What the Supreme Court’s Trucking Safety Case Means for Accident Victims

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The accident location and details are disputed among sources—some indicate Illinois, others Oklahoma, and the date of 2017 is not confirmed in available records. The Supreme Court will decide if Montgomery can hold accountable not just the driver and trucking company, but the broker who chose that company to haul the freight. Does federal law override state negligence claims against freight brokers?

The case, Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, has split federal appeals courts down the middle. Federal appeals courts disagree about what a five-word phrase in a 1994 trucking deregulation law—”with respect to motor vehicles”—means: does it protect your right to sue the middlemen who select carriers, or eliminate it completely? The answer will reshape liability across the industry and determine whether accident victims can reach the deep pockets of freight brokers, or whether those brokers get federal immunity for their hiring decisions.

Circuit Split on Broker Liability

In the Ninth Circuit, covering the West Coast, Miller v. C.H. Robinson held in 2020 that negligent selection claims against brokers fall within a “safety exception” to a federal rule that overrides state law. If you’re injured in California or Oregon, you can sue the broker who hired an unsafe carrier.

The Seventh Circuit, covering Illinois and Wisconsin, reached the opposite conclusion. In January 2025, the panel ruled that a 1994 federal law about trucking preempts these claims because brokers don’t operate vehicles themselves. Same accident, same injuries, different circuit: no lawsuit against the broker.

The Eleventh Circuit went the other way in 2023, ruling in Aspen American Insurance v. Landstar Ranger that such claims don’t qualify as regulations “with respect to motor vehicles.”

What Brokers Do

Freight brokers are middlemen. They don’t own trucks. They don’t employ drivers. They connect shippers who need cargo moved with motor carriers who can move it. When a broker chooses which carrier gets the job, they’re making a decision with life-and-death consequences.

Motor carriers have dramatically different safety records. Can state law hold them accountable for making that choice negligently?

The industry argues brokers cannot feasibly investigate every carrier’s safety record beyond checking that they have federal operating authority. Plaintiffs’ lawyers counter that brokers have easy access to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration databases showing crash rates, inspection scores, and out-of-service violations for every carrier. Basic due diligence means looking at that publicly available information before handing someone a load.

The 1994 Trucking Law and the Five-Word Dispute

The legal fight centers on a section of federal trucking law. The statute says states cannot enforce laws “related to a price, route, or service” of motor carriers or brokers. Congress wanted uniform national rules for interstate trucking, not fifty different state regulatory schemes.

Congress included an exception: the preemption “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Five words—”with respect to motor vehicles”—are doing all the work here. Does a negligent hiring claim against a broker constitute state safety regulation “with respect to motor vehicles”? Or does it fall outside that exception because brokers don’t themselves operate vehicles?

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits read those five words narrowly. They say “with respect to motor vehicles” means regulations that directly govern vehicle operation—speed limits, weight restrictions, driver licensing, hours of service. Claims against brokers, who never touch a steering wheel, don’t qualify. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits read the same phrase broadly. They say state tort law regulating who selects carriers is fundamentally about motor vehicle safety, even if the defendant isn’t behind the wheel. Congress preserved states’ “safety regulatory authority,” and traditional state court liability for careless behavior has always been part of how states regulate safety.

Montgomery’s Legal Arguments

Montgomery’s legal team filed a brief with a straightforward textual argument. If the exception does not apply to brokers because they’re not explicitly listed, it logically would not apply to manufacturers, insurers, or anyone else in the transportation chain either. That would render the exception nearly meaningless.

The brief emphasizes that when brokers negligently select an unsafe carrier, they’re making decisions about which vehicles will be on the road and who will operate them. That’s conduct “with respect to motor vehicles” even if the broker never drives one. The alternative interpretation—that only people who physically operate vehicles can be subject to state safety regulation—would create gaps in state authority to protect their citizens.

The brief points out that Congress knows how to exclude specific entities from statutory provisions when it wants to. If Congress intended to exclude brokers from the safety exception, it could have said so. It did not.

Different states have adopted different legal standards regarding broker liability, and this variation reflects legitimate state policy judgments—exactly the kind of diversity that federalism is supposed to protect when Congress has not clearly preempted it.

The Industry’s Legal Arguments

The Transportation Intermediaries Association and industry groups are making three main arguments. First, they say negligent hiring claims are “related to” a broker’s “service” of arranging transportation. A claim that a broker negligently performed its core service—selecting a carrier—falls squarely within the preemption clause. The safety exception does not save it because brokers don’t operate motor vehicles.

Second, they argue that allowing these claims would create state-by-state regulatory variation. Some states might impose strict liability for any accident involving a selected carrier. Others might require proof of knowledge of specific safety problems. Still others might develop intermediate standards. Brokers would need different hiring practices in different states, depending on how state courts defined the duty of care.

Third, they argue that brokers cannot conduct the level of independent safety audits that plaintiffs’ theories would require. Brokers are logistics coordinators, not safety experts. The federal government has already determined that a carrier is fit to operate by granting it operating authority. Imposing additional common law duties to investigate carriers beyond federal requirements would force brokers to second-guess federal safety determinations, undermining regulatory authority and creating perverse incentives to make carrier selections based on litigation risk rather than efficiency.

The industry also emphasizes practical consequences. If brokers face negligent hiring liability, they’ll likely hire fewer carriers—particularly smaller ones without established safety track records—thereby reducing competition and raising prices for shippers. Insurance costs would rise as liability insurers adjust pricing to reflect broader exposure. These costs would ultimately flow to consumers.

Trucking Safety Trends

The industry’s efficiency arguments would be more persuasive if trucking safety were not getting worse.

