Critical Minerals: US Strategy to Break China’s Supply Chain Dominance

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Critical minerals are the indispensable, non-fuel materials that form the bedrock of 21st-century US economic and military power. They’re essential for national defense, powering everything from advanced surveillance drones to precision guidance systems in next-generation munitions, and for energy security, enabling the transition to technologies like electric vehicles and wind turbines.

However, the United States confronts a profound strategic vulnerability: it’s dangerously reliant on foreign nations, particularly geopolitical adversaries like China, for the mining and, more critically, the processing of these minerals.

The US government has deployed a whole-of-government strategy to diversify these supply chains within a credible timeframe. This strategy rests on four pillars—onshoring domestic production, friend-shoring with allies, recycling, and technological innovation—backed by legislative and financial tools.

The market for minerals essential to military and commercial products is constantly growing and changing, and is subject to dynamic shifts in global politics.

About This Article
The U.S. depends heavily on foreign sources—especially China—for both mining and processing/refining of critical minerals essential to defense, energy, and advanced technology.

The federal strategy to reduce that dependency rests on four pillars:
  • Onshoring (expand domestic extraction and processing)
  • Friend-shoring (supply diversification with allies)
  • Recycling / circular economy approaches
  • Technological innovation (new extraction / separation techniques)

The legal and policy basis includes the Energy Act of 2020, through which the U.S. establishes and updates a “Critical Minerals List.”

The article warns that even with funding, the timeframe is daunting: permitting, infrastructure, and technical scale are long-term challenges.

So What?
China’s dominance in critical minerals—especially in midstream processing—poses a strategic vulnerability for U.S. industrial, defense, and clean energy goals. If the U.S. cannot build resilient supply chains, it risks being dependent on adversaries, losing leverage, and facing supply shocks.

What Makes Minerals “Critical”

The Official Framework

The modern US government approach to mineral security is built on a clear legal framework. The Energy Act of 2020 provides the foundational mandate, directing the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the US Geological Survey (USGS), to establish and periodically update a national Critical Minerals List.

A mineral earns the “critical” designation by meeting a rigorous three-part test. It must be:

• Essential to the economic or national security of the United States
• Part of a supply chain vulnerable to disruption
• An essential component in manufacturing a product, where its absence would lead to significant consequences for the US economy or national security

The most recent list, drafted by the USGS in August 2025, identifies 54 such commodities. This includes well-known minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel, as well as the full suite of rare earth elements (REEs) and lesser-known but equally vital materials such as gallium, germanium, and antimony.

However, “critical mineral” isn’t a monolithic term; it’s a dynamic, mission-driven designation. Different federal agencies maintain their own tailored lists to address specific mandates.

The Department of Energy publishes a “Critical Materials” list focusing specifically on materials essential for energy production, transmission, and storage, such as aluminum, copper, and electrical steel.

The Department of Defense identifies “Strategic and Critical Materials” required to supply military and essential civilian needs during a national emergency, as directed by the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.

The policy analysis group Silverado Policy Accelerator has refined these into a list of 12 “strategic defense critical minerals” that pose the most acute risk to US national security, including antimony, tungsten, and tantalum.

This specialized approach allows policymakers to deploy specific tools for specific problems. The DOD can use Defense Production Act authorities to bolster tungsten supply, while the DOE can leverage Inflation Reduction Act tax credits to incentivize lithium production.

Military Applications

In the 21st century, military superiority is technologically driven, and that technology is fundamentally mineral-dependent. A secure and reliable supply of critical minerals is a prerequisite for fielding a modern, effective fighting force.

Cobalt: Central to high-performance superalloys used in jet engines of advanced fighter aircraft. It’s also a key component in lithium-cobalt-oxide batteries, which power military systems from portable power packs for forward-deployed soldiers to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that enable “silent surveillance” and persistent intelligence gathering.

Rare Earth Elements (REEs): A group of 17 elements, including neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, are irreplaceable in producing the world’s most powerful and lightweight permanent magnets. These magnets are the heart of countless defense systems, including precision-guided missile systems, electric motors that power drones, and sophisticated sonar systems used in nuclear submarines.

