The Constitutional Limits on Federal Control of State Elections

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But there’s a problem. The Constitution might not allow it.

The question isn’t whether these policies are good or bad—though plenty of people have strong opinions about that. The question is whether Congress has the legal authority to force states to rebuild their entire election infrastructure according to federal specifications. Based on three decades of Supreme Court decisions limiting federal power over state governments, the answer appears to be no.

What the Constitution Says About Elections

Article I, Section 4 gives Congress explicit power over federal elections. While state legislatures set the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections, Congress can “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”

But “when needed” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. The Elections Clause grants authority over how elections are held—the mechanics, the procedures, the timing. It doesn’t let Congress force states to completely rebuild how they run elections. And it doesn’t override other constitutional protections, particularly the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states.

The Supreme Court acknowledged Congress’s broad authority in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, calling it “paramount.” When Arizona tried to require documentary proof of citizenship beyond what federal registration forms demanded for federal elections, the Court said no in 2013. Federal law overrides conflicting state requirements for federal voter registration. However, a 2024 ruling allowed Arizona to require proof of citizenship on state-specific registration forms used only for state and local elections, clarifying that states retain authority over their own election requirements even as federal law controls federal election procedures.

States keep control over who gets to vote. The difference between how elections work versus who can vote creates the constitutional vulnerability at the heart of the bill.

The Anti-Commandeering Problem

The bill doesn’t set standards. It mandates specific administrative infrastructure.

That’s called commandeering—when the federal government forces states to do something. The Supreme Court has spent three decades making clear that Congress can’t do it.

The doctrine emerged when the Court struck down a federal law that required states to either regulate radioactive waste disposal according to federal standards or take ownership of the waste themselves. Congress had broad authority to regulate waste disposal. But it couldn’t force state legislatures to implement federal policy.

Approximately five years later, the Brady Act required local law enforcement to conduct background checks on gun purchasers. Congress had authority to regulate guns. But it couldn’t conscript state officers to enforce federal law.

Most recently, the Court applied anti-commandeering rules to block a federal law that prevented states from legalizing sports gambling. The law didn’t even require states to do anything—it prohibited them from repealing their gambling bans. Still unconstitutional.

The bill fits this pattern with uncomfortable precision. States would have to build the database. Staff it. Maintain it. Train personnel. Invest in technology infrastructure. Comply with federal specifications for how it functions. All using state resources to implement federal design choices.

Why the Database Mandate Crosses the Line

Previous federal election laws survived constitutional challenges because they regulated outcomes without dictating administrative means. States could use centralized databases or county-level registries. Their choice.

This bill eliminates that flexibility. It requires a single, centralized database serving as the official repository for federal election information. Not standards. Not outcomes. A specific administrative structure.

States can’t realistically maintain separate registration systems for federal versus state elections. The mandated database would necessarily become the registry for all elections. A federal mandate supposedly limited to federal elections would take over state and local election administration entirely.

Congress can set standards for registration under the Elections Clause. It cannot unilaterally commandeer state data systems to create federally specified infrastructure.

The Private Enforcement Problem

The bill contains another constitutional vulnerability: its authorization for private citizens to sue election officials who register voters without required proof of citizenship.

A voter suing under the bill would need to demonstrate injury from an allegedly improper registration. Not that their preferred candidate lost. Not that they’re generally concerned about election integrity. Concrete harm to them personally. That their vote was diluted. That their candidacy was damaged. Something specific.

Most voters couldn’t meet that standard. Most private enforcement actions would fail for lack of standing, regardless of whether the statute authorizes them.

The provision raises due process concerns. Officials performing routine administrative tasks—registering voters according to law—would face personal liability in litigation for following statutory requirements. The Fifth Amendment protects people from being unfairly punished or losing their property. Subjecting officials to unlimited private lawsuits for performing their jobs violates that protection, particularly when the law’s requirements are ambiguous or subject to reasonable interpretation.

What Courts Have Said About Similar Restrictions

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021) upheld Arizona’s voting restrictions despite their unequal effects on different groups. The decision revealed the framework courts use: looking at how much it burdens voters, how different it is from current practice, and who it affects most, along with availability of alternatives and the state’s regulatory interest.

The bill would fail several of these tests. The photo ID requirement would burden millions of Americans without valid identification—particularly elderly citizens, people with disabilities, younger voters, and voters of color. The effective elimination of mail voting represents a dramatic departure from established practice in states that have operated secure mail-ballot systems for years.

Courts have proven skeptical of “election security” framings when evidence shows the harms being prevented don’t exist.

