Can States Block Federal Immigration Enforcement? The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

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Minnesota deployed lawyers and courts against what federal officials called Operation Metro Surge—the real question is whether states have any power to resist when the federal government sends thousands of agents into their territory.

Starting in December 2025, the federal government sent roughly 3,000 ICE and Border Patrol agents into the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area. State law enforcement resources got diverted to managing protests and federal operations.

The federal government announced a partial withdrawal in early February. Border Czar Tom Homan declared the operation would conclude within weeks. But the constitutional questions remain unresolved, and the precedent sits there waiting for the next massive federal operation in the next resistant state.

Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

A constitutional rule emerged from a simple idea: the federal government can’t force states to do federal work. In Printz v. United States (1997), the Supreme Court struck down a federal requirement that local sheriffs conduct background checks on gun purchasers. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that Congress can’t order state officials to enforce federal laws.

The Framers deliberately rejected a system where the federal government could “act upon and through the States.” They designed a constitutional architecture where federal and state governments have separate powers over the same people—not where the federal government issues orders to state governments.

But the doctrine prevents Congress from requiring states to enforce federal law. It stops the federal government from conscripting state resources. It doesn’t grant states affirmative power to block federal operations conducted by federal agents using federal resources.

That distinction proved decisive in Arizona v. United States (2012). The Supreme Court struck down parts of Arizona’s SB 1070—the “show me your papers” law—not because Arizona violated anti-commandeering principles, but because Arizona tried to regulate immigration itself. Immigration is primarily a federal responsibility, though states retain concurrent authority in certain immigration-related areas such as employment verification and professional licensing. Federal law always wins when it conflicts with state law in areas of federal constitutional authority.

This creates the tricky situation states face with immigration. States can’t be forced to help enforce federal immigration law under anti-commandeering principles. But they also can’t regulate immigration themselves under federal supremacy. And they can’t affirmatively obstruct federal enforcement without running into federal supremacy doctrine.

Minnesota tried to use this protection to actively block federal operations. The state argued that Operation Metro Surge’s scale and disruptive nature, combined with evidence that it was designed to coerce state cooperation, violated the Tenth Amendment even though the federal government wasn’t explicitly demanding state assistance. The operation itself, the state claimed, amounted to unconstitutional coercion.

Federal Immigration Authority and Supremacy

The Constitution gives Congress power over citizenship and immigration. The Supreme Court has long recognized immigration regulation as coming from the federal government’s basic authority over borders and foreign relations.

This suggests federal immigration authority isn’t equal to state authority. It’s fundamentally preemptive. No sphere remains for genuine state choice when federal enforcement is at issue.

Federal law is supreme when Congress is acting in areas the Constitution gives it power over. Congress has enumerated immigration authority. Federal immigration enforcement operations therefore operate with the full weight of constitutional supremacy behind them.

If federal agents doing their job legally commit constitutional violations—excessive force, racial profiling, Fourth Amendment violations—those agents may claim protection that shields federal agents from state prosecution. This doctrine exists to prevent states from using their criminal justice systems to undermine federal law execution.

But the protection isn’t absolute. Federal officials can be prosecuted by states if they break federal law or act so far beyond their job that they lose protection.

The constitutional question becomes whether Operation Metro Surge’s alleged violations—racial profiling, warrantless entries into homes using only administrative warrants—constitute federal agents acting within lawful authority or exceed it so dramatically as to forfeit immunity.

Minnesota’s Coercion Theory

Minnesota’s legal strategy, articulated by Attorney General Ellison in federal court, attempts to use anti-commandeering in a new way courts haven’t considered. Rather than simply defending against commandeering—refusing to honor federal requests—the state argued that sending thousands of armed federal agents to Minneapolis-Saint Paul constitutes unconstitutional coercion designed to force the state to abandon its sanctuary policies.

Evidence presented by the state emphasized that the operation disrupted state constitutional obligations to provide education, impaired state law enforcement’s ability to respond to local crime (resources diverted to managing federal operations and protests), and targeted specific ethnic groups including Somali-Americans with apparent deliberation—suggesting the operation was designed to punish Minnesota politically, not enforce immigration law.

Border Czar Tom Homan’s own statements, according to Minnesota’s filings, indicated that federal enforcement levels would decrease in exchange for state cooperation and increased access to jails. This suggested the operation was designed as leverage to force state policy changes—precisely the coercion that the Tenth Amendment prohibits.

A federal judge initially denied the state’s request for a preliminary injunction blocking the operation. Judge Katherine Menendez recognized this was a new kind of case, noting that it raised questions courts had never dealt with before—specifically, whether the scale and coercive design of federal operations could violate the Tenth Amendment even when the federal government was acting within its enumerated immigration authority.