Tungsten and Tantalum: Valued for their extreme density, hardness, and heat resistance. Tungsten is a key component in kinetic energy penetrators and other armor-piercing munitions, while tantalum is used in high-temperature alloys and advanced electronic components.

Gallium and Germanium: These minerals are foundational to compound semiconductors that enable next-generation military electronics. Gallium arsenide and gallium nitride are used in advanced radar systems, electronic warfare platforms, and high-efficiency power electronics. Germanium is critical for fiber optics and infrared optics used in night vision and thermal imaging systems.

Energy Security Connection

The global shift toward clean energy represents a fundamental change in resource needs. It’s a transition from an energy system intensive in fuels (like oil and natural gas) to one intensive in materials. The International Energy Agency projects that to meet climate goals, demand for key energy transition minerals could grow by a factor of 20 to 40 by 2040.

This creates an inescapable link between energy security and national security, as many of the same minerals are critical for both. The same rare earth magnet that spins a wind turbine can be used to guide a missile, and the same cobalt in an electric vehicle battery can power a military drone.

Battery Metals: Lithium-ion battery performance is determined by its mineral inputs. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and graphite are the core components that dictate a battery’s energy density, lifespan, and cost.

Wind and Solar Components: Rare earth elements are essential for high-strength permanent magnets used in the most efficient direct-drive wind turbines. The entire solar power industry is built upon silicon, the primary material in photovoltaic cells.

Grid Infrastructure: The electrification of the economy requires massive expansion and modernization of the electrical grid. Copper and aluminum are the foundational materials for this effort, used in everything from generators and transformers to millions of miles of transmission and distribution lines.

The China Chokepoint

Geographic Concentration of Processing

The strategic risk to the United States doesn’t stem from global scarcity of critical minerals. Rather, the vulnerability lies in extreme geographic concentration of the supply chain, particularly in the mid-stream stage of processing and refining.

For decades, market forces, lower labor costs, and lax environmental regulations overseas led to the offshoring of this industrial capacity. While economically efficient in the short-term, this trend created a critical national security failure, leaving the US dependent on a small number of countries—and in many cases, a single geopolitical competitor—for materials vital to its prosperity and defense.

An analysis of the global supply chain reveals a recurring and dangerous pattern: while initial extraction (mining) of minerals is somewhat geographically dispersed, the subsequent, highly technical step of processing these raw ores into high-purity metals and chemical compounds is overwhelmingly dominated by the People’s Republic of China.

Lithium: Australia is the world’s largest miner of lithium (from hard rock spodumene), accounting for over half of global production. Chile is the second-largest producer (from brine). However, much of this raw material is shipped to China, which controls approximately 65% of the world’s lithium processing and refining capacity, converting it into battery-grade lithium carbonate and hydroxide needed for EVs.

Cobalt: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the source of nearly three-quarters (73%) of the world’s mined cobalt. This production is often associated with significant environmental and human rights concerns, including child labor use. Yet, the DRC lacks significant refining capacity. Instead, raw cobalt ore is exported, primarily to China, which refines more than 75% of the global supply into battery-ready material.

Natural Graphite: China’s control over the graphite supply chain is absolute. It accounts for 72% of global mining and, critically, almost 100% of the processing needed to upgrade natural graphite into spherical, battery-grade anode material required for lithium-ion batteries. Every EV battery anode made from natural graphite has passed through a Chinese processing facility.

Rare Earth Elements: The United States does have some domestic REE mining at the Mountain Pass mine in California. However, until recently, the rare earth concentrate from this mine was shipped to China for the complex process of separation and refining. Globally, China accounts for about 70% of REE mining and maintains a near-monopoly on processing, with a staggering 90% market share.

US Import Dependence

The direct consequence of this global supply chain structure is severe and quantifiable dependency for the United States. According to the USGS, in 2024, the US was 100% net import reliant for 12 of the minerals on the critical list and had net import reliance greater than 50% for an additional 28 commodities.

This reliance is particularly acute for materials essential to national defense. Analysis of trade data from 2019 to 2022 shows that the US sourced almost three-quarters of its imported rare earth compounds and metals directly from China.

