Federal Law Enforcement Shootings Face Almost No Outside Review. Here’s Why.

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When a Border Patrol agent shot Alex Pretti in Minneapolis, federal authorities blocked state investigators from the scene. No written explanation. No published standard.

These decisions expose something most Americans don’t realize: federal law enforcement operates under an entirely different accountability system than local police. When a city cop shoots someone, multiple independent agencies can step in. When a federal agent does, almost no one outside the federal government can touch the case.

This isn’t an oversight. It’s how the system was designed.

Local Police Accountability vs. Federal Agents

A Minneapolis police officer fires their weapon. Within hours, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension arrives—a state agency with no connection to the Minneapolis Police Department. They take over the crime scene. The Hennepin County Attorney can bring state charges. If the county declines, the Minnesota Attorney General can step in. And federal prosecutors, through the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, can bring federal civil rights charges if they believe constitutional violations occurred.

Multiple different entities, each with independent authority. Any one can pursue charges regardless of what the others decide.

When an immigration officer shoots someone under identical circumstances, one federal agency reviews another: the FBI steps in. The Civil Rights Division decides whether to open a probe—the same Justice Department that employs the shooter’s agency. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General conducts a parallel review, but it’s still part of the federal structure.

The Hennepin County Attorney can’t file murder charges. They’d have to work through complex questions about the balance of power between federal and state governments—specifically, whether states can even prosecute federal officials for on-duty conduct.

This structural difference exists for one reason: federal agencies have never accepted external scrutiny, and federal law was written to let federal agencies avoid outside review.

Supremacy Clause Immunity

A legal shield called Supremacy Clause immunity protects federal agents from state prosecution. The doctrine comes from the Constitution’s assertion that federal law trumps state law. Under this framework, an officer who reasonably believes their actions are authorized by federal law receives protection from state prosecution. State police officers don’t get this shield when they act under state authority.

Lower courts have held that agents enjoy immunity from state criminal prosecution, but have also acknowledged the immunity “has limits”—particularly when conduct is so clearly not part of their job that it can’t reasonably be characterized as within official duties.

When Minnesota’s Bureau of Criminal Apprehension tried to access evidence after Alex Pretti’s death, federal authorities blocked them entirely, asserting federal jurisdiction and control. When state prosecutors sought a temporary restraining order to preserve evidence, federal lawyers argued that states have no role in probing federal shootings. A federal judge eventually issued the order, but the underlying question—whether states can prosecute agents—remains unresolved.

Agents know their conduct will be reviewed by federal colleagues, evaluated by federal prosecutors, and potentially defended by federal attorneys in federal court. Every layer of review operates within a single institutional framework with shared command structures.

A state trooper faces something entirely different. Their conduct might be reviewed by an independent state agency, evaluated by a different county prosecutor’s office, examined by a state attorney general, and subject to federal civil rights prosecution by a separate federal agency. Legal scholars call this competition among prosecutors—when multiple prosecutors can independently pursue the same case, creating pressure because one prosecutor knows that if they decline, another with independent authority might pursue it.

Agents face no such competition.

Opaque Decision-Making Standards

When the DOJ decides whether to open a civil rights probe into a federal shooting, it applies what Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche described as determining whether they have enough reason to investigate. What constitutes enough reason? According to what standard? Applied by whom? Based on what evidence?

The DOJ won’t say. Blanche declined to explain his reasoning in the Good case beyond citing the agent’s self-defense claim.

Unlike state prosecutors, who typically announce declining prosecutions with public statements explaining their reasoning, the federal decision to decline a probe into a civilian death can be announced in a television interview without any underlying memorandum available for review.

No one outside the DOJ can audit whether “basis” decisions are made consistently, whether they’re influenced by political considerations, or whether they’re driven by pressure to protect their own agency rather than investigate it fairly.

