Trump Exits 66 International Bodies: What the U.S. Loses in Global Influence

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In January 2026 (announced January 7-8, 2026), President Donald Trump signed a memorandum directing the United States to withdraw from 66 international organizations. The list includes 31 UN entities and 35 non-UN bodies spanning climate policy, human rights, development assistance, and conflict prevention. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called them “wasteful” and representative of “globalist agendas” that undermine U.S. sovereignty.

The decision represents a fundamental reordering of America’s role in the world—one that hands influence to China and the European Union while removing the U.S. from forums where rules get written. Those rules affect everything from renewable energy standards to pandemic response protocols to the laws governing armed conflict.

The Full Scope: Climate, Health, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding

The 66 bodies cover nearly every dimension of cooperation. The withdrawal list includes the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UN Population Fund, the UN Entity for Gender Equality, the International Law Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, among many others.

Climate bodies dominate. The International Renewable Energy Agency, the International Solar Alliance, and multiple UN Environment Programme subsidiaries all made the cut. So did groups focused on gender equality and reproductive health—the UN Population Fund operates in 150 countries providing maternal health care in places where childbirth remains a leading cause of death among young women. Development coordination mechanisms like UN Habitat and the UN Conference on Trade and Development also appear, along with environmental conservation bodies including the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

The pattern is clear: the administration withdrew from groups focused on climate change, gender equality, and development—areas it views as liberal priorities—while maintaining participation in bodies focused on security and traditional American interests.

Implementation creates immediate complications. Some allow instant withdrawal. Others require waiting periods before the U.S. can officially leave. The UNFCCC permits withdrawal one year after formal notice under Article 25 of the convention. For UN entities funded through the regular UN budget rather than voluntary contributions, the situation gets legally murky—the U.S. is legally required to pay its share of the UN’s operating costs, yet the memorandum instructs cessation of “participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law.”

Constitutional Authority and Treaty Withdrawal

The Constitution grants the President authority to negotiate treaties and manage foreign relations. It also requires Senate ratification of treaties and grants Congress power over appropriations, including funding for bodies created through ratified treaties. When a President seeks to end treaty obligations or cease funding such bodies, the legal question gets complicated fast.

Senator Peter Welch of Vermont challenged the constitutional legitimacy of unilateral withdrawal. According to their bylaws, no UN member state, including the U.S., can withdraw from some, if not many, of these groups and treaties by simply declaring an intent to withdraw. Withdrawing from treaties may require an act of Congress.

The Better World Campaign pointed out that UN Secretary-General António Guterres has stated that the U.S. is legally required to pay its share of the UN’s operating costs and peacekeeping budget, as approved by the General Assembly. These are “a legal obligation under the UN Charter for all Member States, including the United States.”

Several targeted for withdrawal were created through Senate-ratified treaties. Technically, only the Senate can authorize withdrawal, according to constitutional scholars who study the power to end treaty obligations. The memorandum sidesteps this by instructing agencies to cease “participation in or funding…to the extent permitted by law”—acknowledging legal constraints without identifying which withdrawals face congressional roadblocks.

During the first Trump term, the Paris Agreement withdrawal faced legal complications because the agreement’s original structure required a four-year period from the date the agreement entered into force, making Trump’s 2017 withdrawal attempt legally unsuccessful before Biden reversed it. The agreement now operates under a one-year notice period as of 2025-2026. When Biden took office, he reversed the notice on day one. These commitments can be reversed by subsequent administrations, which raises a different question: what does American credibility look like when every four years brings potential policy reversals on foundational commitments?

Climate Leadership and Scientific Cooperation

The UNFCCC is the foundational treaty structuring all climate negotiations. It establishes the framework for carbon emissions monitoring and reporting that informs policy worldwide. By exiting the UNFCCC, the U.S. loses its seat at annual Conference of the Parties negotiations where nations establish targets and agree on implementation mechanisms for climate action.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change departure carries equally significant implications. The IPCC produces assessments of climate science that form the scientific evidence that countries use to negotiate climate deals. With the U.S. absent from IPCC proceedings, American scientists will have diminished opportunities to contribute their expertise. American government officials will lose access to authoritative scientific assessments. And the American public will be isolated from the scientific consensus on climate causation and impacts.