This dependency extends beyond raw materials to finished components. The US currently lacks domestic capacity to manufacture many advanced products, such as high-performance rare earth permanent magnets, forcing it to rely on imports even if the constituent processed metals were available domestically.

China’s Weaponized Supply Chain

This concentrated dependency isn’t a passive risk; it’s a vulnerability that has been actively and repeatedly exploited as a tool of economic and geopolitical coercion. China has demonstrated clear willingness to leverage its dominant market position to achieve strategic objectives, a practice often referred to as the “weaponization” of supply chains.

China’s strategy is a sophisticated, multi-layered economic statecraft that combines:

Market Manipulation: China has strategically oversupplied certain minerals, such as cobalt, to deliberately depress global prices. This tactic makes it economically unviable for producers in higher-cost jurisdictions like North America to compete, stalling or bankrupting potential rivals and consolidating Chinese market control.

Export Controls on Materials: Beijing has used explicit export restrictions as a direct political lever. In response to US technology policies, China has imposed export licensing requirements and outright bans on materials like gallium and germanium, which are critical for semiconductors and defense electronics, directly targeting US access. Seven rare earth elements were added to the list in April, 2025.

Export Bans on Technology: In its most sophisticated move, China has banned the export of technology and intellectual property related to rare earth processing and separation. This strategic masterstroke prevents other countries from easily replicating its capabilities, thereby locking in its mid-stream dominance for the long term.

This multi-pronged approach creates compounding dependency that is exceptionally difficult and time-consuming to break. The US cannot simply buy its way out of the problem. It must simultaneously create a protected market for domestic producers to survive price manipulation, secure alternative sources of raw materials through alliances, and re-develop complex technical expertise for processing from the ground up.

The Four-Pillar Strategy

In response to these acute vulnerabilities, the US government has embarked on a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to rebuild and diversify its critical mineral supply chains. The strategy rests on four mutually reinforcing pillars designed to manage risk across different time horizons.

Pillar 1: Onshoring Domestic Production

The foundational pillar involves increasing domestic production across the entire supply chain, from extraction to processing. This requires identifying domestic resources, tackling the immense challenge of permitting new projects, and developing innovative ways to access minerals from unconventional sources.

Finding the Resources: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law has injected new life into this effort, providing $320 million over five years for the USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI). This program utilizes modern airborne geophysical and hyperspectral surveys to create high-resolution, three-dimensional maps of the nation’s geology, helping scientists identify areas with high potential for hosting critical mineral deposits.

The Permitting Challenge: The single greatest obstacle to bringing new domestic mines online is time. The United States has one of the longest mine development timelines in the world. From the moment a mineral deposit is discovered, it can take an average of 29 years to bring a new mine into production. A significant portion of this delay—often 10 years or more—is consumed by the permitting process.

This “permitting pandemic” results from a complex and often duplicative web of federal, state, and local regulations, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act, which are frequently leveraged in protracted legal challenges by project opponents.

Community Engagement: A primary driver of permitting delays and litigation is opposition from local communities and Native American Tribes. Many of the most promising undeveloped mineral deposits in the US are located on or near lands with historic, ancestral, or cultural significance to Tribal nations, or in rural communities that bear the environmental and social costs of mining.

The Stillwater platinum and palladium mine in Montana successfully navigated community opposition by negotiating a legally binding “Good Neighbor Agreement.” This contract, in place for over two decades, formalizes commitments on environmental monitoring, local hiring, and benefit-sharing, demonstrating that proactive and meaningful engagement can create a durable “social license to operate.”

Unlocking Secondary Resources: To circumvent long timelines and challenges of opening new “greenfield” mines, a key part of the US strategy involves tapping unconventional resources. The Department of the Interior has launched a major initiative to promote recovery of critical minerals from existing and historical mine waste, including tailings piles, coal refuse, and acid mine drainage.

This policy approach solves three problems simultaneously. First, it short-circuits the lengthy permitting process associated with new mines. Second, it creates a new domestic source of minerals. Third, it provides a powerful economic incentive to clean up legacy environmental hazards.

USGS research confirms that these waste streams can be surprisingly rich in valuable minerals; for example, waste from legacy lead-zinc mining in Oklahoma contains high concentrations of germanium, and copper tailings in Utah are a promising source of tellurium.