When ProPublica and The Trace examined federal immigration agent shootings, they found substantial variance in how agencies characterized incidents and whether federal prosecutors opened probes. While their investigation documented patterns in reporting and outcomes, the lack of published criteria or decision-making frameworks means there’s no way for the public, Congress, or state authorities to verify whether the variance reflects appropriate judgment or institutional bias.

Asymmetric Prosecution: Protesters vs. Officers

Civil rights attorney Nekima Valdez Levy-Armstrong and other protesters were arrested and charged under a federal law called the Restoration of Lawful Order Act for their participation in a church-based demonstration. Prosecutors argued that their presence at a church where an ICE official worked constituted obstruction of the church’s religious function. The charges assert that entering a church to protest immigration actions violates the constitutional rights of church attendees by preventing them from practicing their religion—despite video evidence showing worship services continued during the protest.

The statute was originally written to protect abortion clinics from those seeking to obstruct or intimidate people accessing services. It has been used to prosecute anti-abortion protesters who block clinic entrances. It’s now been deployed to prosecute civil rights activists who entered a church to protest immigration policies.

There is no example in federal law of the FACE Act being used to prosecute agents for actions that obstruct religious worship. Yet the same statute that protects freedom of worship has been applied to criminalize protest against agents who gather at places of worship.

A state prosecutor deploying a worship obstruction statute to prosecute protesters would face intense scrutiny from civil rights organizations, appellate courts, and likely the state’s own attorney general. Federal prosecutors face no such pressure.

At least six federal prosecutors in Minnesota’s U.S. Attorney’s office resigned rather than participate in prosecuting protest-related charges while federal shooting deaths remained under review. These resignations reflect professional judgment that prosecutorial priorities were inverted.

Why States Cannot Prosecute Federal Agents

State prosecutors cannot easily charge agents, even for conduct that would unambiguously constitute criminal homicide if committed by a state police officer.

A federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1442) allows federal officials to remove criminal prosecutions from state court to federal court if the prosecution relates to the officer’s employment and the officer can raise some plausible claim that federal law allowed their actions. This removal mechanism means that even if a state prosecutor charges an agent, the case will be transferred to federal court, where the defendant can argue immunity.

The immunity question that then arises: did the officer reasonably believe the fatal shooting was authorized by federal law? Federal law authorizes ICE agents and Border Patrol officers to make arrests and use force to apprehend persons believed to be in the country illegally. If an agent reasonably believed the person they shot was engaged in criminal conduct and posed a threat, the agent can argue the shooting was authorized by this authorization.

The question of whether the shooting was justified under constitutional rules about when police can use force becomes secondary. The primary question is whether the agent reasonably believed the force was permitted by their federal employment.

Minnesota officials confronted this barrier directly after Alex Pretti was shot. The state’s attorney general and local prosecutors began looking into whether to bring state criminal charges for murder. But they quickly realized they faced a legal problem: if they charged the Border Patrol agents, the agents would remove the case to federal court, assert Supremacy Clause immunity, and the state would have to prove that the agents’ conduct was so egregiously unreasonable that it couldn’t possibly have been authorized by federal law.

The legal authorities on Supremacy Clause immunity come from court cases decided in the 1800s and early 1900s, before modern constitutional doctrine on use of force evolved. Federal courts have not clearly established what showing a state must make to overcome an officer’s immunity claim, what evidence is relevant, or what standard applies.

California’s Attorney General Rob Bonta issued guidance reminding state and local law enforcement that they retain authority to pursue agents for state crimes. But he acknowledged that this authority has become obscured by federal agency assertions of exclusive control. Bonta noted that federal and state agencies had historically collaborated on probes that resulted in both federal and state charges, but said the Trump administration’s conduct in Minnesota demonstrated that “cooperation in the conduct of such investigations can no longer be expected from the federal government.”

Bonta suggested states should reassert their jurisdiction and file charges regardless of federal objections. But this remains risky given the uncertainty of federal immunity doctrine and the practical barriers state prosecutors face in accessing evidence controlled by agencies.