While the administration withdraws from climate bodies, renewable energy investment reached record levels in 2024. Solar, wind, and battery storage technologies are becoming cheaper than fossil fuels even in regions like the Middle East and Australia traditionally dependent on hydrocarbons. The Global Renewables Alliance warns that American withdrawal from renewable energy coordination bodies means “the US is choosing to miss out on jobs, investment and industrial growth” in the cleanest energy sector—precisely where the economy is undergoing most rapid expansion.

Humanitarian Impact: Women’s Health and Conflict Prevention

The withdrawal from the UN Population Fund affects approximately 150 countries where it provides reproductive health services and maternal health care to vulnerable populations. UNFPA works in fragile states and conflict zones where childbirth remains a leading cause of death among adolescent girls and women. It operates programs that provide family planning services, prenatal care, and training for midwives in countries where alternatives don’t exist.

The Organization for American States noted that UNFPA programs also support efforts to prevent gender-based violence and provide services to trafficking survivors in Latin America and the Caribbean. American funding cessation will directly impact millions of women and girls in the Global South who depend on these services.

The Women’s Refugee Commission emphasized that this withdrawal “will cause direct harm to women and girls around the world and undermine efforts to prevent conflict and promote stability.”

The peacebuilding infrastructure withdrawal represents a particularly striking retreat from conflict prevention mechanisms. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, established in 2005, supports countries emerging from armed conflict by bringing together donor states, the UN, regional groups, and governments to coordinate reconstruction and reconciliation efforts designed to prevent return to conflict. The Peacebuilding Commission has supported post-conflict recovery in multiple countries, with Burundi and Sierra Leone confirmed as the first cases brought before the Commission. The Peacebuilding Fund provides flexible, rapid-disbursing resources to support peace initiatives in fragile states during critical windows when prevention is still possible.

China and the European Union Expand Influence

As the U.S. deliberately withdraws from governance structures, China is actively filling the vacuum. Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia and senior fellow at Stanford, observed that “Xi did not withdraw China from the same bodies. Instead, he sees an opportunity to expand the CCP’s influence within these organizations that we initially took the lead on creating.”

As American votes, funding, and expertise depart, Chinese presence and influence expand by default in places where Beijing previously held minority positions. Rather than withdrawing from bodies perceived as inefficient or ideologically compromised, Beijing has pursued a strategy of expanding its influence within existing structures while simultaneously creating alternative multilateral frameworks aligned with Chinese interests. BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank represent alternative setups where China is in charge and shapes rules according to its preferences.

As the U.S. retreats from the UNFCCC, IPCC, and other climate governance bodies, China can position itself as a champion of climate action and green technology development—a position that carries both soft power benefits and concrete economic advantages as renewable energy markets expand. When the UN’s climate bodies negotiate new carbon markets, emissions standards, and climate finance mechanisms, American absence means reduced capacity to ensure frameworks serve U.S. business interests or reflect American technological capabilities.

The European Union has similarly recognized the opportunity created by American withdrawal. The European Commission and EU member states are discussing mechanisms to reform aid systems and establish new standards for development cooperation that could replace American leadership in these domains. Spain has emerged as a potential leader of what observers call a “group of countries willing to work together” among EU member states to advance structural aid reform and establish European leadership on development cooperation standards.

Trade Policy Contradictions

The withdrawal from trade and economic coordination bodies extends disengagement into domains directly affecting American business interests. The International Trade Centre provides technical assistance to small and medium enterprises in developing countries seeking to integrate into supply chains. The UN Conference on Trade and Development provides developing countries with research, analysis, and technical assistance on trade, investment, and technology transfer. When American companies seek market access in developing countries, American government engagement in bodies providing trade capacity building to those countries’ governments can help countries understand trade rules and avoid disputes.

While the administration withdraws from structures coordinating trade rules and development cooperation, it simultaneously imposes tariffs of 50 percent or higher on major trading partners including India, Brazil, Mexico, and China. Economic modeling suggests these tariffs will substantially reduce trade volumes, with Asian Development Bank economists projecting that Asia-Pacific region growth will decline from 4.9 percent to 4.8 percent in 2025 and from 4.7 percent to 4.5 percent in 2026 due to American tariff actions.