Pillar 2: Friend-Shoring with Allies

Recognizing that full domestic self-sufficiency is neither achievable nor desirable for all 50 critical minerals, a parallel pillar involves “friend-shoring.” This concept, articulated by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, involves deliberately building resilient and diversified supply chains by partnering with trusted allies and friendly nations, thereby reducing collective dependence on potentially hostile actors like China.

The Minerals Security Partnership: Launched in June 2022, the MSP is the primary diplomatic instrument for executing the friend-shoring strategy. It’s a US-led coalition of 14 countries and the European Union, all committed to accelerating public and private investment in responsible mining, processing, and recycling projects across the globe.

A core tenet of the MSP is its commitment to high Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards. By supporting only projects that demonstrate responsible environmental stewardship, protect labor rights, and provide tangible benefits to local communities, the MSP aims to create a “race to the top,” offering an ethical and sustainable alternative to often opaque and exploitative practices seen in some state-led investment models.

Key Bilateral Partners:

Australia: As a democratic nation and global mining superpower, Australia is a cornerstone of the US friend-shoring strategy. The two nations have formalized their collaboration through the US-Australia Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact, which establishes a framework for coordinating policies and investments to build out secure end-to-end supply chains, particularly in processing.

Canada: The United States’ number one trading partner in minerals, Canada is a natural and essential ally. The Canada-US Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals is designed to create a deeply integrated and resilient North American supply chain. This partnership is not just theoretical; the US Department of Defense is using its DPA authority to co-invest directly in the development of strategic Canadian mining and processing projects.

European Union: The US and EU are actively negotiating a Critical Minerals Agreement. The primary goal is to align standards on sustainable production and labor rights, and crucially, to grant the EU status equivalent to a US free trade agreement partner for the purposes of the IRA’s clean vehicle tax credits. This would allow EVs using minerals processed in the EU to qualify for US subsidies, a powerful incentive to build out transatlantic supply chains.

Pillar 3: Recycling and the Circular Economy

The third pillar involves building a robust circular economy for critical minerals, treating the nation’s accumulated stock of end-of-life products as a valuable resource for “urban mining.”

The Potential: The International Energy Agency has conducted extensive analysis showing the immense potential of recycling. In scenarios where countries meet their climate pledges, a scaled-up recycling industry could reduce the need for new primary mining by up to 40% for copper and cobalt, and 25% for lithium and nickel by 2050.

Environmental and Economic Benefits: The advantages of recycling are twofold. Environmentally, it has a significantly lighter footprint; on average, using recycled battery metals like nickel and cobalt generates 80% less greenhouse gas emissions compared to producing them from virgin ores. Economically, the IEA estimates that a robust recycling industry could reduce the need for new mining capital investment by 30%, a figure that could amount to hundreds of billions of dollars by 2040.

The Timeline Challenge: The primary challenge for recycling as a near-term solution is a mismatch in timing. While recycling capacity is expanding rapidly, the feedstock required to supply these facilities—namely, the massive quantities of EV batteries and other clean energy technologies being deployed today—will not reach their end-of-life in large volumes until after 2030.

US Policy Push: Despite the timeline challenge, the US government is investing heavily now to build the domestic recycling industry of the future. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act have allocated billions of dollars in grants and loans to support the construction of commercial-scale battery recycling facilities. Companies like Nth Cycle are bringing the first domestic commercial-scale systems for refining nickel and cobalt from manufacturing scrap and end-of-life batteries online in Ohio.

Pillar 4: Technological Innovation

The final pillar leverages America’s greatest asymmetric advantage: technological innovation. This involves a multi-pronged effort to design new materials that reduce or eliminate the need for critical minerals, and to develop smarter, cleaner, and faster ways to extract and process the minerals we still need.

Material Substitution: One of the most powerful ways to mitigate supply chain risk is to design the vulnerability out of the system entirely. The Department of Energy’s Critical Materials Innovation Hub, led by Ames National Laboratory, is a major, sustained R&D effort focused on the science of material substitution—developing alternative materials that can perform the same function as at-risk minerals but are made from more abundant and secure elements.