The industry’s core argument is: trust federal regulation. But federal regulation of broker safety practices is minimal. FMCSA regulations require brokers to maintain records, comply with advertising standards, and avoid conflicts of interest with shippers. They don’t impose specific requirements for how brokers should vet carrier safety records before hiring them. If federal law does not require brokers to check safety data, and state law cannot hold them liable for failing to check it, what incentive do they have to look?

The industry says market forces provide sufficient incentives—brokers who consistently select unsafe carriers will lose business. But the victims of crashes involving negligently selected carriers don’t benefit from market discipline that happens after they’re dead or permanently disabled.

Financial Impact on Accident Victims

Under current law in most jurisdictions, you can sue motor carriers and drivers directly. The preemption issue concerns only whether you can also hold brokers liable for negligently selecting those carriers.

Motor carriers vary dramatically in financial resources. A small, under-capitalized carrier might not carry sufficient liability insurance to cover catastrophic injuries. Federal minimum insurance requirements are $750,000 for most interstate carriers—a number that appears adequate until compared to lifetime medical care costs for a spinal cord injury or traumatic brain damage. By contrast, large freight brokers like C.H. Robinson typically carry far more substantial insurance coverage.

If brokers cannot be held liable, your recovery depends entirely on whether the carrier and driver have sufficient insurance and assets to satisfy a judgment. In Montgomery’s case, the truck was operated by Caribe Transport, selected by C.H. Robinson. If the Seventh Circuit’s preemption ruling stands, Montgomery can sue Caribe and the driver, but not C.H. Robinson—regardless of how negligent the broker’s selection process was. If Caribe’s insurance is inadequate, Montgomery bears the shortfall.

Greta Cox was killed when a truck operated by Golden Transit, selected by Total Quality Logistics, collided with her vehicle. Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, her estate would have no claim against TQL—only against Golden Transit and the driver. Under the Sixth Circuit’s rule, which applied to Cox’s case, the estate could potentially recover from the broker as well.

Key Questions for Oral Argument

First: Is “with respect to motor vehicles” an inclusive phrase that sweeps in all safety regulations involving vehicles, or an exclusive phrase that applies only to regulations directly governing vehicle operation? The text does not clearly resolve this.

Second: Should courts defer to the FMCSA’s certification that motor carriers are fit to operate, or allow state tort law to impose additional screening duties on brokers? If federal regulators have determined a carrier is safe enough to operate, does allowing state tort liability undermine that federal judgment? Or does it appropriately supplement federal regulation that was never designed to be exclusive?

Third: If negligent hiring claims are not preempted, what about negligent supervision claims against brokers? What about negligent investigation claims? Could a shipper sue a broker for failing to conduct sufficient due diligence? The justices will likely examine whether there’s a principled distinction between preempted claims about broker “services” and non-preempted claims about safety, or whether the distinction ultimately collapses.

Fourth: Does the FMCSA’s regulatory scheme give brokers enough incentive to select safe carriers? Or does federal regulation leave gaps that state tort law has traditionally filled? The answer depends partly on whether you think market forces and federal oversight adequately protect safety, or whether the threat of state tort liability provides an additional necessary incentive.

Broader Preemption Doctrine Implications

Montgomery goes beyond trucking. The case will clarify how courts should interpret statutory language limiting exceptions to preemption—guidance that will affect numerous other federal statutes containing broad preemption clauses with safety exceptions, including aviation, railroad, and maritime regulations.

Should judges apply a presumption against preemption when interpreting exceptions to clear preemption clauses, or should they apply neutral tools of statutory interpretation focusing on plain language? Federal preemption doctrine has grappled with this question for decades. The Supreme Court has said that what Congress intended is the key question in every preemption case, but determining that purpose is often difficult and disputed when Congress has included both a broad preemption clause and a safety exception.

The case also raises questions about the relationship between federal commerce regulation and state consumer protection law. The statute preserved a safety exception, reflecting Congress’s recognition that states have a role in protecting their citizens from dangerous conditions. How the Court resolves this tension will affect administrative law broadly.

Possible Outcomes

A decision will likely be issued by June 2026.

If the Court rules for Montgomery, holding that federal trucking law does not preempt state negligent hiring claims, brokers operating in all fifty states will face potential liability under state law, subject to whatever standards of care state courts develop. Insurance costs will likely rise. Brokers will probably conduct more extensive due diligence on carrier safety records—or hire fewer carriers to reduce exposure. Safety might improve. Prices might increase.

If the Court rules for C.H. Robinson, upholding preemption, brokers will have certainty that they cannot be held liable under state negligence law for hiring decisions, provided they comply with minimal federal regulations. Litigation costs and insurance premiums would likely decrease. But accident victims in crashes involving broker-selected carriers would lose access to one potential source of compensation—and one potential incentive for brokers to vet carrier safety would disappear.

Congress could respond either way. A ruling for preemption might prompt legislation explicitly carving out negligent selection claims from federal trucking law’s preemption provision. A ruling against preemption might prompt legislation narrowing the safety exception to limit broker liability. The FMCSA might adjust its broker regulations to include explicit safety requirements for carrier vetting, providing federal standards to replace state tort law variation.

The Core Question

When someone is catastrophically injured because a freight broker hired a trucking company with a terrible safety record, should that victim have the right to hold the broker accountable under state law?

The industry says no—federal law should protect brokers from state liability to preserve uniform national regulation and prevent a patchwork of different state standards. Victims say yes—states have always used tort law to regulate safety, and there’s no clear congressional intent to eliminate that traditional authority when brokers make negligent hiring decisions with deadly consequences.

The Supreme Court will pick one. For people affected by crashes involving broker-selected carriers, the Court’s decision will determine whether they can sue for compensation from the broker who selected that carrier, or whether federal law gives that broker immunity for its hiring decisions.

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