America’s leverage to shape trading partners’ responses to tariffs depends partly on the relationships and frameworks through which the U.S. government maintains dialogue with foreign governments. By withdrawing from places where U.S. officials maintain daily engagement with their counterparts, the administration limits the informal ways countries work out trade disagreements.

Canada recently negotiated a trade deal with China. The European Union and South American MERCOSUR bloc concluded a free trade agreement after years of negotiation. Brazil and India are deepening bilateral trade cooperation in response to American tariff threats. ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand continue deepening the RCEP trade framework without American participation.

UNESCO’s Second Withdrawal

The withdrawal from UNESCO—announced for the second time in this administration’s history—carries particular symbolism regarding American engagement with questions of cultural heritage, scientific cooperation, and historical memory. The administration previously withdrew from UNESCO in 2017, citing concerns about the body’s alleged anti-Israel bias and UNESCO’s statements about Israeli control of historical sites in Jerusalem and the occupied territories.

UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay acknowledged the second withdrawal—effective December 31, 2026—while noting that the body had implemented “major structural reforms” and “diversified funding sources” since the first withdrawal. American funding now represents 8 percent of UNESCO’s total budget, whereas it represents 40 percent of some other UN entities’ budgets. Azoulay emphasized that despite the withdrawal, UNESCO would continue its Holocaust education programs and work combating antisemitism—programs that “have been unanimously acclaimed by major specialized organizations such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, the World Jewish Congress and its American Section, and the American Jewish Committee.”

The Reagan administration withdrew from UNESCO in 1984 over accusations that the body was “corrupt and too susceptible to Moscow’s influence” and critical of Israel. The U.S. rejoined in 2002 under George W. Bush, after an absence of nearly two decades. The 2011 Obama administration decision to suspend American UNESCO funding, following UN recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state, created the financial pressure that facilitated the first withdrawal in 2017. This cyclical pattern—where American participation in UNESCO fluctuates based on Palestinian representation and Israeli concerns—demonstrates how engagement becomes entangled with domestic partisan politics regarding Middle East policy.

Congressional Response and Legal Constraints

Congress had previously approved appropriations for these 66 bodies through the FY2026 National Security, State Department, and Related Programs Appropriations bill. Congressional Appropriators recommended “continued funding for most UN organizations and programs, as in past years,” reflecting “bipartisan commitment to strategic investments in diplomacy and assistance.”

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Democratic members issued a statement criticizing the withdrawal, arguing that “participation in organizations allows Washington to shape norms, strengthen alliances and counter adversaries.”

Senator Welch’s extended statement to the Congressional Record articulates the bipartisan concern. Welch acknowledged that “we all want to see the United Nations become more efficient and eliminate unnecessary duplication and waste” and that “selective reassessment of participation may, indeed, be a time to reassess our participation in some of these organizations—something we should do every five to ten years.” However, Welch emphasized that “for an Administration to take such a drastic, unilateral step is short-sighted, and certain to weaken U.S. leadership and U.S. national security.” Many problems “cannot be solved by the United States or any other country alone” and require “regional and cooperation, and the active involvement of these UN organizations that provide the necessary expertise, data, strategies, and guidance.”

Welch directly identified the strategic risk: “otherwise, it will be a matter of time before China or some other country occupies the dominant positions in not only these organizations but the UN Secretariate itself. By then Donald Trump will be gone, but it will be too late to reverse course and future generations of Americans will pay the price.”

The disconnect between congressional appropriations recommendations and executive branch withdrawal directives creates potential constitutional conflict. Congress allocated funding for these groups into FY2026, effectively instructing executive agencies to maintain participation and funding. For the administration to unilaterally cease funding that Congress has explicitly appropriated money to support raises questions about executive overreach into congressional budgetary authority.

American Credibility and Soft Power

The cumulative effect of repeated American withdrawal from and reengagement with these structures over successive administrations carries consequences for American credibility that extend far beyond any single policy domain. Joseph Nye, the Harvard scholar who developed the concept of soft power, has emphasized that American influence historically rested not merely on military or economic might but on the attractiveness of American values, the reliability of American commitments, and the perception that American leadership served broader interests rather than narrow self-interest.

Each time an administration reverses a previous administration’s commitments—whether Biden reversing the WHO withdrawal, Trump reversing Biden’s commitments to climate bodies, or subsequent presidents presumably reversing these current withdrawals—the cumulative effect erodes the perception that American commitments represent enduring national strategy rather than partisan ideology.