A prime example is intense research into alternative battery chemistries. Sodium-ion batteries, which use abundant and inexpensive sodium instead of lithium, are a promising technology that could dramatically reduce future demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel if they can be commercialized at scale.

Advanced Extraction Technologies: Technology is revolutionizing the front end of the supply chain, with innovations that promise to make mining and processing more efficient and environmentally sustainable.

AI-Powered Exploration: Companies are using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to analyze vast datasets from satellite-based hyperspectral imaging. This technology can detect the subtle chemical signatures of mineral deposits on Earth’s surface, allowing geologists to predict high-potential exploration sites with far greater speed and accuracy.

Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE): A suite of technologies designed to pull lithium directly from saline brines without the need for massive, slow, and water-intensive evaporation ponds. DLE promises to dramatically increase lithium recovery rates (from ~40% to over 80%), reduce production time from over a year to a matter of days, and significantly shrink the environmental footprint of lithium production.

Automation and Digitalization: The mining industry is undergoing digital transformation. The deployment of autonomous haul trucks, robotic drilling rigs, and remote-controlled equipment is making mining operations safer, more efficient, and capable of running 24/7. Digital twin technology, which creates virtual replicas of mines, allows operators to simulate and optimize operations, predict maintenance needs, and improve safety.

These four pillars aren’t standalone policies but an integrated, risk-management portfolio. The strategy uses friend-shoring to buy time and address immediate vulnerabilities, while making long-term, capital-intensive investments in domestic mining, processing, and recycling. Technological innovation acts as a constant force multiplier, with the potential to accelerate timelines, reduce costs, and fundamentally alter the strategic landscape.

Legislative and Policy Tools

Landmark Legislation

In recent years, a series of major, often bipartisan, legislative acts have created the legal and financial architecture for the US critical minerals strategy. These laws work in concert, providing different types of support for different parts of the supply chain.

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL): This law serves as a foundational investment in the physical and scientific infrastructure of the supply chain. It provides billions of dollars in direct funding, including over $3 billion for the Department of Energy to award grants for projects that build out domestic processing of battery materials and establish recycling facilities. The BIL also provides core funding for the USGS Earth MRI program, essential for identifying new domestic mineral resources.

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA): The IRA is a powerful instrument of industrial policy that uses the tax code to stimulate private investment and shape market behavior. Its key provisions for critical minerals include:

• Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit: Provides a production tax credit equal to 10% of the costs of producing certain critical minerals (including cobalt, lithium, nickel, and graphite) in the United States, creating a direct and permanent financial incentive for companies to establish domestic processing and refining operations.
• Section 48C Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit: Offers an investment tax credit of up to 30% for the capital costs of building new, or re-equipping existing, industrial facilities to process, refine, or recycle critical minerals.
• Clean Vehicle Credits: The IRA’s lucrative tax credits for consumers who purchase electric vehicles are explicitly tied to supply chain requirements. To qualify for the full credit, a vehicle’s battery must not contain critical minerals or components sourced from a “foreign entity of concern” like China, creating a powerful market demand signal.

The Defense Production Act (DPA): This potent national security tool grants the President broad authorities to mobilize the domestic industrial base. In the context of critical minerals, the DPA has been invoked to allow the Department of Defense to make direct equity investments, provide loans, and enter into long-term purchase commitments (offtake agreements) with companies to ensure domestic production of materials deemed essential for national defense.

Key Agency Roles

Department of Defense (DOD): The DOD has shifted from being a passive consumer to an active, strategic market-maker. Its landmark public-private partnership with MP Materials, the owner of the Mountain Pass rare earth mine, exemplifies this new model of industrial policy. The multi-billion-dollar deal makes the DOD the company’s largest shareholder with a $400 million stock purchase. The deal also included a $150 million loan, a guaranteed price floor for MP’s processed rare earth oxides, and a 10-year offtake agreement for magnets produced at its new facility.

Department of Energy (DOE): The DOE serves as the primary engine for research, development, and technology commercialization. Its Critical Minerals and Materials Program funds a wide spectrum of projects through institutions like the National Energy Technology Laboratory. This includes the CORE-CM initiative to characterize unconventional resources like coal waste, as well as R&D into advanced processing, material substitution, and recycling technologies.

