts argues that a return to explosive testing would be a catastrophic, self-inflicted wound.

The “Locked-In Advantage”: The U.S. stopped testing in 1992 after 1,054 detonations—far more than any other nation.

It then spent billions on the SSMP to turn that “incredibly accurate” data into a world-leading simulation capability.

By stopping, the U.S. “locked in an advantage in knowledge.”

Benefiting the Adversaries: Resuming explosive tests would erase this advantage. The U.S. would gain little new data, but its adversaries—especially China and North Korea, which have small test databases—would gain an “enormous” amount of data to “catch up” and validate their new, modern warhead designs.

The Domestic Legacy: Reopening Painful Wounds

For an American audience, a return to testing is not just a geopolitical abstract. It is a betrayal of the communities that bore the cost of the first nuclear age.

From 1945 to 1992, testing in Nevada rained radioactive fallout on “downwinders” across the U.S., particularly in New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah.

This legacy includes generations of loss, illness, and poisoned land.

The November 2025 statements were met with “outrage” from the congressional delegations of these states, who vowed to block any attempt to “repeat the same mistakes that have already caused so much harm.”

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