The Bush Center’s analysis of soft power emphasizes that “America’s founding ideals – freedom, opportunity, democracy – frame how we approach the world and are critical to our long-term and short-term successes” and that “soft power is the ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” By withdrawing from bodies nominally committed to human rights, gender equality, sustainable development, and climate protection—areas that theoretically align with American foundational values—the administration signals that these values are subordinate to partisan policy preferences and transactional calculations.

Foreign leaders observing these reversals face difficult assessment of American reliability: are commitments made by one administration binding on successors, or subject to reversal based on electoral outcomes? This credibility erosion manifests particularly in America’s relationships with traditional allies. European leaders, observing American withdrawal from climate bodies while Europeans deepen climate commitments, face incentives to develop regulatory frameworks and technology partnerships that don’t depend on American participation. Japanese and South Korean officials, seeing American disengagement from multilateral security and development coordination bodies, rationally hedge their strategic bets by developing deeper relationships with China and diversifying their security arrangements.

McFaul notes that “our European allies seem eager to get to Beijing these days too” and that “Trump’s lack of support for our Asian allies…is also compelling them to hedge their bets and prepare for an unreliable American ally.”

Implementation and Long-Term Consequences

The practical implementation of the withdrawal memorandum will occur over coming months and years, with specific groups facing different legal timelines for American departure. Those without formal treaties anchoring U.S. participation can experience American withdrawal immediately upon cessation of funding and participation. UN-affiliated entities funded through the regular UN budget present more complicated scenarios, as UN Charter obligations potentially bind the U.S. to funding regardless of political preference.

The State Department’s role will be critical in determining how creatively or narrowly it interprets the memorandum’s directive to cease “participation in or funding…to the extent permitted by law.” Aggressive interpretation could see the department arguing that as few obligations as possible exist, while cautious interpretation might identify numerous legal constraints on withdrawal.

Congress appears positioned to play a checking role on withdrawal implementation through its appropriations authority. The bipartisan FY2026 appropriations agreement recommending continued funding for UN groups and programs suggests Congress doesn’t intend to authorize the reductions the administration seeks.

UN bodies and non-UN groups have demonstrated capacity to adapt to American absence by seeking alternative funding and redistributing roles to preserve core functions. UNESCO successfully replaced American funding. The IPCC modified its operations to accommodate American non-participation while continuing scientific work. The WHO expanded its engagement with China and other sources to compensate for American funding loss. But some depend critically on American expertise and resources in ways that can’t be easily replaced. The International Law Commission depends on legal scholars and government experts—reducing American participation necessarily diminishes the body’s capacity to access American legal expertise and incorporate American legal thinking and traditions. The UN Peacebuilding Commission depends on donor country support—American withdrawal reduces the resources available for supporting post-conflict recovery.

Four major structural effects appear probable over coming years and decades. First, American influence over the development of norms and standards across climate policy, human rights law, sustainable development, and environmental protection will substantially decline. Second, rival powers, particularly China and the European Union, will expand their influence in the structures America abandons, potentially reshaping these bodies’ priorities and approaches toward non-American perspectives. Third, the developing world will face reduced American engagement on issues spanning poverty reduction, climate adaptation, reproductive health, and conflict prevention—creating humanitarian consequences and potentially generating geopolitical resentment toward American disengagement. Fourth, the liberal order that the U.S. constructed after World War II and anchored through participation will continue fragmenting into regional and bilateral arrangements where American voice carries less weight.

The long-term question is whether this represents a temporary back-and-forth pattern in American multilateral participation that a future administration will reverse, or whether it signals a fundamental reorientation of American foreign policy away from frameworks toward bilateral deals where the U.S. trades favors for concessions. The administration’s apparent strategy assumes that American interests are better served through selective bilateral deals, where the U.S. leverages its power to extract concessions from weaker countries, rather than through multilateral structures where American influence depends partly on persuasion and coalition-building.

Historical experience suggests that challenges spanning climate change, pandemic disease, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism cannot be effectively addressed through bilateral mechanisms alone. They require the agreements and enforcement tools that these structures provide. The withdrawal from these 66 groups represents an enormous bet that the costs of disengagement will prove smaller than the administration anticipates and that American interests will ultimately be served by a world where rules are written without American input.

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