The federal government countered through the prism of federal supremacy. Immigration is an exclusively federal power. States lack constitutional standing to challenge federal enforcement operations, unless the state could prove the operation forced the state to help. From this perspective, the state’s argument misuses a rule designed to stop the federal government from forcing state police to help with federal work—a problem that doesn’t exist when federal agents conduct entirely federal operations using federal resources and federal personnel.

State Cooperation, Obstruction, and Property Rights

States can pass laws that limit how much their police help federal immigration enforcement. The Supreme Court has established that Congress cannot force states to help enforce federal law. States lack any obligation to honor immigration detainers issued by ICE unless accompanied by judicial warrants and probable cause.

Federal courts have repeatedly rejected Trump administration threats to withhold federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions as exceeding federal authority.

But what states cannot do is actively block federal enforcement.

In United States v. King County (2024), the Ninth Circuit ruled that King County, Washington violated the constitutional rule that federal law wins when it conflicts with state law when its executive order banned fixed-base operators at Boeing Field from servicing ICE charter flights used to transport deportees. The court found that even though King County wasn’t being commanded to participate in federal enforcement—indeed, it was actively refusing to cooperate—its action crossed the line from permissible non-cooperation into impermissible obstruction of federal operations.

Minnesota’s legal strategy arguably attempted to blur this distinction by characterizing Operation Metro Surge not as a lawful federal enforcement operation that the state could decline to assist, but as an unconstitutional invasion and coercive overreach that created a constitutional violation requiring state resistance.

The argument implies that states possess an affirmative right—or possibly an obligation—to resist what they view as federal constitutional overreach within their borders, whether through litigation, prospective relief, or active obstruction. This would be a major shift in power if courts accept it.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2018) provides some support for this expansive reading. In Murphy, the Court held that a federal law prohibiting states from “authorizing” sports gambling violated the anti-commandeering doctrine because the distinction between commanding a state to pass a law and prohibiting a state from repealing an existing law was “an empty one.”

The Tenth Amendment protects states’ right to make their own laws and to repeal laws without federal interference. Applied to immigration enforcement, this logic might suggest that states might have some power to set rules for federal operations within their borders—such as requiring judicial warrants, limiting force, restricting operations near schools and hospitals—even if they cannot prohibit federal enforcement entirely.

California has created the strongest state laws against federal immigration enforcement through its sanctuary state laws, particularly Senate Bill 54. The law restricts the ability of state and local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration authorities and prohibits immigration detention in most state facilities. Police don’t have to keep people in custody for federal immigration agents unless a judge has signed a warrant, cannot make arrests based on immigration violations alone, and cannot transfer people to ICE custody except in narrowly defined circumstances. Courts rejected Trump administration lawsuits to block these laws, saying states can refuse to help federal enforcement.

Illinois filed a similar lawsuit. Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul emphasized that the federal government deployed armed agents “to force states to comply with his policies and seeking retribution against his political enemies.” Illinois’s litigation strategy mirrors Minnesota’s by focusing not solely on non-cooperation but on challenging the federal government’s apparent intent to coerce state policy change through enforcement operations.

New York and New Jersey issued orders restricting ICE access to state property and requiring judicial warrants for any ICE activity on state facilities. New Jersey’s governor signed an order saying ICE agents can be in public spaces but need a judge’s warrant to enter state buildings.

These orders work differently than sanctuary laws. Instead of limiting police cooperation, they use control of state property to limit where federal agents can go. States retain basic property rights to control access to state property and cannot be compelled to affirmatively facilitate federal operations on state premises without state consent. The difference between using property to help federal enforcement versus using property as a basic state right remains unclear.

Fourth Amendment Violations and Administrative Warrants

Underlying much of the constitutional conflict in Operation Metro Surge is a collision between federal immigration enforcement and traditional Fourth Amendment protections.

A May 2025 ICE memo allowed agents to enter homes using warrants signed by ICE officials instead of judges. This was a major change from how ICE had operated before and raised questions about whether this violated constitutional protections for homes.

The Supreme Court has consistently said homes get the strongest constitutional protection and require judge-signed warrants for entry.

A federal district court in California recently concluded that ICE administrative warrants do not authorize ICE officers to enter homes to conduct arrest operations, finding the warrant wasn’t signed by a judge—a requirement central to Fourth Amendment protections.

But the Trump administration says administrative warrants are enough for immigration arrests—a position that contradicts what courts have previously ruled.

The state’s legal filings emphasized these Fourth Amendment violations as evidence that the operation went beyond constitutional bounds. The state documented instances where federal agents entered private homes without judicial warrants, detained citizens who were later released when their citizenship was verified, and used force in ways that violated Fourth Amendment protections.