Department of the Interior (DOI) / USGS: The DOI and its science agency, the USGS, are responsible for foundational science and land management aspects of the strategy. The USGS conducts essential resource assessments, mineral mapping (via Earth MRI), and supply-and-demand analysis that informs all other policy decisions.

Department of State: The State Department leads the diplomatic charge, building international coalitions necessary for the friend-shoring pillar to succeed. Its primary vehicle is the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), through which it coordinates with allies to identify and support responsible mineral projects worldwide.

Timeline Reality Check

The 15-Year Challenge

While the US strategy is comprehensive and well-funded, the central question remains: can it deliver results within a credible timeframe? The answer is complex. Achieving significant diversification and resilience isn’t a single event but a long-term, phased process.

The most significant constraint on the onshoring strategy is the immense lead time required for new mine development. In the United States, bringing a new mine from initial discovery to commercial production is a marathon, not a sprint. S&P Global research found that the average timeline from discovery to production in the US is nearly 29 years, the second-longest in the world.

A major component of this delay is the permitting process, which itself averages a decade. This is driven by the need to secure dozens of permits under a wide array of federal and state environmental laws, a process often extended by years of litigation from project opponents.

A Phased Approach

Given these constraints, the concept of a “credible timeframe” must be redefined. It’s not about achieving complete mineral independence by a single date. Rather, it’s about achieving supply chain resilience through diversification in phases.

Short-Term (2025-2027): Damage Control and Groundwork

The immediate focus is on mitigating the most acute risks. This involves aggressively pursuing the “friend-shoring” pillar by finalizing and implementing agreements with trusted allies like Australia and Canada to secure alternative sources of raw materials and processing capacity. The National Defense Stockpile will be used as a strategic buffer to guard against sudden supply shocks.

Concurrently, the first tranches of funding from the BIL and DPA will be deployed to support R&D, pilot projects for recycling and mine waste reclamation, and financial support for existing domestic operations.

Goal: To rapidly diversify import sources and reduce immediate vulnerability to a single point of failure, effectively buying time for longer-term domestic solutions to mature.

Medium-Term (2028-2032): First Fruits of Domestic Investment

In this phase, the first tangible results of domestic industrial policy should begin to materialize. The first wave of processing and recycling facilities funded by the IRA and BIL are expected to come online. Examples include Nth Cycle’s nickel and cobalt recycling system in Ohio, which began operations in 2024.

Initial production from “mine waste” reclamation projects, which have shorter lead times, should also commence. Toward the end of this period, the first new, “fast-tracked” domestic mines may begin production.

Goal: To establish an initial, albeit partial, domestic mid-stream processing capability and demonstrate the commercial viability of a circular economy. Some industry experts project that this combined approach could allow the US to meet 40-50% of its strategic needs for certain minerals, like rare earths, by the 2027-2028 timeframe.

Long-Term (2033-2040+): A Mature and Resilient Supply Chain

By this stage, the US should have a more mature and resilient supply chain ecosystem. A larger-scale domestic mining and processing industry, built over the preceding decade, will be operational. The recycling industry will have reached maturity, supplied by a steady and predictable stream of end-of-life EV batteries and renewable energy components from the 2020s.

Furthermore, technological breakthroughs in material substitution, nurtured by years of R&D, may have fundamentally reduced demand for some of the most contested minerals.

Goal: To achieve durable supply chain resilience. This doesn’t necessarily mean 100% domestic self-sufficiency across all 50 critical minerals, which may be neither possible nor economically efficient. Instead, the goal is resilient diversification, where the US has robust domestic capability, strong and redundant supply chains with a network of trusted allies, and a thriving circular economy.

Political and Social Risks

The greatest unquantifiable risk to this timeline isn’t geological or financial, but political and social. The long-term nature of this strategy requires sustained, bipartisan political will that can endure across multiple presidential administrations and election cycles.

The uncertainty that a change in administration can bring to long-term industrial policy is a significant concern for private investors. Furthermore, the success of domestic projects will depend on the ability of industry and government to successfully navigate community and environmental opposition through fair, transparent, and effective engagement.

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