Internal Review Mechanisms and Their Limitations

The FBI has established a Shooting Incident Review Group that examines officer-involved incidents and determines whether force was justified. ICE has an Office of Professional Responsibility that conducts an internal review to see if agency rules were broken. The Department of Homeland Security has an Office of Inspector General that conducts independent reviews.

These internal mechanisms are designed primarily for administrative purposes—determining whether agency policy was violated and what discipline should result—rather than pursuing criminal liability. An internal review asks whether an officer violated agency rules. A criminal probe asks whether the officer committed a crime. The standards are different, the evidence gathered may be different, and the outcomes diverge. An agency can determine that an officer violated policy but should face only administrative discipline, while the same conduct might constitute criminal homicide under state or federal law.

Internal review mechanisms have limited independence. An FBI investigator is an agent reporting to federal supervisors. An ICE investigator works within ICE’s hierarchy. The DHS Inspector General, while officially supposed to be independent, still reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

A state police officer reviewed by an independent state agency answering to a governor, then examined by a county prosecutor answering to elected constituents, then subject to potential federal review by the Civil Rights Division, experiences multiple layers of scrutiny by officials with no loyalty to the agency being examined. An agent reviewed internally by colleagues experiences pressure to find the conduct justified, because punishing officers too harshly might upset other federal agents.

In Renee Good’s case, ICE and DHS leadership determined the shooting was justified self-defense within days of the incident, before any independent review had been conducted. The characterization of Good’s vehicle movements as an attempted attack appears not to have been based on forensic analysis of vehicle trajectory or speeds, but rather on the ICE agent’s own account of events.

A Minnesota judge issued a temporary restraining order requiring the federal government to preserve evidence because there was concern that federal authorities were “destroying or altering evidence”—suggesting the probe itself might not be credible.

Unlike state or local police agencies, which typically publish use-of-force reports, release video evidence, and allow public scrutiny of discipline decisions, agencies maintain tight control over information about shootings. The federal government has refused to release the names of the Border Patrol agents who shot Alex Pretti, making it impossible for state prosecutors to charge them or for journalists to examine their history of force. Agencies classify documents related to ongoing probes, preventing public understanding of what evidence exists or what steps have been taken.

The Absence of Federal Use-of-Force Data

The FBI created a National Use-of-Force Data Collection in 2019 to provide nationwide statistics on law enforcement use-of-force incidents. This voluntary program asks agencies nationwide to report on incidents that result in death, serious bodily injury, or discharge of a firearm. About 78% of police agencies nationwide report their data as of 2025, with participation from 94 federal agencies and state and local agencies representing 68% of the total officer population.

Federal participation remains incomplete and fragmented. ICE and CBP report data, but not uniformly, and with gaps in the information submitted. The DEA, ATF, and other agencies participate sporadically.

The program counts how many times agents shoot, but not what happens next. It doesn’t track how many federal shootings result in probes, how many result in charges, or how many result in convictions. State-level data collection efforts often include information about prosecutions and discipline, allowing the public and policymakers to measure accountability. Federal data collection does not.

The Trace, an investigative outlet focused on gun violence, has undertaken manual data collection of federal immigration agent shootings since 2025, because no federal or aggregate data exists. The Trace identified 39 incidents in 2025 in which agents shot someone, held them at gunpoint, or used less-lethal munitions, resulting in at least three deaths and five injuries. But The Trace acknowledges this number is certainly an undercount, because data is collected from media reports and public sources. Incidents that receive no news coverage aren’t captured.

New York City publishes annual reports on police use of force, discipline, and outcomes. California requires state law enforcement to publicly report data on officer-involved shootings. Texas mandates reporting of “officer-involved injury or death” incidents. These states’ data collection requirements emerged after George Floyd’s murder in 2020, from recognition that without data, accountability mechanisms cannot function.

Federal law enforcement has made no similar commitment to transparency. The absence of federal-level data collection on use-of-force outcomes means no one can determine whether the internal review mechanisms that do exist are constraining agents or whether federal shootings are increasing or decreasing.