The Supreme Court’s Current Federalism Orientation

The bill arrives at an unfortunate moment for its proponents. The current Supreme Court has demonstrated renewed interest in federalism limits on federal power. At least five justices appear skeptical of expansive federal authority over matters traditionally governed by states.

Recent decisions on administrative law suggest receptiveness to arguments that Congress exceeds its constitutional authority. That framework would apply with particular force to the centralized database mandate—the kind of broad requirement without clear guidelines that courts are increasingly scrutinizing.

The Court’s revival of a rule that Congress must be clear when giving agencies power over huge issues signals skepticism. If Congress delegated implementation of provisions to the Justice Department through executive regulation, courts would require clear congressional authorization for any significant agency interpretation. Federal takeover of state election administration qualifies as an issue of “vast economic and political significance” requiring explicit authorization.

What States Would Argue

States challenging the bill would have multiple constitutional arguments beyond anti-commandeering. The Tenth Amendment reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government. Election administration constitutes a reserved power to the extent Congress hasn’t acted under its Elections Clause authority.

The question becomes whether the Elections Clause grants authority broad enough to commandeer state administrative systems. The text doesn’t clearly answer that. It grants power over “Times, Places and Manner”—not over the internal structure of state governments.

States might invoke the principle that courts should read laws in a way that doesn’t create constitutional conflicts if possible. Rather than reading the Elections Clause to permit forcing states to restructure their systems, courts should read it to permit only regulation of federal election procedures and standards, leaving implementation means to state choice.

States could raise concerns about how Congress uses its power to give money to states if the bill conditions federal funding on compliance. The federal government can only attach strings to money if it’s crystal clear what it’s requiring. If the bill imposes new requirements without corresponding federal funding, or if compliance costs become coercive, courts might strike it down on Spending Clause grounds.

How This Would Play Out

If enacted, the bill would face immediate constitutional challenges. Multiple states’ attorneys general would file suits in federal district courts within days.

The strongest argument: anti-commandeering. The centralized database mandate violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring states to create and maintain specific administrative systems according to federal specifications. This argument is grounded in clear Supreme Court precedent and doesn’t require courts to redefine the Elections Clause’s scope.

The government would argue that the Elections Clause grants Congress authority to regulate federal election mechanics, including registration systems. They’d distinguish the cases, arguing that unlike the Brady Act’s commandeering of individual officers or the federal sports gambling law’s prohibition on state legislation, this bill merely sets standards for federal election registration. States remain free to organize their election administration however they wish for state and local elections.

That distinction would fail. The bill requires a single, centralized database serving as the official registry for federal elections. States cannot practically maintain two separate registration systems. The bill’s practical effect is to commandeer state election administration systems, regardless of its formal limitation to federal elections.

The Cato Institute’s analysis concluded: “The MEGA Act, like President Trump’s executive order and like the For The People Act supported by Democrats in 2021, violates principles of federalism. Election administration is one of the few remaining areas of American policy that is still largely determined by the states.”

If a district court strikes down the centralized database requirement on anti-commandeering grounds, the government would appeal to a circuit court, and the case would reach the Supreme Court. Given the Court’s recent federalism decisions, a majority seems probable to uphold the district court and strike down at least the centralized database provision.

Whether the entire bill would fall or whether courts would strike down the problematic part and leave other parts intact would depend on whether the bill contains a statement saying that if one part of the law is struck down, the rest can still stand, and whether other provisions can function independently.

The Constitutional Line That Matters

Congress possesses broad authority under the Elections Clause to regulate federal elections. But that authority has limits based on the Tenth Amendment and how the Constitution divides power between federal and state governments.

The bill crosses those limits. Not through its photo ID requirements or ballot deadline restrictions—those regulate procedures for federal elections and fall within Congress’s Elections Clause authority. But through its mandate that states create and maintain centralized databases according to federal specifications.

That’s commandeering. It requires states to build new administrative infrastructure and structure their systems according to federal design. It exceeds Elections Clause authority and violates the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states.

Courts would likely strike down the centralized database requirement while potentially upholding other provisions. The current Supreme Court’s federalism orientation makes it receptive to constitutional limits on federal election authority. States would retain control over their registration infrastructure, though Congress could still regulate specific procedures and standards for federal elections.

Congress has power to regulate federal elections. But that power is not unlimited. This bill ventures into unconstitutional territory by commandeering state administrative systems rather than merely regulating federal election procedures. The Constitution draws a line between those two things. This bill crosses it.

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