Federal courts in the state have responded by enforcing Fourth Amendment limits despite immigration enforcement context. This suggests courts are creating a new legal rule that separates federal authority to enforce immigration laws from federal immunity from Fourth Amendment and rule of law constraints in exercising that authority.

Emerging Constitutional Framework

The constitutional framework emerging from Operation Metro Surge litigation suggests a potential middle ground between unlimited federal enforcement authority and state power to block federal operations.

Federal immigration power is supreme; states can refuse to help; and states might be able to set rules for how federal agents operate.

Under this framework, the president has wide power over immigration and can deploy federal agents to conduct enforcement operations without congressional authorization for specific operations. States can’t block federal agents from federal buildings or prevent federal operations by legislative command.

States can sue to enforce constitutional rules, refuse to help federal enforcement, prosecute federal agents for crimes, and challenge operations that clearly pressure states through force.

Judge Menendez’s decision refusing to stop the operation immediately while admitting the operation was causing serious harm suggested the court recognized these questions but had no clear legal answers. The judge noted that figuring out when federal operations become too big or unconstitutional in terms of type and size remained unclear—courts had no clear way to judge whether 3,000 federal officers was lawful or went beyond what the Constitution allows.

This legal gap will need to be filled by the Supreme Court or appeals courts.

State Prosecution as a Check on Federal Power

States could prosecute federal agents. Courts have allowed states to prosecute federal officials in some situations, limited by the rule that protects federal agents from state prosecution. States can’t prosecute federal officials for things they do as part of their job.

But this protection has limits. If federal officials break federal law or go far beyond their job, states can prosecute.

The question was whether federal agents’ deadly force was part of their job or went so far beyond it that they lost protection.

Minnesota’s Attorney General said the state might prosecute, arguing that the shootings suggested federal agents broke state law for using too much force or killing someone without justification.

The federal government argued that federal agents faced hostile crowds and used force appropriately, so they’re protected from prosecution.

States could use prosecution as a tool to limit federal operations. Operation Metro Surge may establish new precedent regarding the scope of state prosecutorial power as a check on federal enforcement overreach.

The Partial Withdrawal and Unresolved Questions

The Trump administration announced on February 4, 2026, it would withdraw 700 ICE officers from the state, with Border Czar Tom Homan saying the operation would end within weeks. This made the lawsuit more complicated.

The withdrawal could mean the state’s approach worked—lawsuits, political pressure, and protests convinced the federal government to pull back. From another perspective, the withdrawal made many of the state’s legal claims irrelevant, potentially leaving the main legal questions unanswered and creating no legal rule for future operations.

Legal scholars debated whether the withdrawal proved the state was right or whether federal authorities had simply completed their operation. If the administration had already arrested the people it wanted (over 3,000 since December 2025), withdrawal might mean they finished, not that courts stopped them.

If withdrawal happened because of state resistance and legal costs, that would show states can push back through lawsuits.

The fact that the operation might end also complicated the state’s case. If the operation ends before the case is decided, the state might not be able to get a court order preventing future operations. The judge’s decision not to stop the operation immediately because facts were still developing might be the final word, with no court ruling on the actual legal issues.

This creates a problem: the federal government could run big operations, withdraw them before courts rule, then run similar operations elsewhere claiming courts approved them.

The state and other states pursued two strategies at the same time: litigating whether the operation was constitutional even as it wound down, while also seeking court orders to prevent future operations no matter what happened to this one.

Possible Outcomes and Future Litigation

If courts agree that anti-commandeering protects states from operations designed to pressure them, states would gain real power. Future states facing federal enforcement operations would have legal power to challenge how federal agents operate, defend against federal pressure through lawsuits, and potentially limit federal enforcement through coordinated action.

If courts disagree, they would be saying anti-commandeering only protects state resources, not state choices. In that case, states would need to fight back through elections, lobbying Congress, and threatening to reject federal funding.

The most likely outcome is a middle-ground legal rule. States can refuse to help federal enforcement. They can sue to challenge federal operations when federal agents break the law or go beyond their authority. But they can’t stop federal enforcement operations that follow the law and the Constitution.

Under this framework, states could sue for civil rights violations, refuse to help federal enforcement, and prosecute federal agents—but couldn’t stop federal operations or claim they violate state power.

The case will almost certainly be appealed, possibly going to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and maybe the Supreme Court if questions about federal and state power over immigration are important enough.

What’s clear is that the traditional understanding of anti-commandeering doesn’t cover massive federal operations designed to pressure states. Whether courts will expand anti-commandeering to cover this situation remains one of the biggest unanswered questions about state power.

For sanctuary states, the answer will determine whether they can challenge federal enforcement or only refuse to help.

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