Congress has attempted to address this gap. A bill called the Civilian Police Accountability Law would require federal, state, and local agencies to report information about misconduct allegations, probes, and outcomes. The bill specifically seeks to create transparency about the costs of police misconduct settlements and judgments, recognizing that financial data might reveal patterns that misconduct data obscures.

Similar bills have been introduced after high-profile police use-of-force incidents, but federal police accountability legislation has consistently failed to advance.

Available Remedies for Victims of State Police vs. Federal Agents

If a state police officer shoots a civilian, that civilian’s family can pursue multiple avenues simultaneously. They can file a state criminal complaint, initiating a state murder probe. They can file a federal civil rights complaint asking the DOJ to investigate. They can file a civil lawsuit against the officer and the state agency under federal civil rights law, seeking damages. They can petition for a state civil rights probe by the state attorney general. They can demand a civilian review board examination in their municipality. They can petition for a probe into whether an agency has a pattern of misconduct by the DOJ into the state police agency as a whole. They can contact their state legislators and federal representatives, who have oversight authority over state and local law enforcement.

If an immigration agent shoots a civilian, almost none of these mechanisms apply.

The civilian cannot file a state criminal complaint for an agent’s conduct; state prosecutors lack clear authority to prosecute. The civilian cannot seek a state civil rights probe; state attorneys general generally lack jurisdiction over agents. The civilian can file a federal civil rights complaint, but the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division decides whether to pursue it, and can decline without explanation. The civilian can sue in federal court for damages, but the agent can use legal defenses that get cases thrown out before trial, and if those immunity doctrines apply, the case is dismissed. The civilian cannot petition for a civilian review board probe, because agencies don’t have civilian review boards. The family can contact their federal representatives, but Congress has limited oversight over federal law enforcement decisions.

State police are subject to multiple overlapping systems of review and potential accountability, each operating independently, each with incentives to pursue cases if previous authorities have declined. Agents are subject to a single system of review operating within the federal government, with no independent external pressure, no possibility of state prosecution or review, and no obligation to explain declining prosecution decisions.

Structural Barriers to Reform

Agencies themselves strongly resist external review, calling outside review an attack on federal authority. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have resisted outside review and resisted calls for transparency or external oversight. Congress has failed repeatedly to pass legislation requiring agencies to report use-of-force data or submit to probes into whether an agency has a pattern of misconduct. State governments have attempted to reassert jurisdiction over agents, but have faced legal barriers and practical obstacles.

The structural barriers to accountability—Supremacy Clause immunity, agencies’ control over evidence and probes, prosecutorial power with no transparency requirement, absence of federal civilian review boards—would require substantial legislative reform to overcome.

Congress would need to pass legislation requiring agencies to report use-of-force data publicly. Congress would need to clarify the scope of Supremacy Clause immunity for agents, explicitly permitting state prosecution for conduct that violates state law regardless of federal authorization. Congress would need to establish external review mechanisms, whether through independent civilian review boards, inspector general offices with genuine independence from agency leadership, or mandatory civil rights probes when agents cause civilian deaths.

Some states have begun to act unilaterally. California’s Attorney General has asserted state authority to pursue agents, regardless of federal objections, on the theory that states retain authority over state crimes. Minnesota has similarly asserted its authority to examine federal shootings, though federal authorities have resisted cooperation. But without congressional action to clarify the balance of power between federal and state governments and without federal courts definitively ruling on state authority, state efforts to prosecute agents will remain legally uncertain and practically difficult.

Agents know that scrutiny of their conduct will be conducted by federal colleagues, that probes will be kept confidential, that the standards for declining review are opaque, and that external authorities lack effective means to challenge federal determinations.

The deaths of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, the arrest of Nekima Valdez Levy-Armstrong for protesting federal authority, and the resignation of federal prosecutors who could no longer participate in a system they viewed as unjust demonstrate the consequences of this accountability gap.

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